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NOTES UPON A STUDY IN THE PEDAGOGY OF MISSIONS.

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“Or is God the God of Jews only? Is He not the God of Gentiles also? Yea, of Gentiles also; if so be that God is one.”—PAUL.

“God sends His teachers unto every age,
To every clime, and every race of men,
With revelations fitted to their growth
And shape of mind, nor gives the realm of truth
Unto the selfish rule of one sole race:
Therefore each form of worship that hath swayed
The life of man, and given it to grasp
The master-key of knowledge, reverence,
Infolds some germs of goodness and of right;
Else never had the eager soul, which loathes
The slothful down of pampered ignorance,
Found in it even a moment's fitful rest.”—LOWELL.

“I came not to destroy but to fulfill.”—JESUS.

Among many features that have characterized the XIXth century, the movement of missions is conspicuous. At the dawn of a new century the movement continues, but with a need increasingly realized. During the last fifty years the beginnings of a new science have appeared; and to-day the science of comparative religion is taking shape

(Note: These notes are but the tentative presentation of what it is hoped may, with added material and further study, develop helpfully for those engaged in winning men unto Truth. Thanks are due to President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University, for kind and sympathetic counsel, and to the many upon mission fields

to satisfy the demands of a healthful religious scholarship. Whereas, in the past the materials for such a science were non-existent, or at least inaccessible, recent years have, by the discoveries in history, archæology, and anthropology as well as by the contributions of missions, supplied abundant data for scientific classification. This classification has been attempted by many; but, so far as I know, pedagogical suggestions for the practical application of discovered principles have not been drawn. Of such suggestions, mission workers and especially those in preparation for mission work are in need.

He who would present his own religious faith to another most convincingly, or enrich his own from another's experience, must understand that other's religious conceptions sympathetically. He also needs to know the points of approach and contact where truth may meet truth for impartation and completion, the state of psychic development and religious experience of those whom he seeks to teach that he may correctly judge the truth suited to their needs and the fit method for its presentation. He needs to understand and appreciate the psychic basis of religion which, if it proves the same in all men as men, will within himself afford the key to every brother's soul. Something of this the successful missionary has gained more or less unconsciously by experience. The man in training needs it for his equipment; and the following study, in which only a beginning has been made, is undertaken with the purpose of affording some slight contribution toward a body of pedagogical suggestions for the help of those preparing for mission service.

To mission workers and native Christians in other lands is the credit due for any value there may be herein, for from their replies to a series of questions the suggestions are tentatively drawn.

A review of contributions to comparative religion reveals two types of mind that have been engaged in the study. In 1858 Hardwick pro-

who by their co-operation have provided material for the study. While a study of the broadest possible field is necessary for a complete deduction, these notes have reference more particularly to Japan, since from that field, material has thus far been more abundantly obtained.

The purpose of the endeavor is the better equipment of men, through a more sympathetic understanding of those with whom they are to work, to guide the upward development of individuals and faiths unto their stature in Jesus and his Revelation.)

duced his "Christ and Other Masters." His position was that of "Christian Advocate" in King's College, Cambridge; and as an advocate he wrote. In his preface he declares: "I hope that no assailant of Revealed Religion, with whom it is my duty to contend, will ever find his arguments misrepresented; and if in any case I manifest what seems to him a needless warmth of feeling, my apology must be the strong conviction which I entertain as to the sacredness of Christianity." On page 243 of the 1891 edition, when writing of the possible analogies to be found between Christian and non-Christian religions, he asks: "What is the general nature of these points of contact?" And answers: "They are for the most part discernible in the genuine dogmas of revealed religion, but in later depravations of it,—not in Hebraism as founded on the ancient Scriptures and embodied in the temple service, not in Christianity as once for all delivered by the Lord and His Apostles to the keeping of the early church, but in some schools and systems, drawing their original life from these, yet leavened and corrupted by other elements of foreign or extrinsic growth. Nor will the bare existence of such resemblances be a matter of surprise to him who soberly reflects upon the way in which they are produced. As soon as ever the mind of man is anxious to break loose from what is supernaturally revealed; as soon as ever the authority within him is suffered to resist and overrule the authority without him, he at once relapses, in the same proportion, to a state of nature. The religious system he constructs is so far standing on a level with heathenism."

Mr. James S. Dennis (*Christian Missions and Social Progress*, 1897, Vol. 2, p. 3) says: "The fact has been perhaps sufficiently clear to us that non-Christian society, left to its own tendencies, uniformly and persistently goes the way of moral deterioration and sinks into decadence, with no hope of self-reformation." (p. 5) "Christianity must begin by making its own environment. It enters the precincts of heathenism alone, with no basis to work upon, and, entering, is at once surrounded by an unwelcome spirit and a hostile, and in many respects morally objectionable social system."

On the other hand, James Freeman Clarke in his *Ten Great Religions*, holding comparative theology to be in reality "The science of missions," declares that (p. 9) "we shall find them (ethnic religions) always feeling after God, often finding him. We shall see that in their origin they are not the work of priestcraft, but of human nature;

. in their doctrines true more frequently than false; in their moral tendency good rather than evil. And instead of degenerating toward something worse, they came to prepare the way for something better."

Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall, President of Union Theological Seminary, Barrows lecturer to India and Japan (1903), said in an address before the annual meeting of the American Board last Oct. (1903): "I believe that the appreciation of non-Christian religious experience must be far more generally conceded as an element in the future of missions if the problem of evangelizing the world is to be dealt with effectively. The foundations of this spirit of sympathetic appreciation are: The study of comparative religion; belief in the universal working of the Holy Spirit, and recognition of the many points of contact that occur in the religious experience of the world."

A. H. Bradford, D.D. (Moderator), of the National Council of Congregational churches, writes in the *Booklover* of Dec., 1903: "Religion is the answer to the deepest longings of the human soul. It is the response which a rational being receives when he interrogates the Unseen. The savage asks the same from his fetich as the Christian from the Heavenly Father. The Buddhist priest praying in the interior of China, the Hindu as he meditates in the awful silences of the Himalayas, the Parsee who prostrates himself as the sun rises in his splendor, and the peasant kneeling before his crucifix by an Alpine roadside, are all inquiring what answer the Supernatural has to give to the world-wide aspiration of those who live on the earth. Few Christian students now fail to detect intimations of the message of Jesus in the older religions. Missionaries in these days are not sent out to condemn the non-Christian faiths. They teach that even if they are "broken lights" they are still true lights. The great missionaries, leaders of all schools of thought believe that Buddha, Mohammed, Zoroaster, like John the Baptist, were providentially raised up to prepare the way among their own people for clearer revelations of truth than they had before known. They recognize the common religious experience, and are endeavoring more widely to open the doors which true prophets of God in elder ages have unlocked."

The Dean of a Christian Divinity School in a non-Christian land says: "I believe most heartily in a sympathetic approach of any religion. There are points of contact between any religion, no matter how

low in the scale it may stand, and Christianity. I do not think we have carried on our missionary work in any scientific manner. We have been sowers casting our seed broadcast rather than fishers of men. But, perhaps, the times were not ripe for any other kind of work. To-day they are."

These quotations have been made with special regard to the fact that they are from those who view their subject from an intensely practical standpoint, and as men personally interested in the spread of Truth which they believe to be most perfectly expressed in the Christian faith. We cannot doubt that to the sympathetic mind belongs the future. Such seem to imply that the day has come when the Christian missionary, "knowing the fact and having sympathy of heart, shall say to men of other faith, you are already on your way toward God, your religion came from him and was inspired by his Spirit; now he sends you something more and higher by his Son, who does not come to destroy but to fulfill, not to take away any good thing you have, but to add to it something better."

On the side of those not personally engaged in the spread of Christian truth, but interested in the problems of comparative religion from a more philosophic view point, the testimony is becoming increasingly emphatic not only that there are great universal facts in human nature which form the basis of varied beliefs and to which the teaching of any religious truth must be applied, but also that every religion developed in the experience of man, has emphasized elements of truth that fit in with others to make a well-rounded whole. Religion is seen to be a normal experience of man, based upon his very nature and answering to certain facts in his environment as a human being. As a human experience it is "more than any positive form under which it has appeared, and rests on broader and deeper authority than can ever be confined in a prescribed ideal."

Brinton in "*Religions of Primitive Peoples*," (p. 28) says: "There is no one belief or set of beliefs which constitute a religion. . . . There is, in fact, not any one item in any creed which is accepted by all religions; yet a common source, a common end in view, and the closest analogy of means to that end, bind all in one. . . . This inherent unity of all religious feeling and expression was perceived by St. Augustine. *Res ipsa, quae nunc religio Christiana nuncupatur, erat apud antiquos, nec defuit ab initio generis humani.*"

To intensify this opinion, the conclusions of modern science unite. Anthropology is uttering with renewed emphasis its dictum concerning the unity of man, the essential oneness of the race, and the solidarity of that society to which it is advancing. Psychology, even in the study of individual differences, rests upon the postulate of a normal psyche undifferentiatedly human. Evolution, however defined, demands the recognition of development that shall find place for all human experience in the sum total of man's attainments. All conspire to make man seek his heritage in the whole experience of the race, and recognize within himself the microcosm of human existence. The essentials of religion are all of the common stock of race possessions; and in the individual are often faintly recapitulated those forms whereby the race has sought to give them expression.

Dr. du Buy, in his study of Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Christianity, Buddhism and the Vedanta Philosophy, has suggested that in each may be found supremely emphasized certain elements appealing with especial power to varying stages of human development; and many, I believe, can detect within themselves those instincts that make men believers in one and all of these faiths; while the apologist may find in Christianity each of these elements of truth in its proper proportion.

The sense of God, whatever its origin, however defined or however undefined, is universal. Upon it rests all religious convictions, and to it must be addressed all religious appeals. In essence there is no eternal distinction between fetichism, idolatry and spiritual worship. They are gradations in man's religious progress. Nowhere and no-when did man worship a stock or stone or graven image, as such, apart from some strange power typified thereby; and the craving that finds satisfaction in objectifying its unseen, unseeable divinity, is no other than a cruder form of that which is nourished by the material symbols of a spiritual communion in the supper instituted by Jesus with his disciples, and reverently observed throughout Christendom to-day. Polytheism is a necessity in an unorganized world, as is monotheism in a universe. It is a natural step in the development of the race and of the individual, a propædæutic for a true monotheism that is more than monism, a unity in manifoldness. And back of all polytheism is an undefined Pantheism. God is one in many manifestations as many manifestations are of

one. So, too, the transcendence of monotheism and the immanence of Pantheism must now unite to satisfy man's mind filled with the ideas of unity and evolution, idealism evolutionally realized. In its nobler form Pantheism is essentially of the spirit. The constant fact, the one reality nominally known upon which rest all knowledge and the validity of all experience, our confidence in the most material object, the facts of science or of sense, is the unity including both self and non-self.

With the sense of God as spiritually one, the idea of human relationship to him is universally connected, and therein is the essence of religion. The universal prayer used at the opening of the sessions of the World's Parliament of Religions was acceptable to every race, religion and creed there gathered, since universally men's longings are addressed to a "Father who art in heaven."

In addition to the ideas of God as spiritual being, and of man's relation to him, nearly every belief that human experience has accredited as of enduring value finds its hold in the psychic nature of man. Revelation, culminating in an incarnation bringing within human comprehension what has become too transcendent, is an intuitive faith. The sense of sin, of needed sacrifice, of salvation through some atonement, rest on psychic needs and appeal to psychic conditions and, it may well be, correspond to some reality whose fullness includes the germ conception of every human faith.

All these considerations and many more lead the missionary to formulate anew the nature of the task before him, inasmuch as, contrary to the thought of Mr. Dennis, he finds a deep basis in human nature, a rich environment in religious experience, upon which and within which he is to plant and foster Christian truth. The problem before him is that of quickening the truth in the native religions as soil and stock for the sustenance of that which in his graft is of vital and universal value; of presenting such elements of Christianity as are not only essential but even more particularly adapted to recognized needs and conditions.

Says Edward A. Lawrence in his "Modern Missions in the East," when speaking of the missionary: "He needs to be one capable of seeing the deep meaning in the remark of Rothe, that there is nothing more changeable than Christianity, but that in this lies not its weakness but its strength. More than other men he needs to determine between the essential and the incidental, the transient, the historical, and the eternal in Christianity; more than others he needs to know the

true proportion of faith. Presenting it on the historic basis, and in the historic development which belongs to himself as a European, an American, a New Englander, perhaps, he must yet present it in such a way as not to fetter but to stimulate the native mind, so that from the start, being rightly founded, it may find its natural Asiatic development, according to the traits of the Chinese or Indian mind, rather than be forever bound to the one-sided peculiarities of occidental thinking."

We may, must, and should have strong and intense convictions as to what the true religion of the race may be; but with those convictions as to its essential nature, the worker for its realization must remember that the completion of unity is the enfolding of diversities, the development of harmonious parts.

To secure data for a more detailed study, the following syllabus was issued; and from returns to it the suggestions are drawn.

TOPICAL SYLLABUS. No. 12.

(Academic Year 1903-1904.)

A STUDY IN THE PEDAGOGY OF MISSIONS.

1. What characteristics of religious nature do you find in the people; and to what extent are they developed, (*a*) sense of dependence, (*b*) of obligation, (*c*) of fear or reverence, (*d*) of love, etc.?
2. What ideas have they (*a*) of deity, (*b*) of man, (*c*) of their relation, (*d*) of sin, (*e*) of salvation, (*f*) of future life, etc.?
3. What is their ethical sanction?
4. What fundamental features characterize their religion?
5. What influence have they upon character and life?
6. What features of their religion are growing stronger?
7. What features are becoming weaker, or less influential?
8. Are there any features that may be developed as a propædæutic for Christianity?
9. Have such any parallels in "Revealed Truth?" If so, where?
10. What points of approach or of contact has their religion for Christianity?
11. What points of widest separation from Christianity?
12. What features of Christianity appeal to the people most powerfully? Why?

13. What features repel most seriously? Why?
14. In presenting Christianity what features do you make most salient? Do you do this for their intrinsic worth or for pedagogical reasons?
15. What general methods of presentation have been most successfully employed by you and your associates, public preaching, private instruction, school training, distribution of literature, etc.?
16. What detailed methods—(a) form of homiletic, (b) of instruction, (c) of religious pedagogy? Is a system of pedagogy desirable?
17. What methods, general and particular, have most signally failed?
18. What features of Christianity do the most influential native workers emphasize?
19. What methods of presentation do they employ?
20. What classes of society are most impressionable?
21. What classes are least so?
22. At what age do the people most readily respond to the appeal of Christianity?
23. What may be noticed in the religious development of the children of native Christians?
24. Does the transition from the ancient religion to Christianity involve any moral danger? If so, what?
25. How may it be averted?
26. What influence has a liberal education upon the attitude of the people toward Christianity?
27. In how far is it a proper mission activity?
28. What place have medical missions in your field?
29. In your opinion what, for your general field, are a worker's requisites in order of importance?
30. Suggestions along lines not mentioned.

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So far as received from Japan the returns yield the following:

- (1). Obligation stands first as the most evident religious charac-

teristic. It is felt toward persons rather than principles. "The sense of what is suited to my position is strong," says one. This characteristic appears to have been fostered by the experience of feudalism. By many it is recognized as a point of contact for Christianity, and as containing that which may well be developed along natural lines.

(2). The ideas of deity are called "vague, indefinite, childlike, rather than debased." One states that "the ignorant have about the same attitude to the deity that is described to us in Homer." The cultured Japanese is classed as a monist, usually of the agnostic type, at least so far as described by Arnold's lines: "Standing between two worlds, one dead—the other powerless to be born."

The sense of divine personality is not clear either with the ignorant or cultured. The relations of man to the divine are equally vague and unrealized. "Sin," says one, "is a word that grows. It is in its childhood in Japan. The people have slight consciousness of it; and where felt it is thought of as the breaking of law, social or governmental. Salvation has a corresponding significance."

(3). Their ethical sanction is closely connected with their sense of obligation, but with it as felt to their own ideal. Public opinion in the wide sense is a mighty influence; but, above all, the will of the ruler is regarded sufficient. Here again the obligation is seen to be felt toward a person.

(4). Hero-worship, fatalism and loyalty seem the most fundamental features of their religion. Shintoism is systematic hero-worship, say some. Buddhism is fatalistic; and operates for good and for ill, crushing endeavor on the one side, but giving great persistence upon the other. Loyalty is apparently linked with hero-worship, but in a most concrete form.

(5). Those above middle life are restrained in a salutary way by their religious ideas. The young only slightly, except through the sentiment of loyalty. The fatalistic feeling is powerful and paralyzes endeavor, removing the sense of personal responsibility for things as they are. *Shi kata ga nai* (it can't be helped) is the most common of Japanese explanations. Yet this same fatalism leads to bravery and many noble virtues, and is recognized as akin to the Christian sense of omnipotence in harmony with the divine will.

(6-7). Both loyalty and individualism are strengthening, while general superstition and fatalism seem weakening.

(8). Ancestor and hero-worship were regarded by most as helpful approaches to Christianity. A Japanese declares Christianity to be the fulfillment of human longings that seek expression and satisfaction in ancestor worship. An American recognizes ancestor worship as a splendid preparatory stage to the worship of one Father of all. The Shinto world-view to a certain extent parallels the Hebrew, and even surpasses it in the thought of a divine father of land and people. By both American and Japanese, its communism is mentioned as a proper soil for the sane development and correction of Christian individualism.

(10-11). Points of approach to Christianity as such were not mentioned except in allusion to the Shin sect of Buddhism, the Tenrikyo, and the Bushido ideal. All of these have elements in common with distinctive Christianity: the first, in its doctrine of faith and salvation through a personal saviour; the second, in its tendency to monotheism, its recognition of sin as in the human heart and the cause of all evil, and in its ethical aim so that it is often associated by the common people with Christianity; the third, in its high ideal of manhood. The points of widest separation are found in the fatalistic passivity of Buddhism with its contempt of self and salvation through negation, in the separation of religion from morality, and the absence of the personal power of a divine life.

(12). All unite in declaring that the ethical elements of Christianity, love, kindness, heroism, have made the most powerful appeal. Secondly, its personal monotheism; thirdly, its universality. The beauty and grandeur of Christ's moral teachings, the connection of a loving heavenly Father, a sympathetic Saviour, the monogamous home, all make strong appeals because they are absent from native thought and satisfy a conscious need. The heroism of Christ makes a strong appeal, for the people are by nature hero-worshippers, and are hero-hungry, writes one. In general "the love of Christianity interpreted by life" exerts the greatest influence. To the scholarly, Christian monotheism appeals, since it identifies moral and scientific with religious truth.

(13). The features that repel are: the idea of sin, the miraculous element, the divinity of Jesus, and the revolutionizing tendency by some held to be inseparable from Christianity.

(14). The features made most salient in presenting Christianity are: the heavenly Father, his love, his revelation of character in Jesus,

the "acceptance of Christ as an antidote for sin," and the power and willingness of God to give strength to obey him, the heroic in Christ and his call to moral heroism, the superior moral teachings of Christ "as being universal, especially the fact that this ideal morality is workable, having motives unknown to other religions."

(15). Concerning successful methods of presentation, a striking unity of expression is found emphasizing the personal element. "The power of a consecrated life is what carries might" is the vital generalization of a woman. "The inner spirit shines out through the eyes, and the Japanese are sensitive to it. Better to be self-cheated in kindness than to repel by too much of the serpent" is the advice of a Japanese. Says another: "Great care should be exercised to use Japanese methods. Kindness, courtesy, and a deep sympathy with all that is good and true in the people, in their customs and in their religions, is desirable. Recognize the fact that being Orientals, the Japanese have the advantage of us Occidentals in the understanding and interpretation of our Bible, which is a thoroughly oriental book. In short, let the Christian worker orientalize, Japanize, himself; and then speak forth with the confidence of deep conviction the truths of which he has experiential knowledge, and his message will find acceptance." As might be expected, emphasis is placed upon work with children, and for general social betterment.

(16). Of detailed method little is said. Presentation should be illustrative, and not dogmatic or dictatorial. One, a Japanese, warns against the constant drawing of morals, believing that "facts take their own effects." Objective teaching is valued; and "such as pertains to life."

(17). Very few give instances of methods that fail, yet some are suggestive. "The endeavor to transplant Western churches as sects, to teach Western theological systems, to impose Western forms, are widely resisted." One notes failure in philosophic preaching which appeals to the intellect alone; and the verdict of Japanese replies is in the words of another that Christianity is too often presented from its intellectual side, as though "Christian ethics would result in life, as science results in application."

(18). The native workers for the most part emphasize the ethical side of Christian truth. Strictly theological topics are seldom treated. A Japanese mentioning well-known native preachers by name, charac-

terizes the preaching of one as based on the love of God, of another as on the practical value of Christianity, and of a third as on its power in conflict with evil. Of his own preaching, a leading minister says, not in reply to this question but in general, "The people readily understand if you say that God is creator or that heaven is order; but a God with a personality is an idea hard for them to grasp. Even among Christians, the number who really comprehend this personal quality of God is comparatively small. The conviction of a personal God and a sinful self is the key to unlock the ultimate secret of Christianity." At the annual meeting of the churches in the province of Shekoko, April 3-6, 1903, sermons on the following topics were delivered: The need of religion, Important elements of religion, Life the characteristic of true religion, Love the characteristic of a true Christian, The problem of evil.

(20). The most impressionable classes are (1), students from 14 to 21 years of age; (2), young men and women generally; (3), those who for business reasons have removed from the influence of their ancestral homes, they being usually the most wide-awake and open-minded; (4), men and women of the middle and upper class; and, says one, "a very large number of middle aged and elderly people outside of the churches are wonderfully impressed with Christian thought and ideals, and this class includes a large number of Buddhist priests."

(22). From the returns it is impossible to make any estimate of the age at which they are most impressed by Christian truth; but from indirect evidence it is clear that it falls within the period of adolescence; and this is the more significant as in Japan as in no other land, probably, the youth lead in all matters, public and private.

(23). In the children of native Christians a few notice "a marked advance in their power to grasp religious truth;" and a Japanese mentions "improved personal appearance, with a more happy, trustful and kindly disposition."

(24). Most hesitate to admit, some flatly deny any danger in the transition from the ancient religion to Christianity; yet, on the other hand, many advocate slow changes and the conservation of the old until the new spirit of itself seeks new forms.

(26). Liberal education is declared in all ways favorable to the reception of Christianity; and as a mission activity "absolutely essential to final success." "A mission school," says one, "which is not a good

school has no right to be." A Japanese evangelist who has also been a teacher writes thus : "I would begin school work with plain, simple grammar grade; and then would always have a few strong, lovable characters in each class. If my Christianity counts for anything, I ought to be able to impress it upon them, leading them to Christ. With good young men won, the future is ours. Every station ought to have one school at least; but I would not have it a mission school in the narrow sense, where it is thought sacrilegious unless the Bible is taught each day."

(28). Medical missions as such have slight reason for being in Japan, because of the marked ability of native physicians and surgeons.

(29). Workers' requisites as given may be grouped as follows : optimistic consecration, vigorous health, with calm nerves and great patience; a well-balanced, cultured mind, clear but not argumentative; breadth of sympathy, in matters theological and religious candid and conciliatory; tenderness of heart and devotion in service.

Though written of conditions in India, the lines of Kipling, somewhat adapted, appealed to one as no less applicable to Japan, for though the nation and people move rapidly, there is much in that very motion to try Western nerves and patience, and of all mission fields, Japan is most productive of nervous exhaustion.

Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the native brown,

For the Christian riles and the brown man smiles, and he weareth the Christian down;

And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of the late deceased,

And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here, who tried to hustle the East."

In addition, certain suggestions concerning the future character of Christianity in Japan are of interest. "The revitalization of Buddhism," says a Christian Japanese, "must be a help to Christian mission work, not immediately perhaps, but ultimately; because it means, the awakening of general religious consciousness and interest." All unite in the opinion that greater stress will be laid upon the ethical and less upon the metaphysical. "I believe," writes one, "that Japanese

Christianity will assume a less doctrinal and more practical, less ecclesiastical and more simple form than in the occident. Certain forms of ancestor reverence must be retained in future Japanese Christianity, so deeply is it rooted in the heart and life of the people. The Japanese rightly claim that they must apply their own philosophy to Christianity."

In connection with these expressions, it is of value to note the position taken by Dr. Edwin Hatch in his *Introduction to the Hibbert Lectures of 1888*. Raising the question: "Why an ethical sermon stood in the forefront of the teaching of Jesus Christ, and a metaphysical creed in the forefront of the Christianity of the 4th century," he says that "in investigating this problem, the first point that is obvious to an inquirer is, that the change in the centre of gravity from conduct to belief is coincident with the transference of Christianity from a Semitic to a Greek soil." He calls attention to two facts: (1) that religion is relative to and inseparable from the whole mental attitude and phenomena of a race; and (2) that no "permanent change takes place in the religious beliefs and usages of a race which is not rooted in the existing beliefs and usages of that race." "The truth which Aristotle annunciated that all intellectual teaching is based upon what is previously known to the person taught is applicable to a race as well as to an individual and to beliefs even more than to knowledge. A religious change is, like a physical change, of the nature of assimilation by and absorption into existing elements. The religion which our Lord preached was rooted in Judaism. It came not to destroy but to fulfill . . . In a similar way . . . the Greek Christianity of the 4th century was rooted in Hellenism."

With the same lofty and sympathetic spirit, writes an American missionary of what may be expected in Japan. "The base is different here. Just as Greek philosophy and Stoic ethics and Hebrew monotheism shaped the form of Christianity in Europe (and he might well have added Roman Law and Anglo-Saxon individualism) so in a similar way will monism and family ethics and ancestor worship and loyalty necessarily cause a free Christianity to take on new forms which ought to be an aid in making and illustrating a perfect Christianity,—all that is best in the world being gathered into one—the Kingdom of God on earth."

Jesus was himself the first great Christian missionary. Born a Jew, he was a missionary to his own people. He took their religion

and fulfilled its most exalted ideal. He destroyed not, but carried forward into completion. He revitalized that religion, and made it in a sense greater than ever a preparation for his own. He left no completed work, but the promise that the seed should grow. May we not reverently ask, whether all religions have not that within them which, so treated, may be made preparatory to their higher Christian form, if not along parallel lines, at least as converging radii drawing to the centre of a perfect sphere which not in any part, but in its wholeness, shall be seen to be worthy to bear the name of Him who came to fulfill?

In conclusion, the following may be at least tentatively suggested:

1. That the essentials of religion, upon the manward side, are inseparable from human nature, and find expression through every religion that for any length of time has held human allegiance.

2. That those essentials have developed according to the individual experience and environment of peoples.

3. That the objective fact to which they answer is universally the same.

4. That every normal religion is naturally propædæutic to a higher development.

5. That the duty of a religious teacher is (1) to discover and sympathetically appreciate the experience of religion already possessed; (2) to develop that experience along lines native to it; (3) to supplement such by added elements, made conformable; (4) to expect and welcome a new growth, characteristic of the people.

6. That in Japan, the sense of obligation to persons rather than principles, the recognition of an ethical sanction in a personal ideal and a ruler's dictum, together with the conception of sin as broken law and a vague sense of divine personality, seem to call for the development of each with an emphasis upon the personality of God as a permanent basis of obligation, upon his sanction as that of a personal will, and upon his law as a criterion of righteousness.

That the essential lack of life and the separation of religion from ethics seems to call for emphasis upon the possibility of spiritual experience of a God who is Emmanuel in life, through the development of individual spiritual personality; and, on the other hand, to make most essential the present emphasis upon ethics even to the ignoring of dogma and doctrine.

STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAYER.

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I. *An Introduction to the Study of Prayer.*

It was only eight years ago that Leuba in an article dealing with the psychology of conversion¹ drew the attention of investigators to one of the most interesting departments of mental life. Although since then a steady and increasing interest has been manifested in religious psychology, it is not a matter for surprise that many of the most elementary problems still await investigation. Some of the most important of these are suggested by the study of the phenomena known as prayer.

At the beginning of such a study many difficulties arise because of our ignorance concerning three fundamental problems. In the first place, what idea does the worshipper have of the being he would address? Strange as it may seem there is no scientific information concerning the ideas of God prevalent among people of our own civilization. Many questions suggest themselves the moment one thinks of the subject. What varieties and types of the idea of God are prevalent in Christian communities to-day? How do these types of ideas relate themselves to the varying conditions of the men who entertain them? What sort of men believe most fully in their conceptions, and why? What is the reason for the interest, which many men manifest in the idea of God, and for the power which it exercises over their lives? These and many other questions concerning the conception of God arise in the mind of the investigator when he approaches the subject of prayer.

The second problem concerns those characteristics which constitute man a religious being. What are the desires which lead men to communicate with God? What is the source of that marvellous energy

¹J. H. Leuba : A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena. *Am. Jour. Psy.*, Vol. 7, 1896.

and enthusiasm manifested in religious work? That is to say, what needs and instinctive tendencies underlie the religious life?

The third problem, which comes to the student of prayer, is in fact only a broader aspect of the problem of prayer itself. It is this: What is the relation of man to his conception of God; or, better, how does man react toward that conception? Obviously, the answer to this question involves a knowledge of the two preceding ones. We must first understand the idea of God and man's religious tendencies; and then we shall be prepared to understand why man reacts toward that conception as he does. As already intimated, prayer is one of these reactions; and to comprehend it fully, one would need to have obtained an answer for such questions as have been suggested in the previous paragraphs. But, since this is not possible, it will be necessary to start at the end and work toward the logical beginning of the subject. In doing so, some light may be thrown on these unsolved problems, for, at the same time that this study is pressing these problems upon the attention, it will bring to light many facts that will aid in an understanding of them. In prayer, as nowhere else, man reveals his conception of God and gives expression to those vague, half recognized cravings that characterize him as a religious being. Indeed, no richer source of material could be found for the study of such problems than is found in a collection of prayers like that of Mary Tileston.

It is necessary to state briefly the point of view which is adopted in this paper, and the class of facts to which attention will be directed. Excluding the work done by the anthropologists in the history of religion, one finds that the work done upon the psychology of the religious consciousness places the emphasis on facts more truly physiological than psychological. This is seen in the pains, which Starbuck has taken to show the relation of conversion to the period of adolescence, and in his statement that all his interpretations are professedly on the psychophysiological side.¹ In the present paper it is desired to discuss the facts of the religious life from a point of view somewhat different from that typified by Starbuck's work, and to approach the psychology of religion in the same way as the psychology of æsthetics and ethics are now studied: that is, through a study of the interests, desires, and tendencies. We wish to study the *interest* which belongs to certain

¹E. D. Starbuck: *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 16. London, 1899.

religious conceptions, and to analyze it if possible into its most elementary constituents. We wish to analyze the nature of the religious man, to understand the needs and *desires* which make possible the appeal of the religious ideas. And finally, it will be profitable to observe how these interest-charged ideas and more vaguely defined desires and longings find expression; how they act as dominating factors in the mental processes, directing the stream of consciousness; and how they manifest themselves in movement either as the source of incipient *tendencies* or as powerful motives controlling conduct. It is believed that these questions are deserving of more careful consideration than they have yet received.

The psychology of prayer might be approached in either of two ways: one might study the phenomenon as a whole, gathering large numbers of prayers, translating the religious language in which they are expressed into psychological terms, classifying and analyzing them, and thus arriving at an understanding of prayer as such; or, putting aside for the present so extensive an investigation, one might take a certain group of prayers expressive of a definite religious experience, and study them with reference to that particular experience. Indirectly, such a study would throw much light on prayer itself; and after a number of such groups had been described, it would be possible to take a comprehensive view of the whole field, deduce some of the more general principles regarding prayer, and approach somewhat toward a solution of the three fundamental problems of religious psychology.

This second method of attacking the problem has been adopted by the writer, because the quantity of data accessible for such studies has seemed too great for the successful application of the first method. In the second part of this paper on prayer, therefore, instead of attempting an exhaustive treatment of that subject, we will confine our attention to that group of prayers which gives expression to the experience known as the "indwelling presence of God."

The material for study is very ample, and is readily accessible. There are many books, consisting in whole or in part of collections of prayers, which have been published for devotional use. A list of about fifty has been secured, and there are no doubt many others. As each of these collections contains from one hundred to one thousand prayers, there is plenty of material for classification and analysis. There is of course a very large amount of worthless material to be

found in these collections. Many of the prayers are mere repetitions of dogmas, and some others are quite unintelligible. But scattered among these are some—readily distinguishable from the rest—which portray religious experiences, and are of real value. Their simplicity, and freedom from all cant and affectation, make them superior to the answers elicited by a questionnaire. *The worshipper in talking with God often describes his religious life in detail, giving this description spontaneously in the midst of the experience to which it relates.* Scarcely any of these prayers are written by men of mediocre ability; they represent, indeed, the introspection of the choicest minds. Men like Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas à Kempis, have given account of their inner life in language, which is as precise and accurate as it is transparent and beautiful. The quotations which will be given later will furnish the reader an opportunity to judge of the value of this kind of material.

By way of forestalling an objection, it may be noticed here that some of the prayers are petitions for the bestowal of a particular religious experience, and not professedly descriptions of previous experiences. But in these cases it can be readily seen that the petitions are descriptions of past experiences, a repetition of which is desired. The details are too sharply defined, the confidence of the worshipper too great to admit of the assumption that the whole is a fiction of the imagination.

It would seem not altogether out of place, in closing these introductory remarks, to insist that no statements found in these studies are to be taken as bearing in any way whatever on the question of the ultimate validity of religious conceptions. The reader must carefully distinguish between the religious ideas, which are parts of the mental furniture, and, as such, are the proper subject matter of the psychologist, and the facts which are supposed to underlie these ideas—facts with which the psychologist has no concern. Hence, in these studies perfect freedom is exercised in writing of the idea of God. That idea is subject to the same laws as other ideas, and there is no reason why it should not be discussed. But the question of the actual existence and character of God is a question with which psychology has nothing to do. Such an investigation as the present can add no evidence either for or against the validity of religious truth.

II. *The Experience Sometimes Called the "Indwelling Presence of God."*

Little need be said concerning the method used in this investigation in addition to what has been pointed out in the introduction. The collection by Mary Tileston, "Prayers, Ancient and Modern," was studied with a view to determining what are the desires that most often find expression in prayer. At first, no method of classification was adopted; but interest was soon focused on those prayers which give expression to the purely æsthetic desire to contemplate the perfection of the deity. When these were brought together, it became evident that they give expression to a well-defined experience, which on further study was found to be identical with what is described in religious language as the "indwelling presence of God."

Description. This experience will be familiar to any one who has frequented prayer meetings or other places where the religious life is freely discussed. Here one often hears persons testify that they have felt God to be very near or even within, acting on the mind and heart. Under the influence of this presence they are led to choose what ordinarily does not appeal to them; they attempt what at other times would seem impossible undertakings; their thoughts are fixed more completely on things of a religious nature; and all this they attribute (and quite naturally) to the working of the divine mind upon their own. At these times, also, a profound peace takes the place of the usual unrest and discontent, which again is felt to indicate the presence of God.

This phenomenon may be better described if a few illustrations are given. From these illustrations it will appear that religious phraseology has no fixed term for its designation. It is expressed under different imaginative conceptions according to the temperament and beliefs of the individual, but everywhere it has the same characteristics—the feeling that God is acting directly on the mind, controlling the thoughts, directing the actions, and subduing the turmoil of conflicting desires. The best description of this experience that I have found is contained in a letter written by Jonathan Edwards.

"They say there is a young lady in New Haven who is beloved of that great Being who made and rules the world, and that there are certain seasons in which *this great Being, in some way or other invisible,*

comes to her and fills her mind with exceeding sweet delight, and that she hardly cares for anything except to meditate Him. . . . Therefore, if you present all the world before her, with the richest of its treasures, she disregards and cares not for it, and is unmindful of any pain or affliction. She has a strange sweetness in her mind, and singular purity in her affections; is most just and conscientious in all her conduct; and you could not persuade her to do anything wrong or sinful, if you would give her all the world, lest she should offend this great Being. She is of wonderful calmness, and universal benevolence of mind; especially after this great God has manifested Himself to her mind. She will sometimes go about from place to place singing sweetly; and seems to be always full of joy and pleasure, and no one knows for what. She loves to be alone, walking in the fields and groves, and seems to have some one invisible always conversing with her." (Quoted in Yale Review 1891, p. 447.)

This extract, which gives a fairly complete description of the experience in question, came to the attention of the writer after the present paper was almost complete. It is especially valuable, therefore, as a confirmation of the results obtained from an entirely different source. All the observations which will be noted in this paper are at least implicitly contained in Edwards's description. Three of these may be mentioned here. This woman is conscious of the presence of God, who "in some way or other invisible, comes to her." Her attention is fixed in the adoration of God, so that "she hardly cares for anything except to meditate Him." A profound peace united with strong moral purpose characterizes her life.

This brief description will suffice for the present; but as we proceed with the analysis many illustrations will be cited, and the details of the description can best be made out from them. For this reason some of the prayers will be quoted entire. And while it will not be possible to discuss each fully—the emphasis always being placed on the point under immediate consideration—each should be regarded as a fairly complete account. From these prayers, each of which gives expression to a slightly different phase of the experience, it will be possible for the reader to form a truer conception than could be given by any single presentation.¹

¹In a lecture on "The Reality of the Unseen," William James has recorded several similar instances. William James: *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York, 1903.

Analysis. If we seek for the essential element in the phenomenon that has just been described, we shall find it in the unification of consciousness through æsthetic contemplation of God. By unification of consciousness we do not mean to imply that any momentary state of consciousness can be anything but a unit, but apply the term to the whole stream of consciousness. Ordinarily the complexes of ideas, which so rapidly succeed each other in the flow of mental life, vary from one another considerably in their constituent elements. Scarcely a second may be necessary for the whole stream to have changed its character both as to content and emotional tone. Now, by the unification of consciousness, we mean that this flux is relatively slow; that some idea, remaining almost unchanged, holds the attention for a considerable length of time, and so directs the mental processes that the thoughts with their emotional tone and motor tendencies are all in harmony with it. In the unified consciousness which is here described, the central, controlling idea is God; the prevailing emotional tone is that of adoration.

The term æsthetic contemplation is used when a more specific word than adoration is desired; it serves to convey the idea that the object of attention is one of intrinsic worth. Æsthetic contemplation of God involves forgetfulness of all possible blessings to be derived from Him, and the concentration of the attention upon Him as an object in itself supremely desirable.

That our explanation of this experience as the unification of consciousness through æsthetic contemplation of God is correct, is supported by two considerations. Fixation of attention on the great religious Ideal occupies a prominent place in almost every prayer relating to this experience. And what is equally important, it is possible to start from the act of adoration as the primary constituent and give a consistent psychological account of the whole phenomenon.

Any one who will take the trouble to read the collection of prayers by Mary Tileston, can satisfy himself that adoration is a constant factor in this phenomenon. Only a few illustrations may be given here. It will be remembered that the young lady whose experience is described by Edwards cared for nothing but to meditate about the great Being who came to her and filled her with a strange delight. This is well illustrated again in a prayer by Pusey. He is seeking that peace which he knows by experience is to be found only in God—the peace which we shall see is the necessary outcome of the indwelling presence.

“Let me not seek out of Thee what I can find only in Thee, O Lord, peace and rest and joy and bliss, which abide only in Thine abiding joy. Lift up my soul above the weary round of harassing thoughts to Thy eternal Presence. Lift up my soul to the pure, bright, serene, radiant atmosphere of Thy Presence, that there I may breathe freely, there repose in Thy love, there be at rest from myself and from all things that weary me; and thence return, arrayed with Thy peace, to do and bear what shall please Thee.”

This peace is secured when he has fixed his attention on God (lifted up his soul to God) until he feels the radiant atmosphere of the divine presence—phrases descriptive of his unified consciousness, which controlled by one great idea, has been set free from the “weary round of harassing thoughts.” Preparing for this same experience, Johann Arndt prays, “Forgetting all else, let me see and hear Thee.”

“Ah, Lord unto whom all hearts are open, Thou canst govern the vessel of my soul far better than I can. Arise, O Lord, and command the stormy wind and the troubled sea of my heart to be still, and at peace in Thee, *that I may look up to Thee undisturbed, and abide in union with Thee, my Lord. Let me not be carried hither and thither by wandering thoughts; but, forgetting all else, let me see and hear Thee.* Renew my spirit; kindle in me Thy light, that it may shine within me, and my heart may burn in love and adoration towards Thee. Let Thy Holy Spirit dwell in me continually, and make me Thy temple and sanctuary, and fill me with divine love and light and life, with devout and heavenly thoughts, with comfort and strength, with joy and peace.”

Thus, in several typical instances of this experience, we have seen that the æsthetic contemplation of God is an important factor. We may now ask what is the significance of this factor for an understanding of the complete experience. How is the unification of consciousness attained? In one of St. Anselm's prayers there is a suggestion of the reason why the direction of the thoughts to God in loving adoration produces that marked effect upon consciousness which the worshipper attributes to the working of God, and which leads him to feel that God is very near.

“O God Thou art Life, Wisdom, Truth, Bounty, and Blessedness, the Eternal, the only true Good! My God and my Lord, Thou art my hope and my heart's joy. I confess, with thanksgiving, that Thou hast made me Thine image, *that I may direct all my thoughts to Thee,*

and love Thee. Lord, make me to know Thee aright, that I may more and more love, and enjoy, and possess Thee."

The character of the idea of God indicated in this prayer explains its influence over the mind of the worshipper. God is the concrete expression of wisdom, truth, bounty, and blessedness, and of all that can be conceived as being good and desirable. For every aspiration of his own man has attributed to God a corresponding perfection. Or, as Feuerbach has expressed it, "The fundamental hypothesis of belief in God is man's wish to be God himself. Man, however, soon discovers to his sorrow that he is not God; and what he wishes to be thus becomes merely a conceived, a believed, an ideal being. Limited in his faculties, but unlimited in his wishes, man is therefore undivine in power, and unhuman in volition. God thus forms the other half that man lacks; what man imperfectly is, God is perfectly; what man can only desire to be, God actually is." This conception that God is a concrete expression of men's aspiration and a counterpart of their need, is so generally accepted that it needs no elaboration here; but a word may be said regarding its significance as an explanation of the religious consciousness.

If we accept the idea that the conception of God is the sum total of human desires, harmonized, unified, and concretely expressed, we must recognize that the impulsive and inhibitory power it possesses is very great. The conception of God possesses the interest, or dynamic quality, which belongs to the idea of perfect power; but to it belongs also the interest pertaining to virtue and to all the other perfections. Because of this, it is able to catch and hold the attention, direct the associational processes, and come at last to dominate consciousness.

Seldom, however, does the idea of God appeal to the worshipper with all its power, for in most religious exercises the attention is directed to some specific attribute of God rather than to God himself. In prayer, for instance, the man who is seeking moral strength sees in God the All Holy One, while he who seeks succor from physical distress sees in God an Omnipotent Being, each emphasizing that particular perfection which corresponds to his specific needs. This is the practical, self-seeking attitude toward God, in which attention is really fixed upon one's own needs rather than on God. While this is the usual and normal attitude of mind, it does not permit the idea of God to ex-

ercise such power as is exercised over the mind wrapped in æsthetic contemplation.

This æsthetic attitude characterizes the prayer by St. Anselm quoted above. For the moment only is Anselm conscious that God is Wisdom, Truth, Bounty and Blessedness; immediately these merge themselves into one—the only true Good. Without conscious reference to his own needs, he rejoices that he “may direct all his thoughts” to God, for no other purpose than that he “may more and more love, enjoy and possess Him.” The interest or dynamic quality of the idea of God so conceived is very great. While the attention is fixed upon one specific perfection, the idea of God can acquire no further value than is possessed by the attribute in question; but, when in a moment of æsthetic contemplation these attributes are all merged together into the conception of the only true Good, each contributes its own value to the whole, surcharging it with interest.

It is because of this unusual power, possessed by the idea of God under these circumstances, that it is able to hold the attention and remain the central idea in the stream of consciousness for a considerable length of time. So long as it maintains this central position, only those ideas related to it, and possessing an emotional tone in harmony with it, will rise into consciousness. The stream of mental life will change from moment to moment only as regards the phase of the central idea which is emphasized, and the ideas that are associated with it.

This narrowing of the stream of consciousness, this concentration of the attention on one idea, is the essential element in the experience of the indwelling presence and gives rise to two distinguishing marks of that experience, namely: peace of mind and firmness of will. The following paragraphs will serve to illustrate how this peace is produced. The influence of the idea of God on the will and conduct will be reserved for discussion in a future paper.

Maria Nare has given us a good analysis of the peace which follows this experience. “O Lord, this is all my desire—to walk along the path of life that Thou hast appointed me, even as Jesus my Lord would walk along it in steadfastness of faith, in meekness of spirit, in lowliness of heart, in gentleness of love. *And because outward events have so much power in scattering my thoughts and disturbing the inward peace in which alone the voice of Thy spirit is heard, do Thou, gracious Lord,*

calm and settle my soul by that subduing power which alone can bring all thoughts and desires of the heart into captivity to Thyself."

Thus we see that the idea of God, dominating consciousness and bringing "all thoughts and desires into captivity" to itself, is capable of giving a peculiar satisfaction. It gives rest to the mind worn out by conflicting desires, for in the presence of the only true Good, all other interests disappear and consciousness is for the moment unified. Where there are many antagonistic interests there is sure to be discontent and unrest; for, corresponding to each of these, there are motor tendencies, which are checked by the motor tendencies of other ideas, giving rise to disagreeable inhibitions. Now, in the place of the clashing of many equally strong desires, is substituted one supreme passion. No rival desire makes itself felt in consciousness; every innervation finds an open path; and the worshipper is at peace with himself. So, too, when failure has attended the pursuit of certain ambitions, the sting of defeat may be eased by merging one's self in God where these ambitions disappear. Physical pain and distressing circumstances of all sorts are forgotten in these moments of adoration, when all the powers of attention are absorbed in the contemplation of God. So wonderful does this "subduing power" seem to Maria Nare that she attributes it, not to a peculiar working of her own consciousness, but to the influence of the Divine Spirit.

Much the same idea is expressed by John Newman. He describes his usual state of mind as a state of "anarchy" in which each individual interest is struggling for supremacy, and contrasts it with the "fullness of God," a state of mind in which there is no place for other desires. "Teach me, O Lord, and enable me to live the life of saints and angels. *Take me out of the languor, the irritability, the sensitiveness, the anarchy, in which my soul lies, and fill it with Thy fullness, breathe on me with that breath which infuses energy and kindles fervor.* In asking for fervor, I ask for all that I can need, and all that Thou canst give. In asking for fervor, I am asking for faith, hope and charity, in their most heavenly exercise; I am asking for that loyal perception of duty, which follows on yearning affection; I am asking for sanctity, peace, and joy, all at once. Nothing would be a trouble to me, nothing a difficulty, had I but fervor of soul. *Lord, in asking for fervor, I am asking for Thyself, for nothing short of Thee, O my God. Enter my heart, and fill it with fervor by filling it with Thee.*

This same influence is described again in a prayer by Mary Carpenter,—“ *O Father, calm the turbulence of our passions ; quiet the throbbing of our hopes ; repress the waywardness of our wills ; direct the motions of our affections ; and sanctify the varieties of our lot.*”

So far we have considered the effect of the adoration of God as purely negative and inhibitory, giving peace and quiet by doing away with some of the distressing conditions of mental activity ; but as we shall see, it also gives positive pleasure. The peace which comes to the mind in which the anarchy of many petty desires has been displaced by the tyranny of one great and beautiful idea, is not the only source of satisfaction which this experience affords. The contemplation of the ideal is in itself a source of satisfaction ; and as we shall see, this is particularly true of the great religious ideal,—which is God. The contemplation of the idea of God gives pleasure, just as the sight of a flower, or the thought of an heroic action, or any other experience which appeals to us as having intrinsic worth ; but it also gives a satisfaction which none of these other experiences, appealing only in specific ways, can give. The idea of God, being a reflection of man’s aspirations after ideal conditions, being in fact the conception of an ideal man under perfect surroundings, contains in itself that which can appeal to every longing aroused in man by the experiences of life. Since no desires are left unsatisfied, the pleasure so derived is free from any admixture of pain. It is therefore peculiarly satisfying to break away from the disappointments of actual existence and lose one’s self in the adoration of God. These statements may be made clearer by quoting a prayer from Thomas à Kempis. Notice how clearly he differentiates in his account between the satisfaction of the several separate desires and the complete fulfillment of them all in the possession of God. “*Grant me, O most loving Lord, to rest in Thee above all creatures, above all health and beauty, above all glory and honor, above all power and dignity, above all knowledge and subtilty, above all riches and art,—and above all that is visible and invisible, and above all that Thou art not, O my God. It is too small and unsatisfying whatsoever Thou bestowest on me apart from Thee or revealest to me, or promisest, whilst Thou art not seen, and not fully obtained. For surely my heart cannot truly rest, nor be entirely contented, unless it rest in Thee.*”

Summary. In the description, given earlier in the paper, it was pointed out that one of the distinguishing marks of the phenomenon

was the peace which the worshipper enjoyed. Returning to Edwards's description we read: "She is unmindful of any pain or affliction. She has a strange sweetness in her mind, and is of wonderful calmness." It was this characteristic, which first attracted the writer's attention and which led him, in the hope of finding an explanation for it, to study this group of prayers in detail. To sum up the observations so far as they bear on this point, it should be recalled how strongly dynamic is the great religious Ideal, representing, as it does, the sum total of human longings, unified, and concretely expressed; it should be remembered that under proper conditions this idea may so control the mental processes as to bring itself and related ideas into ascendancy in consciousness—exerting this power more strongly than the ordinary idea because of its much greater hold on the attention. It thus exercises what has been called a "dominating" influence, excluding all ideas except those readily associated with it. Where previously the mind was distressed by many conflicting tendencies, one passion is now supreme; and with this unification of consciousness comes a feeling of relief analagous to that felt when the fiat of the will puts an end to deliberation. We have seen this principle illustrated in a number of examples. Maria Nare has been quoted concerning "that subduing power which alone can bring all the thoughts and desires of the heart into captivity." Newman's prayer indicates how this experience—causing him to feel as if filled with the divine spirit—transforms the irritability and anarchy of his soul into a state of energy and fervor, clearly indicative of domination by a great idea.

But the experience involves more than the restful feeling arising from the unification of consciousness. The contemplation of God is a source of positive pleasure. This is the more evident when it is remembered that the idea of God is the counterpart of man's aspirations after the ideal. Because of this reciprocal relation between human desires and the conception of God, it is possible that the adoration of God should yield a pleasure which, on account of its purity, is quite unique.

It is not impossible that the explanation given here of the peace derived from this particular experience, might be extended to serve as a partial explanation of religious peace in general.

A word must be added concerning the imaginative conceptions which are attached to this experience. How does the worshipper come to attribute these reactions of his own mind to the influence of the

Divine Spirit? In the first place, the experience is somewhat extraordinary, and the worshipper is at a loss to account for it. For an unusual experience he expects an unusual cause; and since he finds himself thinking and acting as he believes God would have him think and act, and doing so seemingly without effort, as if impelled by some hidden power, he naturally believes that he is under the immediate influence of the Spirit of God. As did the lady of New Haven, he may feel that God has descended to earth and walks with him. Or, like Pusey, he may feel himself lifted into a new atmosphere, the "pure, bright, serene, radiant atmosphere of the Presence of God."

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SAUL'S CONVERSION.

By CLARENCE D. ROYSE.

Of all the New Testament conversions perhaps none is of keener interest to us than the one which has been chosen as the subject of this article. This is the one case, which, more than any other, has been made the model or pattern of modern conversions. Its particular type has been much sought after and highly prized by religious workers. And conversions accompanied by experiences similar to those that accompanied Saul's conversion are without hesitation pronounced as unusually "clear." There can be no doubt of the high valuation rightly to be placed upon *conversions* like that of St. Paul; but peculiar phenomena attended the conversion, which phenomena are to be separated in our thought from the conversion itself. The conversion is the change in the man; the phenomena are the incidents in connection with that change. In the great gulf between Saul, the persecutor, and Paul, the Apostle, lies the fact of conversion; in the events of the Damascus-road experience is a series of facts, closely associated, on the one hand, with the great character change which began that day, and, on the other hand, with the previous life-history. It is with these events that we have principally to do. But not simply in their physical aspects do we consider them; rather do we wish to treat them in the two relations above indicated. The mental phenomena are of particular interest to us. What were the mental processes in Saul's mind during the transition-experience of that day? What did his past history contribute to these processes? How were they affected by the peculiar mental traits and environment of Saul? What bearing did these experiences have upon the later life? Or, in general, why did the conversion-experience assume the particular form that it did? and what, if anything, did the form of this experience contribute to the character of the conversion itself?

It is not presumed that these questions can be answered with mathematical exactness from the data at hand. But it is assumed that there is a sequence of mental processes, no less in a conversion than in other

experiences. Varieties in religious experience are not hap-hazard or due to chance, accident or divine whim. On the contrary, the laws of the spiritual are as certainly uniform as those of the physical world. And this idea no more rules God out of the one realm than out of the other.

In harmony with this view we have some very interesting and suggestive facts in the case of Saul, which clearly throw some light upon the questions under consideration. Saul was born of Jewish parents in Tarsus, a city of Cilicia in Asia Minor, early in the first decade of the Christian era. This city was the capital of a Roman province, one of the leading commercial centres, and the seat of one of the three greatest educational institutions of the day. Here the boy spent his childhood and was taught by his parents in accordance with the custom of the Jews. His outer environment was intensely Gentile, but, as the parents were Hebrews of the strictest type, it is reasonable to suppose that every possible effort was made to counteract the influence of this environment. Hence the home training was probably the more strictly Jewish. At an early age (tradition places it at 13) Saul was sent to Jerusalem, where, according to his own statement, he was "brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, and taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers."

The next authenticated fact concerning Saul is his connection with the martyrdom of Stephen. Here we find him abetting the persecutors of the church. It is perfectly natural that he should share the anti-Christian sentiments of the conservative Jews. But he is a disciple of Gamaliel, who advocated the use of mild measures with the Christians, and hence, it is hardly to be expected that he would be an active persecutor. His attitude on this occasion is a middle position, somewhat of a compromise, but fairly consistent with both of these two contending influences.

This incident of the martyrdom of Stephen has been regarded almost universally as having an important bearing upon the conversion of Saul. We may accept the general statement, but the writer does not believe that there is sufficient ground for the theory that Saul's remorse for the part taken by him in this tragedy had any great part in the conversion. His desire to exterminate the Christians root and branch was only intensified. We find nowhere any indication of doubt in his mind as to the rightness of his course during the persecutions. He did not brood

over his sin in the death of Stephen. Psychologically the effect upon Saul's mind was identically that of a deed of violence upon an unreasoning mob, or the smell of blood upon a tiger. It only infuriated. Instead of remaining a passive observer of the persecutions we find Saul searching out the Christians and giving his vote against them; at last his zeal overleaps all ordinary bounds and, not content with persecuting in Jerusalem, he pushes the extermination into foreign cities until the climax of frenzy is reached in "breathing out threatening and slaughter." There is not one hint of wavering by reason of remorse. On the contrary his fury gathers momentum as it moves. It is true that there must have been the natural revulsion that any sensitive mind feels against the shedding of human blood, but this was completely overwhelmed by the stronger emotion; there was no conscious weakening until the crisis came.

Yet the influence of Stephen upon Paul is obvious, and Stephen's death no doubt had something to do with Saul's conversion. Stephen has been called the forerunner of Paul from the similarity of the two characters, and many believe that had he lived, he, and not Paul, would have been the great leader in the movement to give the gospel to the Gentiles without Jewish entanglements. When on the defensive both men use the method of appealing to history to secure attention. They next assert their allegiance to the true principles of Judaism. Their attitude under persecution is strikingly similar, as also their general trend of thought and their conception of Christianity. The agreement extends even to specific thoughts and almost to words as has been very ingeniously pointed out by Conybeare and Howson. *Cf.* Acts vii, 48-50 with Acts xvii, 24-25, Acts vii, 53 with Gal. iii, 19, Acts vii, 51 with Romans xi, 17-29.

The mental constitution of Saul will throw some light upon the relation between these two men and this relation will in turn illuminate some of the peculiar features of Saul's conversion-experience. But the analysis of a man's mind is a difficult problem even at close range and with intimate personal acquaintance; and the difficulties increase enormously as the point of view recedes. But in the case of Saul the data are unusually abundant considering the remoteness of his time. Yet we have not all of the facts, and if we had it would not be possible within the scope of this article to more than hint at some of the leading characteristics. It is evident that Paul was not weak in any mental

faculty. His intellect is weighty rather than sharp. For close reasoning and logical argument the Epistle to the Romans, the 15th chapter of First Corinthians and the Epistle to the Galatians are good examples. And yet his readiness with a keen response in emergencies and his ability to turn occasions to profit require that he be at least not classed as slow. His speech on Mars Hill, his manner and method of answer when arrested in Jerusalem, his reply to Agrippa, his appeal to Cæsar are sufficient evidence of alertness of mind.

But Paul's emotions are exceptionally strong. Note the burning intensity of his nature as revealed on numerous occasions in word and action. Even his iron will seems to be more an expression of consuming zeal than calm, deliberate determination. The very intensity of the persecutions carried on by him and the expression "breathing out threatening and slaughter" do not indicate the man who has carefully reasoned out a proposition and arrived at a conclusion. The moving impulse in him is rather emotional than intellectual. His movements are of the whirlwind variety, impelled by passion and not the result of continuous deliberation. This same life was later controlled by a nobler purpose which drove it forward as a ship is driven before the wind. Whatever the struggle to install within him this new governing principle, when once installed his conduct in harmony with that principle is not a continuous volitional struggle, but falls automatically within the limits of the ruling motive. It becomes what Prof. James calls choice without effort. Note how emotion abounds in Paul's epistles, most of which were written at a much later period of life, when this quality might naturally be expected to be less prominent than at the time of his conversion. See with what vehemence he describes the battle in himself between the carnal and the spiritual, at last breaking forth in the cry, "O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this dead body?" And yet, intense as is his outburst of feeling, he is only relating an incident long since past. But so vivid is his imagination that it is to him as present experience. Though Paul's mind was intellectual far beyond the ordinary, it was not the stern, harsh, unsympathetic intellectuality. It was logical, but not coldly so. This is apparent from the variety and richness of the figurative language used by him. And his emotions are not mere animal excitement or physical exuberance; rather they are the normal expression of the rich and warm intellectual life. Paul's emotions indicate depth, not shallowness of

intellect. They are the emotions of the great mind, not of the small one. Back of all is the well-thought-out, logical and sufficient rational basis for all of his conduct. But the general principles of conduct being settled, the emotional nature is on the throne to direct the life in accordance with those principles. But the individual acts scarcely require individual volitions. We have, then, a life ruled by a governing passion. Back of this is a sufficient, satisfying reason for the conduct, but not every act is the direct result of reasoning. At one time this passion was antagonistic to Christianity; later a change occurred which turned the great flood of emotions to the building up of what Saul had formerly torn down. The change that occurred overturned the rational foundation for his previous conduct. The course that had formerly appeared perfectly reasonable and right, now appeared as clearly wrong. Saul changed his mind. This gave new direction to his emotions but did not vary their intensity.

We are now ready to consider directly the immediate events of the experience on the Damascus road out of which came this change of mind and this new direction to his emotions and to his life. All of our scriptural information concerning these events is contained in three accounts in the Acts of the Apostles, two of which purport to be in the language of Paul himself, and a few references in Paul's Epistles. In Acts ix, 1-19 is Luke's own account, but he was not present at the time of the conversion. Twice Paul refers to his conversion in speeches reported by Luke. The account in the speech before Agrippa (Acts xxvi, 12-19) could not have been heard by Luke. Both of these accounts, then, were written on information received by the writer from others. The account in Paul's speech at Jerusalem at the time of his arrest (Acts xxii, 6-21) might have been heard by Luke, but we have no information on the subject. The references in the epistles are meagre. Between the different accounts in the Acts there are some wide variations, but variations help us to determine what is fundamental. Luke's account mentions the vision of Ananias somewhat in detail, but makes no mention of any commission to Saul. The Jerusalem speech simply says, "And one Ananias, a devout man . . . came to me and standing by me said, Brother Saul, receive thy sight," and then follows in part Saul's commission to the Gentiles as coming through Ananias. But the same account represents this commission as given more in detail to Saul himself while in a trance in the

temple after his return to Jerusalem. The third account does not mention Ananias or the baptism of Saul, and the commission is received by Saul directly from Jesus during the appearance on the Damascus road. One account says that Saul heard a voice, another that those who journeyed with him heard the voice, but the other distinctly says that those who journeyed with him heard not the voice. One account says Saul fell to the earth, another that they all fell, but Luke's account especially mentions that Saul fell to the earth, that he arose from the earth, and that the others stood during the incident.

But taking all things together we are justified in three conclusions, viz.:

First, it is reasonably clear that Saul was overwhelmed by a blinding light, that he saw Jesus and talked with him, that he went into Damascus, talked with Ananias and was baptized, that he received a divine commission to carry the gospel to the Gentiles. Second, it is not clear just what Saul's companions saw and heard that day, and consequently we may conclude that this is of no great value. Third, it is certain that these companions did not experience just what Saul did on that day. Two of the three accounts clearly state the fact that Saul had some phases of experience that were not shared by his companions, and particular emphasis is placed upon this fact. If the companions saw any unusual light, a fact which is hard to determine, they did not see a blinding light, for they were able to guide Saul into the city. But he was blinded for a period of three days. If they heard any unusual sound they did not hear any voice as such nor comprehend any message, but Saul heard a voice which called him by name and carried on intelligent conversation with him. It is also clear that they saw no person. But Ananias mentions the fact that Saul saw Jesus on the way to Damascus; Barnabas makes this fact the basis of his confidence in the new convert; and Paul himself declares to the Corinthians that Jesus appeared to him after the resurrection as one born out of due time, and this is one of the strong arguments for his belief in the resurrection.

We conclude, therefore, that the peculiar experience of Saul on the Damascus road was not due to light-waves and sound-waves acting upon the organs of sight and sound, that a camera exposed upon the scene would not have shown any unusual light or the form of any person not belonging to the company, nor would a phonograph have re-

corded the voice that Saul heard. In other words, Saul's experience was subjective; it was an hallucination. This view receives some confirmation from the fact that Paul himself calls it a vision and that such experiences were somewhat common with him. On his return to Jerusalem he was in a trance in the temple; the experience at Troas where he saw the man of Macedonia was a night vision; at Corinth, it is stated, the Lord appeared to Paul in a vision and again at Jerusalem after his arrest. In Second Corinthians Paul declares that he was caught up into paradise and heard things unspeakable and not lawful for man to utter. During the shipwreck on the voyage to Rome he had another vision.

The mental characteristics of Paul are conducive to hallucinations. It may be, perhaps, generally thought that these experiences do not come to persons of unusually strong minds. But this is not true. The error possibly comes by reason of the fact that hallucinations usually come to highly emotional natures, and the popular mind is in the habit of associating a high degree of emotion with a low degree of intellect. But nearly every famous poet is a practical refutation of this latter misconception. History is full of what appear to be hallucinations occurring to men of more than ordinary intellect, as the *daimon* of Socrates, the blazing sword of Savonarola and the devil that appeared to Luther.

A strong intellect helps rather than hinders the hallucination if the emotional nature be present, because of the power to concentrate thought and exclude irrelevant matter. It is not absence of thought that is required, but absence of counteracting thought.

We have already shown that Paul had the highly emotional nature just indicated as essential to hallucinations, and it has been as clearly established that he had also the other faculty which is at least helpful to the production of hallucinations, a strong intellect. We have further given the experimental proof from the facts of record that this Damascus-road experience was hallucination. But we go still further. Not only does the fact of the hallucination appear to be clearly proved, but in certain facts of Saul's early life and training, his schooling under Gamaliel, his connection with the martyrdom of Stephen and the subsequent persecutions, facts already referred to, we are able to gather even some of the very elements that determined its character and content. The mental process by which these facts thus influenced this experience

is one the steps of which Saul was not always conscious of taking. We know that facts long since lost to consciousness often influence our dreams. Any fact of past experience, whether remembered or forgotten, belongs to the "stuff that dreams are made of," and we are frequently unable to account for or trace their connection with our dreams. But hallucinations are nothing more or less than dreams that come to us while we are awake but with the mind so absorbed as to render it oblivious to the distractions of ordinary impressions upon the senses. Hallucinations, being therefore only waking dreams, are made of the same "stuff" that other dreams are made of.

In Bible times all nations believed in gods who worked supernaturally and all nations produced the so-called supernatural in proof of their gods. The Hebrews believed in one God whose claim to divinity rested chiefly upon the fact that his supernatural works were far superior to those of other so-called gods. This was the object-lesson to Hebrews and Egyptians alike when Aaron's rod swallowed the rods of the sorcerers. God was known by the unusual and the extraordinary, and especially so among the Hebrews. Saul, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, would naturally expect proof of the claims of a divine messenger and revelations of divine truth to come in the form of marvellous manifestations of power. Saul believed he was doing God's will in the persecutions, and so believing himself to be a special messenger of God, might reasonably be supposed to stand in an attitude of general expectation of receiving some divine revelation. We know something of the power of expectation in determining both the fact and the quality of a religious experience.

We have shown somewhat the influence of Stephen's speech upon Paul's language. Likewise parts of Stephen's speech and some of the events in connection with his death appear to have given color to some of the incidents of Saul's conversion. The speech opens with the statement that God appeared to Abraham and talked with him, and called him to go into a foreign land. It tells of God's appearing to Moses in a flame of fire, and by the voice of God Moses was sent on a foreign mission. God is continually referred to as speaking directly to his people and manifesting himself by signs and wonders. Throughout the speech those that looked on Stephen saw his face as the face of an angel. And then in concluding he declared that he saw heaven opened and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God. Here we have

all of the elements that go to make up the recorded facts of Saul's hallucination. There is the glory and light, the sight of Jesus in heaven, the voice speaking out of heaven, the call to service and that service in foreign parts.

No doubt Saul's life among the Gentiles had something to do with the nature of his call. Every person's call to service is determined by the facts of his past experience so far as these facts bear upon adaptability and general qualifications. It is perhaps true that every possible effort was made during Saul's boyhood to counteract the influence of Gentile surroundings, but we know that the period he spent in Tarsus was the most impressionable part of his life. We know also that impressions are often made that lie dormant for years, sometimes gathering force to break out suddenly in later life, sometimes held as vague, indefinite half-thoughts that may or may not lose their haziness in after years, and sometimes such that during the dormant period the subject is hardly conscious of their existence at all. And yet even in the latter case the later life is often very decidedly influenced by these early events. At any rate we know that though Paul was thoroughly Jewish, yet he was decidedly cosmopolitan. The very fact that he pushes the persecution into Gentile cities strongly hints that his field of labor is not to be confined within the narrow limits of any single nation. The fact that he was even now approaching a Gentile city for the purpose of persecuting Christians would readily suggest that his call to establish the gospel should be no less extensive than his supposed call to tear it down.

The time of this experience was propitious for an hallucination to Saul, by reason of the excitement due to the establishing of the new religion with the persecutions incident thereto, and the near approach to the scene of further persecutions after the suspension of this work during the journey. The comparative solitude of the journey gave opportunity for reflection; the time of day was about the noon hour when reflection is especially likely to run into reverie. Any sudden shock or disturbance of the reverie would complete the chain of causes and could readily be expected to precipitate an hallucination that might be regarded as held in solution up to this time. And when we consider that Saul had a natural abhorrence of bloodshed and violence, and a general broadness of mind and spirit of tolerance, and that both of these qualities were held in check and even ruthlessly trampled under foot

up to this time by the counter-passion that had taken possession of him, it is not difficult to see how a shock might have come during his reflection and reverie upon these very matters. This mental reaction may have been aided or even produced by some disturbance of the elements, which disturbance, if any, would account for the experience of Saul's companions on that day.

This view does not leave God out of the transaction nor does the word "hallucination" imply the unreality of the experience. This word is used in its strictly scientific sense and means simply a mental impression without any objective stimulus. There was nothing there external to Saul to affect his organs of sense, or it would have affected the sense-organs of his companions as well. But the sensation was just as real and true as if it had been produced by an objective stimulus. It was no less real to Saul because it came only to him. And it is no less divinely influenced because it admits of psychological explanation. God is not a lawless being, the evidence of whose presence is to be found in uncaused events; rather is he the cause of causes, the first great cause, and the evidence of his presence lies in order and method rather than in lawlessness and chaos. He is in all the order and method of nature; the changing seasons, the march of time, the movements of the planets, life, growth, decay and death, all have God in them; but in a peculiar sense is he in those higher forces and influences that adjust men to the duties of the passing time, that make life noble and growth sublime, that give the soul victory over death and decay.

The presence of God, then, in this experience is shown by a natural and psychological sequence of events, rather than by a mass of unrelated and uncaused facts; but still more is He shown by the *manner* in which these events are related, with respect to their influence upon the character of Saul and the later history of the world. Saul needed exactly the lesson that came to him at this time. He disbelieved in Jesus largely because he was unable to ascribe divine powers to one who had not the power to save himself from the cross. He believed that Jesus was dead and that for the good of the people the heresy of belief in him ought to be stamped out. He needed to know that Jesus was not only greater than the cross, but that he had triumphed over death itself. He received this lesson on the road to Damascus. The whole direction of his life is changed. All of the power of his being is turned to the spread of the gospel. The resurrection becomes the keynote of his

message. Invincible in spirit, full of faith and of dauntless courage, he carries the gospel triumphantly into the uttermost parts of the then known world. It is of comparatively little importance just what form the vision should take in Saul's mind, but it is of vast importance what it leaves in his mind to affect the later life. Any vision or any other experience that would have conveyed the truth to his mind and dislodged the error that was there would have been equally effective. But God used the facts of his past history and the natural laws of the mind to communicate to Saul the needed lesson. The evidence of God's presence lies less in the fact of the light that Saul saw than in the use that was made of it; it lies less in the fact that he saw a form or heard a voice than that he learned the truth. The one important and absolutely indisputable evidence of the divine hand in Saul's conversion is the fact of the conversion itself.

The fact that the visions of Saul and Ananias are in substantial agreement does not weaken the argument that they yet follow the laws of mind, nor does it at all strengthen the argument for the divine presence in the event. As already indicated, the divine presence is not proved by lawlessness but rather the reverse. In the case of Peter and Cornelius we have concurrent visions which fit into each other perfectly and God's hand was evidently in them, and yet we have very good reason for believing that the vision of Peter, at least, is colored by suggestion from his physical condition and environment. Just as our dreams are thus colored, so also are our visions which are waking dreams. It is stated of Peter that he was very hungry and would have eaten, but while they made ready he fell into a trance. What would be more natural than that he would dream of food? And being in the house of a tanner, with the memory of the skins of animals fresh in his mind, is it not reasonable that he would dream of animals? The supreme proof of God in this event is not the fact that Peter saw animals, but rather that God used some means to drive the prejudice out of Peter's mind. The particular means is only of incidental importance. Even so conservative a commentator as Benson, writing on this very incident, says that the symbols used in these visions were determined by the state of the person himself. Stokes, in the *Expositor's Bible*, recognizes the same truth when he says, "To the devout believer in Christianity who knows that in His works in grace as well as in His works in nature the Lord leaves nothing to mere chance, but perfectly orders them all down

to the minutest detail, to such an one this human hunger of St. Peter appears as divinely planned. . . . St. Peter's hunger is . . . but a manifestation of that superhuman foresight which was directing the whole transaction from behind this visible scene . . . teaching us that nothing . . . is too minute for the divine love and care."

The evidence of God's special presence in an experience does not depend upon the fact of visions nor even upon their content, *per se*, but upon results worthy of God. People are sometimes genuinely converted in trances, but the conversion is proved not by the trance but by the life. The trance is explainable by known laws, but this surely does not argue that God is not in the conversion. Was it not worthy of God to work through what we now know to be the laws of mind to bring Saul to a knowledge of his error? And is not the marvellous transformation of the man and the use of the minutest peculiarities of temperament, training, and past experience to achieve this result sufficient proof that God's hand was in the work?

THE FIELD AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

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The division of the field of scientific inquiry into branches is to knowledge what the specialization of labor is to industry: a condition as well as a result of progress. The multiplication of special physical sciences in what was originally a common field is one of the striking developments of the past centuries. A similar disentanglement of material and of methods has taken place in the study of non-physical life: history, logic, ethics, psychology, metaphysics and their various subdivisions, have gradually emerged from the primitive 'Philosophy.' It may therefore be a matter for wonder that with regard to religious life the original chaos is only now beginning to break into clearly differentiated special sciences. The so-called 'Philosophies of Religion' are still too often unconscious attempts to weave into some sort of whole loose ethical, psychological, and metaphysical inquiries.

Of late, it has become fashionable in works on Religion, as well as elsewhere, to make a conspicuous use of the word psychology. An 'up-to-date' student of Religion cannot afford to leave it out of the title, or, at least, of the preface of his books, even though he should be an historian or a metaphysician and should know nothing of recent psychology.¹ This homage paid to psychology by ignorance is not without disadvantages to that much-talked-of science. Nearly everywhere a medley of common sense psychological remarks may still pass for psychological science. How could the historian feel hesitation in founding his 'philosophy,' on 'psychology,' or how could the theological student fed on Greek and Hebrew exegesis refrain from writing a 'psychological' dissertation on some phase of religious life, seeing that they ignore the existence, or, at least, the significance, of the large body of facts gathered

¹As an illustration of the confusion still reigning in the study of Religion I would point to the valuable work of Tiele, 'Elements of the Science of Religion,' the Gifford lectures of 1896.

and systematized during the past fifty years as the science of psychology?

It is not usually the appreciation of the importance of 'psychology'—whatever that term may mean to those who use it—which is wanting, but a sufficiently clear idea of what it is and of its present resources. Pfeiderer expressed a wide-spread opinion when he wrote, "we may say, therefore, that the indispensable key to the understanding of the phenomena given in external historical experience lies in the inner experience of subjective consciousness."¹ There are still, however, historians who hold that "one can study any particular religion in all its phases without entering the province of psychology." The clear recognition by Pfeiderer of the necessity of individual psychology as a prelude to the philosophy of Religion did not prevent him from writing a 'Philosophy of Religion,' even though he did not possess the "indispensable key."

In the following pages I shall undertake first to separate the province of the psychology, from that of the history, of Religion and then to give an outline of the problems with which a systematic psychological study of Religion would have to deal. Any one desirous of seeing a more general discussion of the relation of psychology to history will do well to go to the vigorous book of Professor Münsterberg, 'Psychology and Life.'

I. The Differentiation of the Psychology of Religion from the History of Religion.

How would the psychologist and the historian divide the field offered to their investigation by an ecclesiastical assembly? The facts usually entered on the minutes of the meeting—the hour, the place, the membership, the topics under discussion, the discussions themselves with their outcome, and other similar facts, make up the material of the historian. His task is to record and interpret the meaning of the actions of this particular group of men. He will treat a devotional meeting in the same way as a business session. *The deeds of men, as deeds and their appreciation*, are his province. If he attempts to explain actions,

¹"The Notion and Problem of the Philosophy of Religion," Phil. Rev., Jan., 1893. Reprinted in the volume entitled "Evolution and Theology."

he will look for their cause either to other actions or to physical events ; but he may not penetrate within the individual consciousness itself. As a matter of fact the historian commonly oversteps deliberately, or does not know, the boundaries of his profession. He likes to dabble in sociology and in psychology. It may be remarked, by the way, that this proneness to wander in other people's preserves is not always disadvantageous to his works. Had Taine been purely an historian, his 'History of English Literature' would have been little more than a skeleton of what it is.

But what, in that ecclesiastical assembly we have imagined, are the data belonging to the psychologist? They are the ideas, the feelings, the emotions, the desires and the volitions of its members when considered not in their outward issue, but *in themselves*, *i. e.*, as subjective experiences of an individual. The historian may take account of the heat and asperity of the debate ; but it is reserved for the psychologist to describe, to compare and to analyze particular emotions. The *expression* of the will in action and in emotion, not the will and the emotion themselves, is historical material. When confronted, for instance, with the phenomenon of faith, the historian of Religion will take note of its presence, of the manner in which it makes itself felt, of its objects, of its antecedents. The psychologist, on the other hand, describes and analyzes faith as an experience of the subject. He discriminates, for instance, between the faith-states and the faith-beliefs. He observes the coincident increase of power in certain directions and attempts an explanation of it by reference to the relation existing between the desires and the emotions on the one side and the intellect on the other, etc. If, instead of being faith, the topic be sin, the historian records the sinful deed, the circumstances which lead to it, the judgment passed by society or by particular individuals, the punishment inflicted, and the like. The psychologist deals, instead, with the facts of moral consciousness, the feelings of guilt, of remorse, of repentance ; with the ideas connected with these feelings ; with their interpretation, etc.

Thus, though the historian and the psychologist may consider the same general object, *they are concerned with different data and therefore with different problems.*

It should be further noted touching the question of data that, except in biography, history deals with groups of men, with tribes, nations, sects, societies, corporations, and not with particular individuals, *i. e.*, with actions generalized in a process of social consolidation.

In Religion, for instance, it deals with beliefs, doctrines, modes of worship, institutions and the like. In so far as history concerns itself with these social products of individual life its data are still further removed from those of individual psychology. Though there may be some difficulty in separating the historical from the psychological data when history deals with separate individuals, no confusion is possible when it deals with social documents. The actual need of an all-sufficient Helper and the doctrine of God's omnipotence and goodness; the mystical ecstasy itself and the doctrine of the union of the soul with God; the faith-state itself and the doctrines of faith; the actual passing through the moral transformation called conversion and the doctrine of conversion; the spirit of prayer and adoration and the forms of worship, etc., are objects as different as can well be imagined.

The primary, fundamental, character of individual experience with regard to the social data of history is a fact the meaning of which has not yet been recognized, surely not by the students of Religion. The buildings dedicated to worship, the societies for religious purposes, the prayer books, the orthodoxies, the heresies, have a sort of reality patent to all and so it has happened that institutions, myths, legends, creeds, have filled the vision of the student of religion to the exclusion of individual experiences. The facts of the inner life of the millions who have made the buildings, organized the worship, formulated the doctrines, are more subtle. They have for the many the unsubstantiality of shadows. And so these inner manifestations of psychic life have been neglected albeit the historical data issue of necessity from them. Exhaustive historical treatises have, for instance, been written on the beliefs in spirits, the Grecian gods, the rites of atonement, the Christian heresies, etc., etc., but where are the works in which one may find set forth the individual psychological origin of these rites and these beliefs? Let it be once fully realized that in individual experience is the source of the historical data, and the psychology of Religion will have gained the place belonging to it by the side of the history.

Both history and psychology are explanatory, but each explains in a way impossible to the other because of the disparity of their respective material. What kind of explanation does history provide? History relates, for instance, how, when the army of Xerxes was threatening Attica, Demosthenes, moved by patriotism and ambition, sent word to the Persian monarch that the Greek galleys were about to make their

escape. This cunning tale led to the destruction of the Persian sea-power. It may relate how a people groaning under oppression, and spurred on by famine, rose against their rulers and demanded, or themselves executed, reforms. It may treat of the progress of art and science and show how inventions have revolutionized the manner of life. If it be religious history it may, for instance, establish the chronology of the Greek Pantheon, trace the origin of a sect back to an individual founder and set forth his particular ideas together with the circumstances surrounding his life. Or it may determine the gradual modifications undergone by a particular doctrine and the historical circumstances to which are due these modifications. The reference to Demosthenes patriotism, ambition, foresight and cunning; to the oppression practiced upon a people; to the scientific spirit; to the peculiar desires, ideas and conduct of a person; to social circumstances, etc., constitute the historical explanation. Shall we rest satisfied with this kind of explanation? If we do, we shall remain completely in the dark as to what are after all the vital problems of religious life—to speak of religion only. Why did Augustine and his predecessors entertain startling opinions concerning Election and the Grace of God? Why did Luther proclaim Salvation by Faith and reject Salvation by Works? Why did George Fox go about preaching holiness and simplicity without regard either for the opinion of society or for his physical comfort? Shall we be done when we have said that these men thought they took their teaching from the Gospels? The historical explanation can satisfy those only who regard Religion merely as an external phenomenon. Those who believe that Religion is primarily and essentially an inner life, will turn to psychology and ask of it from what private, intimate experiences: from what impulses, desires and needs, from what ideas, arose the beliefs by which the leaders and founders of Religion lived and for which they were ready to die. History, cannot, like psychology, penetrate behind the manifestation of the will into consciousness wherein action is elaborated, and therefore it cannot be explanatory of inner religious life.

It follows, moreover, from the difference of data, that to psychology will fall the task of correlating psychic experiences with physiological processes. Psycho-physics and psycho-physiology have become theoretically important, and practically fruitful, branches of General Psychology. There is no reason whatsoever to prevent the psychologist from carrying within the field of religious and ethical experience the parallel

between psychic and physiological life, unless it be the difficulty of the task. Nothing more need be said here on this point provided it be understood that tracing a physiological parallel is neither attempting to solve the metaphysical question involved in the recognition of a parallelism between body and mind, nor betraying any opinion whatsoever touching that question.

The psychology of Religion thus separates itself from the history in two essential particulars. (1) It deals with the contents of consciousness themselves: impulses, desires, representations, ideas, volitions; whereas its sister science finds its data in the deeds of men and chiefly in the social resultants of the activities of individuals. (2) From the difference of material follows a difference in the problems.

For this double reason the entrance of the psychologist into the field of religious experience marks an epoch in religious study. Psychological science itself should also be the gainer for this extension of interest, for no portion of human life surpasses the religious in depth of feeling, in intensity of desire and in effort of the will. Nowhere else does the struggle for life uncover more unmercifully the hidden recesses of the human soul; nowhere else does the lust of life throw more completely out of joint certain fine mental adjustments antagonistic to the religious end. In the moments of intense religious experience man reverts to a simpler state and uncovers certain aboriginal aspects of himself never otherwise visible; or, and perhaps not less frequently, he rises in understanding and in purpose beyond his ordinary self. Let, therefore, the psychologist disregard the complaints that may come from unwitting enemies of knowledge and enter boldly into this new country.

Would it be of any use to add, before passing to the consideration of the problems, that what I have said does in no way aim to diminish or to belittle the scope of the history of Religion? I have merely tried to point out the place of *another* science.

II. *Outline of a Psychology of Religious Life.*

A systematic psychological study of religious life might properly begin with the consideration of *the needs and the desires* which it expresses, because religion is a mode of living, a species of purposive activity. It is logically proper, whatever be the part of life under consideration, to inquire first as to its purposes or its ends.

The investigation of *the intellectual constituents* of religious life,—ideas, beliefs, doctrines—would come next in order, for the business of the intellect is the understanding of life in order to provide means by which the needs and desires may be satisfied. The will, born blind, generates the intellect in order to have a guide. It is the intellect which interprets and organizes the chaos in which the will finds itself on awakening. In religion, for instance, the intellect spurred to its task by certain needs, creates divinities. There would be no theology if there were no religious needs and purposes. The creative freedom of the intellect is, of course, checked from several sides, chiefly perhaps by the logical claims made by the external world.

The third part of the psychology of Religion would deal with *the means* provided by intelligence and used by the will to obtain its ends. The discovery of the means is the contribution of the intellect to the business of living. Here would find place the study of worship (meditation, adoration, rites, ceremonies, etc.) and of the particular conditions in which the pious soul puts itself (the faith-state, ecstasy, etc.), for these are also means employed for religious satisfaction.

There would remain for a fourth and last part the critical consideration of the results secured by religion. This section would fall into three chapters dealing respectively with the following queries: What are the results? How far are they adequate responses to the religious demands? What is the *modus operandi*?

The four parts into which the psychology of Religion falls would then be:

- A. The study of the motives (impulses, desires, needs).
- B. The study of the concepts (doctrines, religious ideas, and beliefs).
- C. The study of the means (worship, rites; religious states).
- D. The study of the adequacy and efficacy of the means.

A. With regard to motives¹ the psychologist may undertake several more or less independent tasks. He may limit himself to the investigation of one religion at a particular moment and find out what its adherents want, hope, expect, from their religious objects. Or he may extend his survey, take the genetic point of view, go back to primi-

¹I use the word *motive* so as to include both impulse and desire.

tive man and, coming up to himself, write out a chapter of the psychological development of man: the genesis and growth of so-called religious instincts, needs and desires.

He may in this part, as well as elsewhere, attempt, where it seems least impossible, to trace the parallel development of the central nervous system. In the case, for instance, of the appearance of ethical desires, and more particularly of the Moral Imperative, he may venture to search for the correlated nervous organization.

Or, instead of dealing with racial, he may devote his attention to individual development; and then he may, leaving aside the larger aspects of the problem, consider the bearing of a multitude of circumstances upon the religious needs, in particular, of sex, of age, of knowledge.

B. The study of the intellectual contents of religious life has not been so completely neglected as the study of the motives and of the efficiency of the means. Thanks to the intellectualistic bias of the dominant philosophy, the beliefs connected with religious life have almost monopolized the attention of the students of Religion, many of whom have gone so far as to imagine that Religion *is* a system of ideas! And yet several of the vital problems of this section have so far been left well-nigh untouched, because they were neither within the province of the theologian nor in that of the metaphysician.

Religious ideas, so called, are before all else *ideas*. The study of religious conceptions and beliefs is therefore to be based upon the general psychology of the intellect, the more important chapter of which, to the would-be psychologist of religion, deals with the passage from mere apprehension to belief, *i. e.*, with the relation of knowledge to the feelings, the emotions and the will. Without acquaintance with that chapter it would be futile to proceed with this part of the work.

As preliminary work the psychologist would have to make here an inventory of the ideas entering into religious experience and ascertain how far the officially accepted ideas and dogma actually enter into the religious consciousness. He would find among other things that most of them are mere fossils, philosophical lucubrations, without any place in the life of ostensible believers. From these he would separate the real, living, beliefs and investigate their rôle in persons of diverse temperament and education. Here again he may go the way of phylogenesis or, instead, of ontogenesis.

The conceptions of the religious objects themselves, be they called gods or otherwise, would, of course, be found to constitute the basal portion of the intellectual content of religious life. And one of the most important tasks of the psychologist would be to disentangle what is essential or generic in these, at times widely different, views. Natural phenomena, ghosts, spirits, anthropomorphic gods, the Absolute, Humanity, etc., may each, it seems, be object of worship and centre of a religion. In virtue of what property can they serve as such? In fulfilling this task the ground of the division of life into religious and secular would be brought to light, or, as I like to put it, the problem of the *religious channel* would be solved.

Then would follow, in this second part, the investigation of the origin of religious conceptions (spirit, God, soul immortality, Nirvana, etc.), and, finally, the explanation of the influence of these conceptions upon the conduct of life.

To the formation of the individual religious ideas—let it be remembered that out of individual ideas arise the doctrinal structure of religion—contribute on the one hand the needs, the desires, and, on the other, meshes of logically connected ideas born of observation and reasoning upon the world and one's self. The stock of ideas in hand is used both in the interpretation of the impulses and cravings and in the discovery of means by which they may be expressed and satisfied. The mass of ideas arising logically from sense data, are chiefly the outcome of scientific interest. In religion, the will is the predominant generator of ideas. It is so much so that there is no more consistent and constant corrupter of objective truth than Religion.

It should not be overlooked that the psychology of Religion provides a basis for a judgment as to the *pragmatic* truth of beliefs. I have elsewhere and in several instances¹ tried to indicate this function of the branch of psychology with which we are dealing. In an essay on the Christian Mystics² I tried to show, for instance, how two of their distinctive beliefs have either their source or their confirmation in the ecstatic experience. I may be permitted to repeat here in brief and by

¹ See, regarding the Grace of God and Faith, the "Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Jour. of Psy.*, Vol. 7, chiefly pp. 355-370; also, concerning Faith, the first number of this *Journal*.

² "Les tendances religieuses chez les mystiques chrétiens," *Revue Philosophique*, 1902, pp. 1-36 and 441-487, particularly the second paper.

way of a partial illustration of the preceding statement what was said there on that point. Religious meditation and, more completely still, religious ecstasy are, according to the Christian Mystics, a union of the soul with God, a synthesis of the individual spirit with the Absolute. God is conceived of as the simplest substance. Eckhart calls it *Grund*, *Boden*, *Wurzel*. It is neither this nor that, it is the Being without being (*das Wesen ohne wesen*), above all existence. Nothing may be predicated of Him because that to which a predicate may be attached is, in so far, determined and therefore is not yet God. Boehme, Suzo and Tauler agree substantially with Eckhart. Boehme, for instance, uses the term *Urgrund* to name the essence. He describes it as without form, absolutely indeterminate; it is unity and perfect identity; it is nothing; it is the abyss, the infinite.¹

Now, the condition of a person in a mystical trance comes very near this negative definition of God. For, as the ecstasy deepens, the intellectually apprehended distinctions lose their sharpness of outline and finally disappear in an undifferentiated homogeneity. The multiplicity of existences is replaced by a Great All, simple, without attribute, mysterious, infinite. We are, therefore, justified in asking ourselves how far the mystical conception of God is modeled upon the trance-state itself.

But we find ourselves here face to face with what seems a monstrous absurdity. In itself, the *completed* mystical trance is nothing since, in it, the loss of consciousness is entire. It is not even that substantial Nothing which in certain metaphysical jugglery is made into the Essence of Being, but a nothing which has no existence. How is this identification of non-existence with God, the giver of all good gifts, to be accounted for, through what magical art can enough reality be injected into it to make it synonymous with the fullness of the divinity? The entranced soul described by our Mystics, as naked, absolutely empty, etc., is for them, nevertheless, not the equivalent of non-existence. It is, after all, something more because of the following circumstance. When the soul, after its return to consciousness, thinks of the preceding moments it becomes aware of a break in its life, of a void, of a nothing. And this nothing is transformed into an existent something by the very fact that it has become an object of thought. It

¹See a chapter on Boehme in Boutroux's "Etudes d'histoire de la Philosophie."

is henceforth the non-existent which exists: the unconscious trance has come to enjoy that particular kind of reality given by the mind to all its objects. Only—and here is one of the errors of our Mystics—this nothing-thought-of is by no means the same thing as the absence of consciousness constituting the void.

But this is not yet the most potent of the reasons accounting for the apparent identification of a state of unconsciousness with the Divine Substance. An observant reader is struck, even in the most philosophical of the Mystics, with the anomalous presence in their definition of God of certain significant words. Eckhart, for instance, occasionally uses the expression *Eternal Silence* to designate the *Grund*. He speaks of the Eternal Silence reposing in himself, and Boehme affirms that the Urgrund is all silence, repose, eternal peace; more than that, it is free from suffering; yet more than that, it is “the Eternal Good, Eternal Sweetness, Eternal Love.” Here is, indeed, a Nothing sufficiently well filled with positive qualities to make of it an object of desire! If, therefore, the Mystics seek union with God, it is not in the least because He is the All of which nothing can be affirmed. Mystical philosophers are no fonder of emptiness than other men. If they woo the Absolute it is, after all, because their idea of Him gratifies some of the deepest human needs. For the Christian Mystic, God is, philosophical utterances to the contrary, at least peace bathed in love. And what is that but a love-trance? The Christian Mystics assimilate God with the most blessed experience with which they are acquainted; they make Him in the image of the divine moments which precede and follow the loss of consciousness in ecstasy.

When ideas have once been established, psychologically assimilated, they influence conduct in degrees varying widely according to their conative and affective value. The consideration of the motive power of ideas forms one of the important chapters of the technical studies incumbent upon the psychological student of Religion. Here would be met, for instance, the question of the relation of beliefs to the power that is in Faith and to the moral transformation known as Conversion. The elucidation of these problems would bring with it an answer to the question, how is an idea to be invested with the power of faith?

In order to keep this outline within admissible limits, I shall pass in silence the third part, the study of the means employed for the satis-

faction of religious needs and desires and, concerning the fourth and last section, I shall content myself with reminding the reader that it deals with the critical consideration of the results of religious practice. It falls, as already said, under three heads, (1) the results, (2) their adequacy, (3) the *modus operandi*.

The psychologist would have stopped where his task culminated were he to neglect the investigation of the causes or conditions of the power that is in religion, whether it shows itself in a so-called answer to prayer, in a mystical 'revelation,' in a conversion, or simply in the peace that 'passeth all understanding.' He will already have come face to face with these dynamic problems in part B, when dealing with the relation of ideas to the feelings and the will.

In conclusion, and without stepping outside of his field, the psychologist may venture suggestions for the more direct and efficient realization of the purposes of religious life as they are revealed in the Motives and thus he would reach the portal of the philosophy of Religion with a mass of information without which the flights of the Philosopher could be only the prelude to a fall.

What problems will remain for the philosophy of Religion to unravel when psychology and history shall have completed their tasks? There will be, if nothing more, at least the metaphysical question of the objective reality of the religious objects. As to the so-called 'essence' of Religion, its future, the laws of its development, the legitimacy—I mean the practical fitness and effectiveness—of the beliefs and practices and other similar topics, any one may, if he likes, treat of them under the same covers with a discussion of the metaphysical question and call the whole the philosophy of Religion. But it should not be forgotten that proper answers to these problems may come in the form of immediate generalizations and inductions from psychological and historical data and not from metaphysical speculations. They remain, therefore, within the field of scientific conclusions.

The psychologists who have written on Religion have been prompt to recognize that it is no business of theirs either to reject or to affirm the transcendental existence of God. They have even done so with alacrity. But in so doing they have by no means intended to deny to

¹For a possibly different view see Flournoy, *Archives de Psychologie* No. 5, Dec. 1902, p. 33-57.

psychology a share in the formation of metaphysical opinions.¹ Only recently, Professor James in his Gifford Lectures, "The Varieties of Religious Experience," attempted to find an empirical foundation in certain religious experiences for a form of Pluralistic Idealism. Although he seems to me to have failed in his special purpose, the attempt was certainly legitimate. We may well look to the psychology of Religion for weighty contributions to the data of general metaphysics and particularly to those upon which Theology should be founded.

THE FEELINGS AND THEIR PLACE IN RELIGION.

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One of the central problems in the study of religion since the time of Schleiermacher has been to determine where, among the normal mental processes, the religious impulse has its setting. Does it centre in a conscious recognition of the "Presence of a Higher Power or Powers" and a purposeful attempt at an adjustment between worshipper and Deity, or is it a more or less blind, instinctive response of the person to forces that are acting upon and through him? If the latter, from what does it draw: is it a feeling, an *affective* response to intimations of a higher reality, and if so, how may it establish the validity and trustworthiness of its utterances? Or is it a matter of instinct *reaction*, receiving its impulse from the dynamic character of life itself, its guidance from inherited race experiences and from a fine intuition of present and possible relations, and containing also a prophetic quality in the same way that all instincts are supposed to be teleological? And if so, are there any evidences, beyond the more or less problematical ones of "Psychic Research," that we are so constructed that our essentially religious reactions and conduct do represent a higher kind of spiritual adjustment?

The discussion which follows means to present a point of view of religious psychology and of general psychology, whose justification is that it is in line with many of the facts empirically adduced, that it fills up several ugly gaps in psychology, and that it brings into relation some of the not easily reconcilable departments of human interest. Taken, as it is, at the request of the editor of this *Journal*, out of a larger work that is now in progress, it must necessarily be more or less schematic, and appear dogmatic in its presentation. The question to which we shall confine ourselves is concerning the rôle the affective processes play in the rest of life and especially in religion. We shall prefer to speak of the affective life instead of feeling since it is more comprehensive. It will be understood to include the overtone from

all the organic reactions, sensory processes and higher mental activities, which are generally, according to the James-Lange theory of the emotions, considered to be their accompaniment and condition. It will be set for the most part in opposition to the cognitive processes, which deal with the concrete, definable elements of experience and their relations. The thesis is, in brief, that the affective life is a direct source of knowledge as truly as is the cognitive. This knowledge has to do, furthermore, with objective facts and relations, and also with the relation of the individual to his largest environment. Religion, art, and all forms of appreciation have their setting in the affective life. They draw directly from it and only indirectly, if at all, from the cognitive life. They plant themselves firmly and squarely in the midst of human experiences, and have a content and function of their own. They can never be justified or defined or successfully explained when described in the stilted and inapplicable technique of the cognitive processes.

The only fair way to test the truth of this point of view would be to examine, critically, the phenomena of religion as they issue in the lives of those who profess it. That is clearly out of the question in a brief article. It is worth noting, however, that intellectualism in religion has been almost entirely discredited in recent years. Among the empiricists in the study of religion, there is not one, so far as I know, who is able to find that the intellectual, ideational, rational, cognitive processes perform more than a mere by-play in the drama of the personal life. Whether this depreciation of the ideational functions in religion is a bias due to the general decline of intellectualism in psychology all along the line, or the result of an exact reading of the facts, might be a fair question. I am inclined to think it the result of both things, and therefore essentially right.

It will serve us best in a brief presentation to attempt the hazardous task of giving a definition of religion somewhat in line with the developments of the empirical study of religion, and then to inquire whether the conception that the affective life is the source from which it draws will explain its phenomena and tend to bring religion in satisfactory relation to the rest of life. I shall, therefore, point out what seem to me four of the basal characteristics of religion on which there might be a fair amount of agreement.

In the first place, religion is a *whole* experience. It tends to take in the entire self with all its affections, aspirations, thoughts and con-

duct. Its messages are always directed to the heart, and are a challenge to the will. Even when it directs itself toward specific observances or moral distinctions, it is heavy with an appeal which means to compass an attitude toward life, or toward some higher reality. We can accept Principal John Caird's "appeal to an objective standard"¹ as furnishing the "content" to religion, not because he has found in it the "intelligent basis of religion" but because that which is "discerned by the intelligence to be true" is an index at the surface of a vigorous and all embracing life response which one feels saturating every sentence, which is focalized and intensified by the intellect and which set apart the messages of Caird as having an inherent religious character as distinguished from those of a smaller mind. So with Cardinal Newman's "Science of God."² There is betrayed in every sentence of it an uprush of the whole life which breaks through and beyond his doctrines and objects of thought. Without this heart response Newman's "Theology or Science of God" would have no more worth religiously than the words of any carping theologian. Something akin to a religious experience at its best is set forth in Browning's *Abt Vogler*. The hands of the musician wandered over the keys until gradually deeps of life began to respond to deeps, and a temple of music arose, planting its base on the nether springs and towering skyward, and finally heaven and earth and artist were all blended into one.

Religion draws from deeper than we know and rises higher than we can conceive. That is, in the second place, there is a larger Reality—call it Truth or Love or God or Brahma or what we will—that is tending to break into this circumscribed space of life that I call myself. It may filter and trickle into our little spheres, like the coming of the dawn, so that we merely give a series of assents to its imperceptible widening and enriching; or it may break suddenly, as in Sir Rowan Hamilton's discovery of the quaternions, H. H. Jackson's conception of the plot of *Ramona*, or Paul's conversion.

In the third place, the person becomes more or less conscious of the existence of this larger Life or Truth or Reality, and hungers and thirsts after it. There is a variety of attitudes which religionists assume in the presence of this "trans-marginal" Reality. The Positivist is

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 174, quoted by James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 434.

² Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 437.

heartful, but is modest in his demands and guards against an overdose. The Mystic insists on having it all or none. The inhibition of the Agnostic has often within it a tentative affirmation. He is comparable with a boy when he starts fishing and makes a great point of his doubt whether there is anything worth catching in the whole creek—and half believes, all the while, that it is full of fine large fish. His caution and poise are commendable to many professing Christians, who sometimes scare the fish away by too much stalking and overconfidence. With all the shades of difference, the religious man is one who believes in his deepest heart in the immediate reality of the transcendent life. He is confident, too, that it is possible for it to deliver up its truth to him. Professor Harnack, in his "Essence of Christianity," has aptly said that Christianity is nothing more nor less than eternal life in the midst of time. Religion is that, certainly, and more. It is infinity attached by its nether extremity. It is boundless love projected beyond our common human loves. It is a little life breaking through at every point the barriers that shut it in, and, appreciating the limitations of thought and sense, sharing more and more the enveloping and infusing Divine Life.

Again, and lastly, the religious man is one who places himself in an *attitude to receive* the larger life. It has been the business of religion to cultivate in human beings certain persistent moods and attitudes, which place the individual in such a condition that the Divine Life may come in. It tries, on the one hand, to make men feel their insufficiency. It preaches down pride and vanity, and magnifies the degree of man's helplessness of himself to do anything. Its message is that of humility and dependence. On the other hand, it attempts to induce a state of obsession toward the Higher Life. Its keynote is *faith*. One must throw himself wholly in the direction of the Divine Life with confidence that it will be his. The affirmation of the heart in the direction of the Higher Truth involves a complete act of the will, and crystallizes into *belief*. Made as man is, with high resistance in his members, and a strong strain of negation in his heart, it is sometimes necessary for the worshipper simply to hold in check the impulses toward lesser expression, as in the case of many of the mystics and the Buddhist monks, until the Divine Life surges up of its own accord. Of the same kind, but more marked, is the need of a *surrender of the will* to God, whether it be in the persistent attitude of a Huxley toward the truth he is seek-

ing, or the supreme act of a perverse heart in entering upon the way of righteousness. A marked case in point is that of Bunyan, who must at last decide to surrender his soul to satan before God could take him. The dallying with, or winking at the Infinite of the Agnostic, referred to above, is somewhat of the same kind. But, in the midst of all the varieties, the type seems to be a person in full rapport with the God-life. He is responsive to it. He *loves* it, and so grows towards it, since the soul, like the body, grows by what it feeds upon. He feels in such close communion with it that he may commune with it in *prayer*, or in *song*, as friend with friend.

These are some of the characteristics of the religious life. It must be clear that throughout it is a *matter of the affective life*. The end of religion always and everywhere is to induce a heart and will response to the larger things of life that lead away towards unconditioned reality and boundless fulfillment. In the all inclusiveness of its states, religion allies itself with the affective life. Its appeal is always to those states of consciousness and attitudes toward life — faith, hope, love and service, which are directly opposed to the cognitive processes. Like music or poetry, although full of a sense of conviction and certainty, it is incapable of reduction to terms of ideation. Like the highest music, it is abused in all it stands for by attempts at concrete description and rational interpretation, and yet it can stand forth and utter its messages with the utmost assurance, and the generations that follow put their truth to the final test, and often a successful one, — that of fitness to the completest and most satisfying life. The appeal is almost always away from the cognitive-rational processes toward such wisdom as can come to babes and sucklings and the childlike and the pure in heart. Toward the supreme object of religion, the God-life, the reason must be in abeyance. He cannot be found out by searching. If one can comprehend Him, Augustine taught, it is not God. The great religions have hesitated to give Him specific attributes or even give Him a name, preferring to use an indefinite term as “I am that I am,” or merely “that” or “it,” or “om” as in some phases of Brahmanism. The proper attitude seems to be that of waiting or feeling or listening. “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear,” hearing being very closely related, as psychology has shown, with the deeper emotional life. Feeling after God is the condition of finding Him, and the success of the search is reported to the heart by a witness of the spirit. There is not

enough theology or ethics in the Sermon on the Mount to make a single modern sermon, and yet the world looks upon it as being the profoundest religious document the world has seen. It speaks directly to the heart.

So strong is the conviction of mankind that religion is a thing of the heart and not of the intellect that there has been constantly, in the history of religion, a confusion of non-rationality and irrationality. Men have been tempted to choose as fitting objects of religious expression the novel, the exceptional, the spectacular, and almost any phrase or dogma that smacks of anomaly or mystery. They have even been willing to say, "I believe because incredible." The conviction behind such an attitude is essentially right. The cure for the malady is in coming to appreciate not only that the verities of religion, like those of art, are not always capable of rational analysis, but that the truths projected in line with and in terms of the affective life are to be accepted (tentatively, of course, and within limits, and subject to criticism through rational methods) within their own sphere.

In an excerpt, such as this, there are certain to be many apparent distortions. Before going farther, one of these must be guarded against. The point of view is not, as might appear, that feeling is the basal thing in life and also in religion. On the contrary, in both it is a secondary and derived factor in development. The fundamental fact of life is, perhaps, a *tendency toward reaction* in the presence of manifold stimuli. The unit of consciousness is not a feeling or an idea or a volition. It is all of these bound up in a single fact—a stock of latent energy set to respond to the outside world for the sake of completer life adjustment and enlargement. One cannot observe the behavior of the simpler types of life or of the newborn without seeing that at first the reactions are more or less indiscriminate, in respect both to stimulus and to character of response. Out of the multiplicity of responses those are gradually selected that happen to fit some need of the organism. Those which are felt to subserve some useful life function are seized upon, emphasized through repetition, transmitted through blood and social heredity, until, being crystallized in habit, instinct and custom, they become a common possession of the species. This view, that a set of activities and reactions is the basal fact of life, is not a new one. It has been formulated in one way or another by several of our leading psychologists. It is ample to suggest Dewey's "organic circuit," James's

“native reactions,” Baldwin’s “excess of discharge,” Münsterberg’s “action theory of consciousness,” Loeb’s “tropisms” and Royce’s “mental initiative.”

The next consideration, however, will not be so readily conceded. The set of reactions which make up the stream of life go on, for the most part, without making any distinct report to consciousness; development has been chiefly concerned with differentiating *specialized means* of taking note of a larger number of the complex elements of life, which even in the most developed creatures flow on beneath the reach of consciousness. The means that have been set apart are two-fold—feeling and ideation, each with its separate mechanism. These have arisen out of conduct, and exist primarily and solely for conduct. Consciousness has thus a double hold upon its processes by way of estimating their fitness. Through the ideational powers it can re-present them, bring them into relation, hold them in check and forecast their outcome. Through the feelings,—of pleasure and pain, expansion and contraction, tension and recoil,—it receives a direct and non-mediated account of its own inner life, the consistency of its variety of processes among themselves, and of the adjustment of inner and outer relations. Both intellection and feeling, as Prof. James has said of the former, are secondary and derived products. They are both, as Prof. Dewey has fittingly called the latter (*Psych. Rev.* II: 15) “the internalizing of activity or will.” With all their differences in content, they subserve the same function in the animal economy, viz., to give to consciousness an account of its own inner life, a report upon the facts of the outside world, and an estimation of its adjustment or lack of adjustment to the sum of outer relations.

In this point of view, the feelings in religion are but surface hints of movements that are going on beneath, and these latter are the vital part of the experience. The essential thing in religion is not to cultivate a set of feelings, but, in the serious concern about the things that make for righteousness, to come to appreciate from the inside the meaning of the life movements of which the feelings are a criterion. The feelings are often made an end in religion, it must be admitted. But, when this occurs, it is analogous to the many instances in which a means to an end, as wealth, clothing, food or pleasure, can become an end in itself, and is usually a distortion. It is also true that by the intensity of religious experience the foam and spray that break at the

surface have served to obscure the currents beneath. So much is this the case that an occasional student of religion has believed "that feeling is the deeper source of religion." It is becoming impossible to get on psychologically without postulating that life throughout is somehow auto-dynamic, that the functioning of the organism is a primary fact, and that self-expression is both means and end in itself. So in religion, many of the central phenomena—worship, love, ritual, enthusiasm, missionary zeal, struggling after ideals even through difficulty and pain—are hardly comprehensible except that they are means of higher self-expression. I believe there is hardly a case among the many records of religious experience, however much saturated with emotion, that will not show, on further analysis, that the feelings are but indexes of life movements and adjustments that are working themselves out. In this view of the mental life it seems probable that conduct, activity and will are the deeper sources of religion, and that its chief end and function is as a means of *self-expression* in the higher reaches of developed life, just as are play and art on its lower planes.

Even if religion is at bottom a matter of spiritual dynamics, this fact does not weaken the part that feeling plays in it. If we include in feeling its groundwork in organic reactions, *i. e.*, the affective life, our claim is that religion, art and all forms of "appreciation" have their setting almost entirely in this sphere, as suggested above, just as logic, mathematics and science have theirs among the cognitive processes. The question then arises, have these departments of life any power to reach out beyond the limits of the self and take account of fact and truth of the external world, or are they a species of pure subjectivity? Both reason and feeling are the "internalizing of activity or will," and the power of the reason to grapple with the outer world is fully recognized; but have the feelings any such power? Recent developments in empirical psychology are undoubtedly pointing toward an affirmative answer to the question.

It is safe to affirm unreservedly that the affective life gives us as valid an account of external facts and relations, truth and reality, as does the cognitive. It exists essentially for that end, *viz.*, to take account of the outer world, its significance to the life of the organism and of the degree of adjustment of the organism to its fullest environment. It seizes upon the outer world at the points at which this touches the subjective life, and couches its reading always in terms of well or ill-being,

whether it is the amoeba selecting between yeast plant and harmful food substance, or the religionist wrestling with the problem of immortality. Furthermore, an affective response is the absolutely essential condition of appreciation of any kind, as well in science and logic as in art and religion. This is nothing more than to say that there is no intellectual attention without interest (James, Psychology I, 416) with which almost all psychologists are in agreement. But it is equivalent to asserting that throughout the mental life, in all its aspects, the final appeal is always to an affective response. A sense of "worth" or "values" which is the primary mode of judgment in religion, art and morals is also the seat of authority behind every intellectual act or affirmation. The ideational processes come in only in the presence of a complication or inhibition. Whenever the original sense of worth or fitness is reasonably satisfying, that is accepted as final.

The feelings are perhaps never purely subjective. There is present always somewhere in a succession of organic changes and reactions a set of external stimuli, and the animal invariably responds by some fitting act or adjustment, which shows respect for the external fact. Hunger and satiety are spoken of as being subjective experiences, but farther reflection must show them to be as far from it as are visual experiences or auditory. The organism takes definite note of an objective fact, the food; judges its qualities, as shown by its preference for special foods, hunger for some and repugnance against others; takes account of their relation to its well-being, keeping track of the relationships through a sense of hunger or satiety, exuberance or gloom, and acts accordingly through selection, rejection and assimilation. There is an exact analogy at every point between this "blind" sense and that of visual experiences: in both there are the specialized nerve endings; the stimuli; the chemical action on the nerves; the accompanying reflexes; the report to consciousness, partly clear and partly submerged, of an objective fact and of a subjective condition and of the relation between subject and object. The only *real* difference between the two is that the eye has data to work with that are somewhat discrete and quantitatively definable, while the instinct of hunger has, so far as the field of clear consciousness is concerned, only qualitative data which cannot be so easily objectified and localized, and so it can take note of them only in terms of feeling. So it is in enjoying or disliking a work of art. The elements that enter into it are such that consciousness has no

mechanism by which it can trace them out and define them. They play directly upon the vaso-motor and sympathetic nervous system responses, and these give to consciousness a non-mediated sense of satisfaction or displeasure. Consciousness may busy itself later in trying to pick out its characteristics for the sake of better representation of what it has found, in order to fix and repeat and communicate them; but in the nature of the case this can never be adequately done, and the message of the picture must remain a matter of "appreciation" or "worth," *i. e.*, of affective response.

The usual explanation of such matters is, of course, that the total experience is the outcome of the creaming off of a multiplicity of dim and half-forgotten *associations*. This view, in the history of the theories of art and religion, one must admit, has been extremely unsatisfactory; and in the light of the developments of experimental research on organic changes in the presence of stimuli is becoming entirely untenable. The vaso-motor reactions have been clearly shown, in voluminous experiments on the affective life since the early ones of Mosso, invariably to accompany all emotional states and intellectual processes. These changes are direct and immediate. The point to note is that they are as liable to precede as to accompany or follow the corresponding conscious elements, and that in many, if not in the most instances they arouse no conscious counterpart that the mind can lay hold upon and adequately cognize. Experiments upon sleeping reagents are suggestive in this connection. Every sound is responded to by circulatory changes, but arouses no mental process that can be recalled. The bearing of this on art and religion must be apparent. They are the spheres of experience in which mankind is in touch with truth and reality in such a way that its elements are not easily describable and cognizable, but must remain for the most part in terms of appreciation. They are essentially non-rational, and in the nature of the case must remain so. The dominance of intellectualism in psychology, and the persistence of the explanations of art in terms of subliminal associations, is due to the simple fact that, until recently, since empirical psychology has been unable to demonstrate more adequately how consciousness behaves, we have been, of necessity, ignorant of the fineness of the organic response to the outside world, and have imagined that the little peaks of experience that project into the sphere of cognition and ideation were everything, and that they were causal rather than epiphenomenal. Ig-

norant of the presence of those hidden sources of judgment, affection and action, we have supposed that our lives were controlled by clear perception and logical inference, which is not true, even in matters of science and invention. The history of science amply shows that the line of approach to discoveries is that, first, of happening upon a curious or surprising situation or occurrence, and then of tactful adjustment to the situation which leads to the discovery of the laws involved. The proverb, necessity is the mother of invention, expresses the exact way inventions have always been made. Professor Mach, of Vienna, who has earned the right to speak with authority, in his recent volume of *Popular Lectures*, describes the method of invention and discovery, and gives many illustrations to show that it is adjustment to "fortuitous circumstances." Huygens, for instance, says of the discovery of the telescope, that not only was it not discovered according to the laws of physics and geometry, but he would regard it as a superhuman mind that could explain it by these laws after it had been discovered. The condition behind discovery is a *sense* or *feeling* of harmony or discord among phenomena, and of adjustment or maladjustment between consciousness and its objects. The final test of all reasoning is a sort of intuition or feeling of worth or value, just as in the normative sciences. It will be for the health of science and philosophy to accept the fact that speculation, reflection and reasoning have their beginning and end in our intimations of truth that are not below the threshold of reason but above it; not only behind reason giving to it its impulse, but within it, at every step guiding its course and approving or rejecting its conclusions.

If the affective life is the ultimate tribunal in science and philosophy, even more marked is it such in morals, poetry, art, music and religion. In this latter group it is about the only appeal; and mankind will have to learn to trust its reports, just as they do, as a *practical* fact, until confronted with the demand for proof or demonstration. We try to build a science of poetry, for example, without recognizing what is probably true, that the only way to enter into the life of the poet that has at last crystallized into this particular poem, is to allow the play of the music, the cadence, the meter, the rhyme, and all, saturated with a message, to work upon the feelings until they blossom out into an obsession in the reader corresponding to that in the heart of the poet. The first important thing is to be able to respond organically to the multitudinous hints that are present in the poem, and that part of its nature has

largely taken care of herself in the sum of developed instinctive endowments. The secondary requisite is to be able to call up into definite appreciation and apprehension the presence and meaning to life of these reactions. The experiments of Feré¹ on musical and non musical reagents seem to demonstrate this truth. With reagents musically trained and others without musical tastes he re-established the fact that consonant tones heightened the bodily tone, as shown by an increased ability in muscular performance in the presence of the tones, and that dissonant tones produced a corresponding lowering of ability. The bodily response was the same with both groups of reagents, whether or not they could consciously recognize the consonances and dissonances. He draws the inference that the difference between musical cultivation and a lack of it is that "the most richly endowed have simply superior powers of penetrating the phenomena that take place within them."

Something like this is true, I believe, of all the specialized forms of appreciation. Religion is a *feeling adjustment* to the deeper things of life, and to the larger reality that encompasses the personal life. In this point of view many of the phenomena connected with religion seem to fall into place: the elimination of all sense experiences; the negation of everything specific from the field of consciousness, as with Buddhist seekers after Nirvana and the Christian mystics; contemplation, revery and fasting; the denunciation of "worldly" occupations and enjoyments; distrust of science and worldly wisdom; reliance on faith, hope, love, aspiration and prayer; the fullness and wholeness of its experiences when they come; the frequent accompaniments of these in weeping, swooning, groaning, trance, ecstasy, hallucinations and other marks of organic tension and somatic reaction. These are all marks of an attempt to break away from the dominance of the cognitive processes, and are indications that the affective have been given full sway. That religion is a matter of life and world adjustment is evidenced also by many of these phenomena, as well as by the fundamental place occupied by the sense of sin and need of salvation. This is doubtless the dominant note of most of the religions of the world,—a man out of tune, undone, with a heritage of imperfection and sin and consequently helpless and hopeless, in the presence of the possibility of sinlessness and divine perfection.

¹ Feré and Jaëll : *Revue Scientifique*, Dec. 20, 1902.


The reader who has followed the discussion so far will have wondered many times what this Truth or Reality is to which the individual is trying to adjust himself, and which religion proposes to reveal. If the significance of the foregoing has been gathered up, it must be clear on second thought that the question is not a pertinent one. A description such as this, would commit, in the act of answering it, the same folly of which theology and other forms of rationalism have been guilty all along. We must trust the reports of religion for that, as put to the test of individual and collective experience. What a description can do, and that is our next consideration, is to show more specifically, by the way consciousness behaves, that it is so constituted that it can reach out far beyond the range of its definable and consciously appreciable experiences, and interpret them and their bearing upon life.

In the first place, the individual life draws from a limitless past. What is known of blood heredity, instinct, imitation and social heredity, will render this sufficiently clear. The individual, in the truest sense, shares the wisdom of all the life that has gone before, with all its successes and failures, aspirations and tragedies. He comes into life guided, in a measure, by "that fine hereditary memory we call conscience," as Guyau has termed it. Religion, centering as it does in the affective life, is in the direct line of this heritage. Hence it is that its intimations and intuitions are sometimes wiser guides to life and conduct and to the interpretation of the things of life that touch it than are the ideational processes that gather their data from the tangled mesh of concrete data.

A second consideration is this, that the affective life can interpret the phenomena of the present in more delicate ways than we can possibly know, that is, than the bungling mechanism of the senses and intellectual activities can ascertain. However anomalous the statement may seem, it has been proven to be true by empirical psychology, in subjecting the facts of experience to experimental control. Professor Dexter has shown that such intangible factors as atmospheric conditions exert a consistent influence upon behavior.¹ Pierce and Jastrow have demonstrated that imperceptible differences in the degree of illumination of two surfaces will give rise in a majority of instances to a correct

¹School Department and the Weather. Monograph Supplement to the Psy. Rev. No. 10.

judgment of difference.¹ The degree of difference is made so slight and the time of exposure so short that they appear the same, but the guesses of difference pile up on the side of right judgments. A set of experiments which show a similar fact was devised by Dr. Singer.² Pairs of like and different figures were shown for an instantaneous time, requiring judgments of likeness and difference and, where different, the respect in which they differed. The correct judgments of difference were far in excess of the ability to point out the character of the difference. From experiments upon the Müller-Lyer figures for optical illusions it has been found that the projection of imperceptible shadows in the place of the slanting lines at the extremities of the equal lines *a* and *b* will produce a similar illusion.³ The



projection of such lines is, perhaps, not necessary to demonstrate the point. By any theory that has been advanced to explain the illusion, *imperceptible* eye movements or eye tensions or what not have tricked the judgment beyond the power of correction. A mass of evidences which point in the same direction arise from the studies of memory, association, hypnotism, suggestion and "unconscious cerebration." When taken in connection with the studies upon the extreme delicacy of the vaso-motor responses to internal and external stimuli, referred to above, they are sufficient to demonstrate beyond question that the world we take in and use and interpret is extended indefinitely beyond the limits of our conscious states. A crude psychology of the "five" senses and of a set of intellectual processes built upon them has been crumbling and must fall entirely. The mental life acts more like the plant which feeds, through leaves and roots, from air and soil, and blossoms out into flower and fruit, which are merely specialized parts of the entire life of the plant, and an outgrowth therefrom. The mere blossoming out of the mental life is the specific, conscious intellections, affections and volitions. Or it is like the floating iceberg with only a peak projecting above, while it is the part beneath that catches the currents and determines its movements.

¹ Published originally in *Mem. Nat. Acad. Sci.*, Washington, 1884. Quoted by Donaldson, *Growth of the Brain*, p. 292.

² General and specific judgments. *Psych. Rev.*, for about 1897.

³ See Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, for a discussion of this and other experiments of a similar character.

It is the submerged nine-tenths of life with which psychology must reckon as well as with its projecting peaks. Of all the hints we gather from the world outside only a few are of so discrete and definable a nature that the "five" senses can handle them, and of such fixed relationships that the rational life can project upon them its stilted categories, or force them into its set molds. Still it must remain that these usable, thinkable, communicable facts that can be classified and tabulated and pigeon-holed, will possess a seemingly heightened significance over and above those which remain in the sphere of affective appreciation. It is well enough that they do, provided they be taken ever and always in their larger life setting. But if we pitch our tents about them as fixed and final, we and our little tents will meet a fatal shock when the larger currents of life sweep by, and we shall add one more to the wrecks that have strewn the course of history. It is the function of religion to help humanity keep its bark trimmed for the open sea. It is concerned chiefly with keeping men alive to the deeper streams of reality, out of which they are continually dragged by entanglement with the "objects" of consciousness in the form of definite ideas and specific feelings.

The extra-marginal or subliminal self is, as Professor James has shown in a large and true way, "the fountain head of much that feeds our religion." It will be a fortunate thing for religious psychology and philosophy if it can find a considerable descriptive background for the subconscious life and the part it plays in religion. It may save it from aimless wanderings and faulty generalizations, just as the introjection of a physiological description of the cognitive processes, has, without binding them to the finality of the terminology by which it spells out its facts, exerted, on the whole, a salubrious influence upon psychology. The foregoing discussion means to suggest, although in a hasty and imperfect way, some points in such a descriptive background.

Before specifying two or three of the particular correctives it may supply, I shall try to sum up, as concisely as possible, the view of the mental life herein set forth, or else implied.

The basal characteristic of life is its tendency to reaction. It is dynamic throughout. The moving force in practical life, science, art, religion, and everywhere, is the impulse to self expression and self-fulfillment. That which determines the course along which life moves is its sensitivity and its constant adjustments to the outer world. In the

simpler types of life and in babies, a feeling response is the only means of interpreting the successive situations into which they glide, and even in the most highly cultivated creatures, an affective response is their chief reliance. There have arisen, not parallel with, nor out of, but in the midst of the complicated set of reactions that are going on, two sets of specialized functions, the intellectual and the feeling processes. They are for the purpose of taking account of a certain fraction of the stock of reactions for the sake of fuller adjustment, although most of them remain out of the reach of conscious interference. Going parallel with both these specialized functions is a corresponding differentiation of physiological structure. The mechanism for the cognitive-intellectual group of activities consists of the senses in so far as they are able to dissect and define their data, the basal ganglia for the co-ordination of sensations, and for the further elaboration of these, the "association centres" in the cerebrum. The mechanism of the affective life consists of all the senses in so far as they respond to stimuli that do not admit of discrete handling, the nerve endings in skin, intestines, blood vessels, glands, muscles and joints, the sympathetic nervous system with all its ramifications, and perhaps, also, structures in the central nervous system corresponding to the "association centres." The affective life thus involves all the organic reactions in vaso-motor response, circulatory and glandular tone, vascular tension and the like, which experimentation is showing to be the immediate and ever present accompaniment of all sensation. These reactions are the selected and transmitted acquisitions of race experience, and so bear within them not only a fine intimation of the forces that are playing in the present environment, but also a strain of proven and tried wisdom from the past. The higher emotions and sentiments are but specialized aspects of the affective life, and in consequence are able not only to interpret the present in the light of the past, but also to project the future. Morals, art and religion, which have their setting in the affective life, are in the central stream of race development.

The point of view here suggested is thus consistent with the James-Lange theory of the emotions; but does not stop there. It says further that the feeling life draws *directly* from experience, and not through the mediation of the cognitive processes; that is, it is itself a direct source of knowledge. Furthermore, it is through the affective life, and through that alone, that we can interpret any objective facts or rela-

tions and their significance to life. The facts of descriptive psychology referred to above, and also the manifold proofs of experimental psychology of the way the conscious life is influenced by imperceptible stimuli, throw open the door for such a conception. An immediate organic response is the vital part, not only of every intellectual interest, but also of every sensation, not excluding those of sight which are capable of the exactest definition. Without an affective response an eye-brain process, if it could exist, would be but a blank. The anatomical and physiological evidences to corroborate or overthrow this conception, which is in line with the psychological evidences, are yet problematical; but they are not altogether wanting. Dr. Oppenheimer has published a considerable body of evidence that the sense organs are connected directly with the mechanism of organic response.¹

This view of the mental life has a direct bearing, in many ways, upon one's interpretation of religious phenomena. In conclusion, we can notice only a few of the more important implications. Its most direct outcome is to bring out into clearer perspective the claim that religious geniuses have made all along, that religion is essentially non-rational. It is a life, and not a system. Its reports of truth are direct and immediate, just as are the instincts that guide the brute or babe and the moral intuitions that prompt conduct; and the chances are that its wisdom will be blurred and distorted by an over-degree of rationality. A theology is no more a religion than a set of articulated bones are a human being. The content of religion usually leaks out through the cracks and joints of a rational scheme. While theologians are patching up one crevice, the pure waters of religion are flowing away through a dozen others, and soon their vessel of faith and love is left empty and dry. Theology can pick at religion, and the psychology of religion can probe a little into it, but the great affirmations of the spiritual life will continue to speak directly to the heart and to conduct regardless. And life will test them, as it has done in the past, by the ultimate test of larger living, and find them true.

We are in a position now, I think, to understand better the breach between science and religion, between art and practical life, why the mystics and other religionists have distrusted the senses and worldly wisdom, and appealed to a higher kind of wisdom, and why the indi-

¹Dr. Z. Oppenheimer: "*Bewusstsein-Gefühl*," Wiesbaden, 1903.

vidual life is liable to be torn between two contending worlds, that of the lower, external, and the inward, spiritual life. It is because we are made as we are. It is a cleavage that will persist as long, perhaps, as the sympathetic nervous system and the central nervous system each continues to do business, to some extent, on its own account. It is a breach that should not continue, because all phases of life have their legitimate function and tend to make a whole man. But with individual differences so great as they are, and temperaments varying as they do, there will always be, doubtless, a group of persons whose tastes prefer the merchandise of the intellect to the food of the spirit, and still others who instinctively rebel against anything that does not appeal directly to the spiritual tastes. The breach will heal as men gradually appreciate more fully the meanings and modes of the complicated life process, and that each is set apart to subserve some useful end in giving us a larger and truer world.

The most significant implication of the foregoing discussion, but one that, I fear, has not come out in the bold relief that it deserves, is that the reports of religion are to be trusted. Religion is in the direct line of development from the higher refinements of the affective life, which is the source, and guide and ultimate tribunal of any knowledge whatsoever. It utters only a few great verities, but it holds them up in defiance of sense and reason wherein they clash, and the heart of men responds to them just as it does to the music of Beethoven or Wagner or the poems of Browning, and grows by them without knowing how or why.

Although the kind of knowledge (or wisdom) that religion professes cannot be couched in the stilted terms of the intellect, it has nevertheless an *objective* content. We have seen how consciousness interprets rightly, not only the dreamy unnoticed facts that surround it, but also those that are entirely imperceptible. The affective life is, perhaps, the only means of appreciating the objective world.

As to the *nature* of the objective reality with which religion proposes to be in rapport, as has been said, it is, in the nature of the case, beside the mark to raise the question. There are hints, however, of what it may, or may not be, that are legitimate observations. We are able to see the way in which new insights, or inspirations or revelations come in. They are the organic reaction factors that enter into the subliminal self, which are the registration of responses to the influx of finer influences that play upon consciousness until they finally burst in the field

of clear consciousness. This does not eliminate the divine element in such experiences. It only tends to give us a God that is adequate to compass the whole of life. It gives glimpses of a divine life that not only infuses this little span of the personal life but a reality that extends infinitely beyond it after which the personal life is feeling. We can see in a fresh way the conclusion of Prof. James that the larger reality is continuous with the personal life and not at variance with it. It looks as if the conscious self were but the blossoming into *self* consciousness of the stuff of which the world is made.

We have here a tangible means of approach to the conception that religion is a species of social, racial and world adjustment. To the extent that one recognizes the sensitivity of consciousness to all the influences that are playing about, this truth takes on a tinge of reality. To this extent, too, do a "telepathic law" (of the wireless telegraphic sort) and the introjection of spirit communications, in explaining the phenomena of religion, become superfluous.

The point of view here outlined, finally, leans in the direction of monism or monotheism instead of a dualistic or pluralistic interpretation of the world. If it comes to be believed that the affective life is the real approach that mankind has ever made and must ever make, in arriving at truth, while a developed intellect is but its necessary and efficient tool, it is almost inevitable that the trend of faith will be in the direction of the world-old struggle toward monotheism. "The passion for unity," to which philosophy has been addicted, instead of being regarded as a possible self-deception in the interest of peace of mind and ultimate safety may with equal plausibility be considered as a sane intimation, an incursion through the affective door of a higher bit of world wisdom, which dominates the life of mankind in spite of the inevitable splitting and dissecting to which the intellect subjects all the stuff it handles.

LITERATURE.

The Beginnings of Christianity, by PAUL WERNLE. Tr. by G. A. Bienemann. Ed. w. introd. by W. D. Morrison. Vol. 1. *The Rise of the Religion*. (Theological Translation Library. Vol. 17.) G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 389. Vol. 2. *The Development of the Church*. 1904. pp. 376.

This is the most matured product of the scholarship of one of the most brilliant theologians of the younger generation. It is written with very unusual vivacity, insight, and charm, and addressed only to those who are prepared to accept the bolder results of New Testament criticism. The central idea is first to ascertain what the Gospel is as seen in the character and teachings of Jesus, and second to measure all the later expositions of the Gospel by the Gospel itself. If we would know what the latter really is we must free its eternal substance from its historical form. When we thus eliminate the supernatural birth, the Resurrection, the miracles, the limited conceptions of the antique world, the belief in hierarchies of thronging spirits, etc., we find that Jesus prepared the ground for a new religious community, but did not himself organize it nor did his early followers, largely on account of the belief of an impending end of things. His disciples could not liberate themselves from Judaism nor impress the Gentiles. Both these tasks were the great and transcendent work of St. Paul, to whose character and theology a large part of the work is devoted. It derived its character from the situation in which the apostle was placed. He must defend himself from both Jews and Gentiles and direct his apologetic now against one, now against the other. The work closes with an analysis of the writer of the Apocalypse, the oldest and only document springing out of early Christian enthusiasm. He believes it represents the general lay opinion of the primitive church. The world was rapidly coming to an end. Man's supreme duty was to seek salvation from the coming judgment by watchfulness and repentance. In this state men had no thought of setting up stable, ecclesiastical forms or institutions. But they had in them new life the chief feature of which was self-mastery, love of God and each other, such as the world had never seen before. They were conscious that this new life came direct and solely from the living spirit of the Redeemer. This new faith is the first momentous event that has ever entered human history and the manner in which it took place is presented to us in this volume with unusual light, sympathy, and power. The writer's mastery of expression is remarkable. His opinions, which seem sometimes a little too confident where men no less wise or liberal walk with doubt and fear, are always illuminating and suggestive, and we predict for these volumes an important and a salutary influence upon the Christian thought of the next few years. His insights into the consciousness of Jesus and his conception of the Messianic idea, his interpretation of the temptations, the essence of the kingdom, the relation of the disciples and of believers to the Master, show unusual psychic penetration. Perhaps no recent writer has combined such frank and hearty concessions to all that modern criticism has urged against everything supernatural and everything that belonged to Jesus' circle of thought, which modern science has condemned, with more penetrating insight into, and more enthusiastic appreciation of the value of the life and teachings of Jesus than this author. He makes here no attempt to go into the details of critical scholarship, but to draw the important conclusions from a wide field, so that his book may perhaps, without exaggeration, be compared in its value to the world with that of Harnack's "Essence of Christianity."

Die Entstehung des Christentums, von ALBERT KALTHOFF. Neue Beiträge zum Christusproblem. Eugen Diederichs, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 155.

The author quotes at the outset, with only slightly qualified approval, Professor Kahler's statement that "we possess no single certainly authentic word of Jesus," and a longer quotation from Professor Steck, another theologian in Bern, to the effect that the further we penetrate into the Gospels the more we find that subjec-

tivity predominates over history, that many of the parables seem to have originated in the minds of the early disciples rather than in that of Jesus. Kalthoff urges that Christianity is far more than has been hitherto suspected a product of social evolution rather than the work of an individual founder, that we can never agree as to the historical Jesus, the views of Franz Overbeck, professor of Basel, to the effect that Christian theology lacked Christianity and was unscientific. His book was published in 1873 at an unfavorable time. This book appears to have had an important influence, however, upon the views of our author, who, after a survey of the preliminary history of Christianity in Rome, Greece, Judea, and in philosophy, etc., reaches the general conclusion that its chief characteristic of old was autonomy of the individual, the church being heteronomous. The ethics of Jesus from his conceptions were probably very elastic and well adjusted to its time and place. As the portraits of Jesus have reflected the impressions he has made upon many minds and ages, so should the conceptions of Jesus' life and work be plastic. Jesus is more a type than a model which can be copied. Types of people and races constantly vary and develop. "Socially considered Christ was originally the type of the autonomous or divine man in the church communion. The Christ-type has been variously nationalized and the historic Jesus has been represented as a type of the patriot, the democrat, the obedient subject, a revolutionary leader. In a sense Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an important modernization of a highly personal type of man. A new Jesus type breaks old tables of value. Thus we must constantly change the type and prevent historical rigidity. Christianity has always been a prophetic religion and its most intimate power has been based upon a belief in the future. But future ideals constantly vary and differ essentially from the ideals of the past in their plasticity. Historical theology has only asked what was. The chief question of Christianity should always be what ought to be and what will be. Thus alone will it have a free course for a natural future development. The theological Christ must be unprogressive. Only the prophetic type can be a blessing for future races. It does not live by the bread of history alone. The secularized Christ as a type of autonomous man is a conception which should resurrect the old Christ type of the church, the schoolmaster, the theologian, and become the Christ of the people. Just as Jesus broke the bonds of Judaism, so his ideal goes marching on and should be always more ready to divest itself of everything local and temporal. It must no longer rest upon Jesuanism of the past, and every age, century, and race must have its own Christ.

Die Religion des Neuen Testaments, von BERNHARD WEISS. J. G. Cotta, Berlin, 1903. pp. 321.

When in 1852 this author published his habilitation thesis he discussed the relation of exegesis to Biblical theology. This then almost newly discovered science he has since represented in his well known text book of the Biblical theology of the New Testament, now in its seventh edition. He had also postulated a purely historical presentation of the many New Testament tropes and forms of teaching which should bring these manifold and broken lights into a fuller unity. It is this latter problem to which the author addresses himself in this volume, in which he seeks to show that the New Testament is a unique unity and not merely a group of disjointed phenomena in the shoreless sea of religious history. This is no system of theology, but the scripture is left to speak for itself. Thus, in the introduction he discusses the essence of Christianity and revelation, the Holy Scriptures, religion, and theology. In the first part on the pre-suppositions of salvation he treats the essence of God, the world, man, sin and its results, the divine government of the world, and the preparations for salvation. Under these captions he gathers the expressions of the Scriptures upon each of the four or five sub-divisions of these heads. In the next part, devoted to the salvation in Jesus, God as the son, the man, the life work of Jesus, the significance of his death, the exalted Christ and the Holy Spirit, the word, and the sacrament are discussed. Under the realization of salvation, calling, and election, the belief and status of salvation, regeneration, sanctification, the church, the Kingdom of God, and the last things are treated.

The Virgin Birth of Christ, by PAUL LOBSTEIN. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 138.

This famous monograph by the Professor of Dogmatics at the University of

Strasburg is here rendered into good English. It is a brilliant and masterful, although very concise discussion of its topic by a writer who, as the notes at the end show, commands all the ancient and modern literature. At the outset he proceeds vehemently against all such points of view as that set forth by Dr. B. W. Randolph in his "The Virgin Birth of Our Lord," who assumes that the alternative is either the literal truth of the record or the deliberate and conscious falsehood of the recorder. This alternative Lobstein declares to be antiquated in view of modern scholarship concerning myth and the popular consciousness generally. He shows with sufficient detail how the infancy stories of Luke and Matthew have no inherent connection with the rest of these Gospels; points out their contradictions one with the other; emphasizes the fact that the two genealogies which have but two names in common are both of Joseph only and, therefore, if the record is true, have no genetic record with Jesus; that the genealogies were probably incorporated from older sources in a clumsy way; tells us how very little outside this infancy record the Gospels themselves make use of the virgin birth; shows why Paul in none of his writings makes the slightest allusion to it, but bases all his arguments for the divine nature of Jesus upon the resurrection; describes how developing as the story did under the influence of the dogmas of divinity and sinlessness or the dual nature of Jesus, it was soon found necessary to vent the same dogmatic tendency upon the mother in order that Jesus might be pure on both sides from the hereditary taint of sin; shows how this tendency cropping out first in the assumption of virginity passed to that of perpetual virginity, then into the Immaculate Conception of Mary herself; gives many illustrations of the extreme and grotesque efforts of many apocryphal writers to add details, often very noxious, by way of confirmation and of metaphysical speculation to volatilize in many ways the plain story of the virgin birth; and, finally, postulates a theology that shall frankly drop this burden. He treats the whole topic with extreme delicacy and even reverence and recognizes fully that the edification value of the nativity story has from long association become very great. He would safeguard this reverence in every possible way by his own solution, which he admits will apply chiefly only to scholars, that these tales developed out of the supposed necessity to give Jesus a divine as well as a human nature.

The Virgin Birth, by ALLAN HOBEN. Chicago, 1903. pp. 87.

This writer undertakes to set forth the views of all the early Christian writers, about twenty in number, who touched the subject of the Immaculate Conception, from Ignatius down to the Council of Nice. The more important passages are given in the original with summaries and also with efforts to give the whole matter historic perspective. The author's presentation is almost entirely colorless as perhaps befits an historical monograph. It is plain, however, that his sympathies and convictions incline toward a liberal view. He distinguishes very sharply between the Logos theories and the records as contained in Matthew and Luke. The former, he believes, preceded and following both movements came as incidental to the polemic against Docetism efforts to prove that Jesus had a body and a human nature. The work is done with conscientious care and apparently with quite sufficient scholarship, and all students of the topic will acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the author.

The Recovery and Restatement of the Gospel, by LORAN D. OSBORN. Chicago, 1903. pp. 253.

This Chicago thesis treats of matters which perhaps are not readily suggested by its title. Very early in its history the Gospel was obscured and underwent both ecclesiastical and theological transformation. This is briefly outlined from Origen to the Reformation. In this change both the personal and the moral element of the Gospel suffered eclipse. The recovery of the Gospel began with Luther, and was, at first, very promising, but a post-reformation movement re-eclipsed it and Greco-Catholic dogmatics revived. New emphasis was placed upon theology, and the formal displaced the material principle of the reformation. The dogmatic system was read back again into the Bible, and that in new ways. In the present century the instinct of return to the Christian records is seen in what is called both the popular and the scientific reopening of the Bible. The results of this movement are summarized as the recovered Gospel of Jesus, as the mediator of salvation of which God

is the author, as laying down its conditions and as describing it under two leading forms, first, as the kingdom of God, and second, as eternal life. The author then proceeds to discover in four chapters the nature, value, right and need of theological restatement. He then rather boldly suggests the outlines of a new theological system with Jesus at its heart. His mission and his person mediate eternal life, of which God is the author and man the recipient. The nature, entrance, continuance, result and award of eternal life are next set forth, and finally comes the consummation of the complete kingdom. From the time when the historical Jesus was superseded by the Logos and the Heavenly Father was made a metaphysical idea, philosophical dominion has been too great, and as generation has followed generation, epicyle has been added to cycle in theology, but theology has always proved a failure. Instead of leading the church, it has lagged behind and become a burden. It is arid, acrimonious, weakening, and misrepresents the Gospel of Jesus. The author, therefore, proposes that instead of having the Gospels revolve about philosophical dogma, it make the latter revolve about the historic Jesus. This method will solve all difficulties. It is somewhat Copernican. The old authoritative theology is not found in the Bible at all. It became attached to it by slow historic process and has nothing divine about it. Thus theology has become divorced from the life of the church and has split the latter into parties. He believes in a great impending theological reformation which shall overthrow the oldest and most comprehensive of all heresies, viz., that of changing the Gospel of salvation into a system of metaphysical philosophy. This would leave the church free from the culture of an ancient world to enter modern life on a new career of conquest. The Gospels will resume their rightful jurisdiction over conscience and will. If another theology arises, it will always be as a means and never an end.

Liberal Christianity. Its Origin, Nature and Mission, by JEAN REVILLE. Tr. and ed. by Victor Leuliette. Crown Theological Library. Vol. 4. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 205.

These lectures are a very plain, simple statement of the position and programme of liberal Protestantism. They do not pretend to present anything new to those informed about the movement. They stand for inner freedom and spiritual unity among all men of good will in their struggle against sin, selfishness and injustice. This is the true moral Catholicity of humanity. Those really liberal must speak out and confess their broad views. They must see that their children have education at once religious and moral and in this way also not pretend to be orthodox when they are not so. The double mindedness is a great evil which can only thus be avoided. Religion must be distinguished from doctrines and rites, and does not perish if these are even repudiated. The great enemies of liberal Christians are those who pillory sincerity, and the dual minds with religion and life in two distinct compartments of their brain are like husband and wife who can neither agree nor divorce, and so live under the same roof but separately. We must no longer teach miracles even in schools. These play no part whatever in the religious life of the present which supernaturalism limits. So, too, external authority must be rejected. Religion and progress can thus be harmonized. Liberal Christians are now often regarded, as the early Christians were by the pagans of antiquity, as being deniers, but the future is theirs. The substance of Christ's Gospel is the fatherhood of God and the resulting brotherhood of man. These two doctrines are really one and the same, at least each implies the other. Religion is "a living relation between the human individual and the powers or power of which the universe is a manifest station." Liberal Protestantism is founded on religious, moral and social experience.

The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion. By GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 196.

These lectures are by the professor of philosophy and history of religion in the Union Theological Seminary, and consist of addresses given in 1903 before the Divinity School at Yale. The book, however, deals very little with either philosophy or the history of religion. The criticism would perhaps lie chiefly against the second chapter, entitled the "Modern View of the World," which to our thinking reveals a totally inadequate conception of what modernity means. Subsequent lectures treat of reality and proof, the definition, development, varieties and conflicts

of religion, Christianity as religion, its conflicts and proofs, and Christianity as the absolute religion. When we reflect on what might have been said upon this topic at the present day, these lectures must be set down as disappointing and arid.

Apologie des Christentums. Erster Band: Religion und Offenbarung, von HERMAN SCHELL. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 1902. pp. 482.

This is the second edition of a work which has been recognized, since it first appeared in 1901, as a standard. The author denies that apologetics constitute a *Tendenz-science*. The new age makes new demands on religious science, and men like Mommsen, von Hertling, Güttler, Leumann and Lenz have opened almost a new era. The first part of this book is devoted to religious philosophy, which he treats by topics rather than by authors. The second part is on the philosophy of revelation. Under this he discusses the value of miracles and prophecy as criteria, with a final section on the secret of supernatural wisdom and holiness.

The Gospel and the Church, by ALFRED LOISY. Tr. by Christopher Home. Isbister & Company, Ltd., London, 1903. pp. 277.

This work is essentially a vigorous criticism of Harnack by an able Catholic writer. He discusses the following chief topics which he chooses from Harnack: the sources of the Gospels, the Kingdom of Heaven, the Son of God, the church, the Christian dogma, Catholic worship. His defence of the place of dogma and the function of worship and the nature of the church constitute the best part of this writer's work, and the impartial and careful reader will certainly be led, whatever his doctrinal point of view, to the conviction that Harnack's positions upon these topics need radical modification.

Geschichte der Logosidee in der Christlichen Litteratur, von ANATHON AALL. O. R. Reisland, Leipzig, 1899. pp. 493.

Although this work has been published some years it has just come to our notice. It is so thorough a piece of work, and treats of a subject of such importance to all students of historical philosophy, that we desire to briefly call the favorable attention of all readers of this journal to it. It begins with the very first logosophy of early Christendom as contained in the teachings of Jesus and Paul, and describes how Hellenistic effects are already manifest in the Epistles to the Colossians and Hebrews and in the Apocalypse. The next chapter traces the history of the form of the logos ideas as it appears in the fourth Gospel. The next describes its pervasive influence on the extracanonical Christian literature, first before and then in the great apologists from Justine to Minucius Felix. The author then discusses the great rôle it played in the controversies with heretics in the early Catholic church and in the Alexandrian writers, Clement and Origen. The last chapter amplifies its treatment by Origen.

The New Testament in the Christian Church. Eight Lectures, by EDWARD CALDWELL MOORE. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1904. pp. 367.

These lectures discuss the authorities of the early Christian church, the witness of the earliest Christian literature to the New Testament, the New Testament at the end of the second century, the closing of the canon in the West and in the East, the Renaissance and the Reformation, canonization and the origin of church government, the beginnings of the history of doctrine, and the idea of authority in the Christian church.

The Eschatology of Jesus, by LEWIS A. MUIRHEAD. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1904. pp. 224.

The standpoint of this work is sufficiently definite in the following sentence of the preface: "Jesus has revealed the supremacy of righteousness and holy love; but I am not aware that He has said or done anything, that makes it less absolutely true than it was before He came, that 'we know not what we shall be.'" These four lectures are entitled Presuppositions; the Main Features of Jewish Apocalypse considered in their Affinity to the Mind of Jesus; Jesus' Doctrine concerning the Consummation of the Kingdom, considered in relation to His Ethical Doctrine and His Messianic Consciousness; the Title "Son of Man." Jesus' age and the time immediately following were marked by a confident expectation of the speedy con-

summation of all things. This is found, although to a less degree, in many other ancient religions. Resurrection, parousia, judgment gave a futuristic tendency to all religious thought. The immediate successors in the work of Jesus were not only filled with yearning and fainting for the great consummation, but this made their work both intense and to some extent provisional. The kingdom was seen to be delivered up. God was the source and would be the goal of all. The dead would rise in due order. Christ would be subordinated to God. This impending close of history pervaded far ranged plans for the future but impelled to meet present exigencies rather than to think of the lasting church. The call to all to be ever ready raised moral life to a higher pitch than perhaps it had ever attained before. All gifts must be organized. The very purpose of creation was about to be revealed. The fall of Jerusalem was perhaps the beginning of the new train of events all of which had a transcendent and perhaps apocalyptic consummation described preferentially in terms of vision, light and glory. Happy he who lived to the parousia and so escaped death. Resurrection was the end and completion of personality. Perhaps the soul was to be clothed upon by a new body not entirely dissimilar from that which death had taken away. In some passages it seems uncertain whether the heavenly kingdom was to last forever or be temporal, whether it was mundane or transcendent, how far the pneuma would be changed. Perhaps everything in the transition from earthly to heavenly life depended upon the vigor of man's moral personality. The conception of Daniel played a very important role in all the figures and symbols of the great change and the new state.

With regard to the title "Son of God," Muirhead's conclusion is "that in a very real sense Jesus habitually placed His Messiahship outside the sphere of His ordinary human self-consciousness. If the fact of the Messiah in Jesus came as a revelation from the Father to His disciples, it does not seem to be saying anything more than is said in the story of His baptism to affirm that it was equally a revelation to Himself. It was a voice from heaven that said to Him—partly in the words of the 2nd Psalm—'Thou art My Son, the Beloved, in whom I am well pleased.' He had a vision of the Spirit of God descending upon Himself. His calling, therefore, did not proceed from a consciousness of powers born with Him and natural to His humanity. It came from a consciousness of special power lent to His human nature, and constituting, in the first instance, a temptation to it. In the crisis of the Temptation the power obtained the right place in His life." Jesus himself was, perhaps, so far as this title goes "ungestempelter Begriff." The Jewish apocalypse had provided many main ideas such as a final judgment, preliminary woes, wonderful advent, and some subsidiary ones like rewards and punishments in Hades, the principalities of evil spirits, and above all the conception of angels. Out of these views conceptions of pre-written history were sometimes framed. The apocalypses of the Old Testament are tracts for bad times, not born of, but in despair. The Book of Daniel originated in the times of the Syrian oppression; Psalms at the era of the first Roman invasion; the Similitudes of Enoch coincide with the massacres under Herod the Great. The assumption of Moses just preceded the fall of Jerusalem, and the revelations of Ezra and Baruch just followed it. Apocalyptists generally predict that the evil will continue and perhaps become worse, but assume ultimate deliverance. They often assume the name of a bygone saint or prophet because the voice of prophecy was generally believed to have ceased. The mind of Jesus had some special affinity with the Book of Daniel. Apocalyptic literature, Muirhead claims, marks the beginning in Jewish history, and so in the religious history of the world of a new idea regarding God, world and life. It brought the power of the transcendent to bear. The kingdom of Jesus assumed a "futuristic aspect." The imminence of this kingdom was one of the most certain and positive contents of the mind of Jesus. It was a near mystery, suggested a new view of the world. It impelled what ought to be to be, summed up all the good things belonging to the supernatural life of God's children, and many felt that this generation should not pass before these things were realized, although Jesus intimated no date. He warned against false prophets to arise in these last days, was perhaps misunderstood by his disciples who certainly had no certificate of accuracy. The Gospels are more or less preachy throughout, and their certainty is to some extent a moral certainty. Yet the main teachings of our Lord stand out distinctly. His ethical conceptions must be always the standards of interpretation.

St Paul's Conception of the Last Things, by H. A. A. KENNEDY. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1904. pp. 370.

This latest is also, as it ought to be, the best compendious exposition of its subject. After discussing the prominence of eschatology in all religious systems, the formative influences in Paul's conception of the last things are described. The influence of the Old Testament, especially the book of Daniel, the remarkable kinship of Paul with the prophetic spirit, the Old Testament teleology, the Day of the Lord and the parousia, the effect of Paul's Pharisaic training, the slow development of the Resurrection idea, the transformation of the old conception of Sheol, the divergent views as to the scope of the Resurrection, the effect of Paul's own experience on his doctrine, its relations to both the basis and the nature of future life, the Old Testament ideas of death as the absence and life as the presence of an indwelling, if not divine, spirit, the extraordinary prominence of the expectation of a speedy culmination of events, the scope of judgment from local to universal, the extemporized nature of much thought of organization due to the expected end of things, the Greek prejudice against the doctrine of Resurrection and Paul's interpretation of it, modern views of the spiritual body of an intermediate state, of the consummation of God's kingdom, and the relation of his views to Hellenism:—these topics present a wide range of themes for treatment. The author has with very great diligence utilized the authorities, so far mostly German, in this field, has taken pains, and has had the liberality to co-ordinate these views with a few modern psychological and philosophical conceptions, so that, while his own standpoint and conclusions are essentially conservative, his range of thought is wider than that of any one who has yet written upon the subject. It is refreshing to see the many diverse and often somewhat constrained, if not even fantastic, views which German savants have been led to take upon some of these matters and treated with so much common sense and scholarship combined that in most matters the author's views carry conviction.

Nevertheless, it seems to us this topic now needs, in addition to such masterly treatment as it finds here, a larger philosophical and also a subtler psychological discussion. This can only be made on a broad comparative basis which is here only hinted at but not at all attempted.

Die Offenbarung des Johannes, von JOHANNES WEISS. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1904. pp. 164. Preis, 4.80 m.

The author protests against the Tübingen alternative that either the Apocalypse or the Fourth Gospel could not have sprung from John, and holds that as a whole the Apocalypse did arise within the Johannine circle in which it was, in its early form at least, a sacred reading book. It took this form perhaps about A. D. 95 at the end of Domitian's reign, while the Gospel arose in the same circle ten or twenty years later. In local allusions and in many philological points the two resemble each other and certainly there was abundant room in the same mind for both the Apocalypse and the "imminent-mystic" view of the world. To explain how these two books could have arisen in the same circle so near each other the author turns to history. The Apocalypse had appeared, Domitian died, the prophecy was not fulfilled, and to the apocalyptic seer this was a hard blow. If Irenæus is right that John lived on to the time of Trajan, his death occurred a few years after the appearance of the Apocalypse. This was another hard blow to the Johannine circle who had expected their leader would live until the Lord's return. This prompted a change of mode and of view point. The eschatological ideas were changed, spiritualized, allegorized. After all these disillusionments it is now proclaimed that he who believes will not be judged, that he who does not is judged already. The great separation has already taken place. The dead already hear the voice. The Lord comes in the paraclete. He who sees Christ sees the Father. To be sure it was a great change from the impending parousia to impiety, but a normal one. Paul, too, marks the overcoming of eschatological ideas for piety in the present. This marked a new type of piety. Weiss thinks that the Asia Minor John wrote his Apocalypse before A. D. 70. Later he wrote his letter against the heresy in which he saw the coming of anti-Christ. When he wrote his Gospel he no longer awaited the second coming of the Lord. He survived all the witnesses of Jesus' work. Later his own work was re-edited. This may have been done in his own lifetime.

This rather startling theory is put forth with much modesty and is somewhat tentative by its author.

Die Ethik Jesu, von EDUARD GRIMM. Grefe & Tiedemann, Hamburg, 1903. pp. 293.

The writer first discusses the ethics of Jesus according to the verdict of modern contemporaries, scientific and social, Catholic and Evangelical, metaphysical and psychological. Here Nietzsche's view is given prominence, and a section is devoted to what is temporal and local and, therefore, by general consent modifiable. The chief captions are love of truth, the presupposition of all moral endeavor, the criteria of morality, the worth of personality, egoism and altruism, the relations of morals and religion, revenge and forgiveness, and the problem of redemption. These are the fundamental traits. Special problems and relations are differences between the early and the later teachings of Jesus, the conceptions of marriage, family, country, calling, possession, Kingdom of God, etc. The great need of our time, according to the author, is a more masculine Christianity. We must have that or else the lax, effeminate tone of Christianity will lapse towards the negative attitude of Buddhism. The old body of religion and virtue must be sloughed off and a new one made that fits the thought and feeling of our time better. No doubt it will bear the ear marks of our own time, but this will indeed be its practical merit if it has scientific defect. If this is done with fidelity to human nature and needs the great features of the ethics of Jesus will remain.

Die Tugendlehre des Christentums, von OTTO ZOCKLER. C Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1904. pp. 378.

This is not only a scholarly but an interesting sketch of the history of the various ethical views and systems which have been developed under the influence of Christianity, beginning with that of primitive Christianity, then taking up that of the pre-Augustine fathers of the Orient and the West, then the ethics of Augustine and his successors, tracing the history of the beginning of the charm of the number seven for sins and virtues. In the middle ages, the chief systems of both the Orient, and, especially, the West, are set forth from the pre-scholastic time down. An interesting section is devoted to the notion of virtue and vice in the life and art of the middle ages showing how they are set forth in sermons, pictures, poems, sacred dramas, etc. The Reformation time follows when the influence of the decalogue comes to the fore again in the Protestant ethics. Three types—the Lutheran, Melancthonian, and Calvinistic—are considered. Then follow the Venatorius, Huberius, and the Regius type. The concluding chapter on modern philosophic ethics is the briefest and most inadequate.

The Teachings of Jesus Concerning Wealth, by GERALD D. HEUVER. F. H. Revell Co., 1903. pp. 208.

This is a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Chicago Divinity School. It shows that Jesus was immensely interested in people's economic condition, that he sought to better it by making the people themselves better, and to do the latter through the agency of the church. Palestine in Jesus' day had certain economic advantages. The condition of the people was unhappy, and although the Old Testament taught humanitarian laws, the Jewish Church failed to improve the people's social condition. It is heartily granted that there are considerable variations concerning Jesus' teachings on wealth in the various gospels. These teachings, however, are summarized and held to be far more central to the purpose of Jesus' ministry than had hitherto been supposed. A chapter each is devoted to the teachings concerning the possession of property, to those devoted to the worship of Mammon, and to those on the accumulation and use of riches.

Die Abendmahlsfrage in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, von KARL GEROLD GOETZ. J. C. Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 311.

Herman Scholtz, in 1886, and Schweitzer, in 1901, are the only predecessors of Goetz in recent years who have attempted to sum up both the history and the present status of the problem of the Lord's Supper. From all three writers, and especially the last, it appears that the commemorative meal which Jesus instituted was very simple, that at the outset Jesus told the disciples of his departure and of an impending new basis of relation between them, and that after the close of the meal, or, at least, after thanks had been rendered, he gave the bread and cup under the simile of his flesh and blood in token that his own earthly life was to abide. He left no writings or monuments and this literal experience was intended to keep his

own memory and especially that of the truth he taught green. Almost immediately, however, Paul and Luke added to this the sacrificial idea of an offering. Perhaps, as many think, Jesus himself had in mind the covenant on Sinai, although this seems uncertain. The view often held that he meant it to symbolize his own death as a sacrifice, we are told, can no longer be held. Some have thought that the chief significance of this sacrament must be sought in the sacrifice of the elements as the ancients poured libations of wine and as viands were sacrificed to the gods. As the idea of this memorial festival gradually changed and it became an actual means of grace, it was perhaps natural that the conceptions of it should degenerate toward the doctrine of transubstantiation as underlying the Catholic mass. This view was developed by those utterly without historic sense but who sought by scholastic logic to show how reason should apprehend it. This was very different from the Paschal idea or from that of Zwingli who inclined to the view that a hearty meal would be itself the best commemoration. Instead of being a simple fact or interpreting the acts alone as they stand as more important than the words, it is now more commonly regarded in an allegoric, mystic sense. The mode of apprehension of its significance has undergone very many changes so that the attempt to go back to the historic fact was inevitable, although the latter can never be exactly restored. Perhaps, now, the interpretation of the sacrament of the eucharist is a kind of anthropometer testing the kind of faith, insight, ideals, etc., of believers. The stern legalist inclines to the offering idea; the rationalist would drop it all; the historian would go back to its primal form; the mystic revels in the depth of symbolism, etc.

Die moderne Weltauschauung und das apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss, von AUGUST TRUEMPELMANN. C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, Berlin, 1901. pp. 395. Preis, 5.-m.

This work moves in a very modest, limited and conventional field. The author takes up the various phases of the Apostle's Creed and discusses and vindicates each against what he understands to be the teachings of modern science and the tendencies of the modern age. It is a pattern of orthodoxy and unimpeachable in this respect. There are also without doubt many faltering souls whose steps through life may be steadied by it. It adds, however, nothing to modern scholarship, and from our American standpoint seems somewhat tedious and prolix. Its form is open to criticism in that it has no chapters, no table of content, no index, no summaries, and no other means of getting at its content without reading it entire. This we confess we have only done in parts, but we honestly doubt whether such a book as this will ever be read through from cover to cover by any one unless it be by the author's immediate friends.

Saint Paul and the Ante-Nicene Church, by STEWART MEANS. Adam & Charles Black, London, 1903. pp. 349.

The scope of this book is best indicated by the titles of its five chapters, which are St. Paul, The Apostolic Fathers and Justin Martyr, Irenæus and the Catholic Church, The Alexandrines, Clement, and Origen, Tertullian and the Foundation of Latin Christianity.

Christian Faith in an Age of Science, by WILLIAM NORTH RICE. A. C. Armstrong and Son, New York, 1903. pp. 425.

The author is a Professor of Geology and here gives us his view of life in general. He discusses first the extension of the universe in time and space, the antiquity of man, Genesis and geology, the unity of the universe, the conservation of energy, evolution and its theological bearings. In the second part he passes to certain Christian doctrines, discussing especially the personality of man and God, law in nature, providence, prayer, miracle, revelation and the Bible, and sums up in a final chapter with a general statement of Christian evidences.

Die Apostolischen Väter. I. Tiel. Von DANIEL VÖLTER. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1904. pp. 472.

This is only part of an attempt to investigate in detail all the questions connected with both the form and content of the writings of the apostolic fathers, the present volume being devoted to Clemens, Hermas and Barnabas. The author concerns himself little with the biography of these writers but discusses the conditions

under which their writings appeared, their first form, literary character, the content, the sources used, etc. The work promises to be an admirable monument of German erudition.

Idealisten und Idealismus des Christentums, von K. H. PAHNCKE. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 195. Preis, 2.80 M.

This is a collection of somewhat miscellaneous papers; first, thoughts and opinions from the letters and diaries of two idealists, viz., Albrecht Wolters and Willibald Beyschlag. In another chapter idealistic dreamery of art is involved at Raphael's grave. In another Paul Gerhardt is described as an idealistic of faith. Christian idealism and its culture in the present time is commended. A few deeds illustrating it are given.

The Tombs of the Popes, by FERDINAND GREGOROVIVS. Tr. fr. the 2nd and Enlarged Ger. ed. with a mem. of the author, by R. W. Seton-Watson. Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., Westminster, 1903. pp. 174.

Although this volume was written some twenty years ago it appears now for the first time in translation, with the full page portraits of sixteen of the tombs of popes. The author is well known as the author of "The History of Rome in the Middle Ages," and his outspoken criticisms of many of the popes is somewhat remarkable.

The Apocryphal and Legendary Life of Christ, by JAMES DE QUINCEY DONEHOO. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1903. pp. 531.

This work attempts to present the whole body of ancient canonical literature that pretends to tell at first hand anything of the life and words of Jesus. There are, no doubt, a few golden grains amidst a vast body of chaff. It is hard even to resolve this literature into its constituent elements. The writer has simply compiled, and attempted nothing in the way of critical editing. The value of the book lies in its comprehensiveness. The writer has followed the order of events in Jesus' life and has not attempted even a chronological arrangement of these apocrypha. Dreary and verbose as many of them are, they are not uninteresting reading for the historian or for the psychologist, for, at any rate, they show the effects of colossal events upon minds, some of which are simple, some subtle, and others probably very remote in time and place from the events which motivated all. Had all canonical writings perished and nothing but these remained the inference to a great personality and to epoch-making period and train of events would have been irresistible. This may be said even if everything in these writings were excluded which is in form or substance duplicated in the New Testament.

The Life of Saint Mary Magdalen, by VALENTINA HAWTREY. With an introduction by Vernon Lee. John Lane, London, 1904. pp. 286.

This is a translation of an unknown Italian writer of the fourteenth century, who tells the story of the relations of Jesus with the family of Lazarus, whose sister is here identified with the sinful but repentant Magdalen. The story makes a romance almost of the Aucassin and Nicolette type. The writer spins out her romance with great detail, constantly saying, "I think that we may believe," or "I love to think," or "it seems to me well to hold," or "they say," etc. The whole thing is charming and reverent and has the interest of a romance. The work is interspersed by fourteen full page cuts of the Magdalen by standard artists.

Confession and Absolution, by T. W. DRURY. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1903. pp. 300.

This painstaking book does not attempt to describe the practice of confession and absolution in the primitive, mediæval, or modern church in general, but is limited to the teachings of the church of England in the sixteenth century. It is a little unfortunate that these limitations are so severely observed. Certainly, these English reformers were men of deep piety, sound conviction, intellectual power and solid learning. They appealed to Scripture and to history concerning both the doctrine, practice, and sacrament of penance. Much depended upon their views of post-baptismal sin. They borrowed the idea of attrition from the scholastics, and this plus absolution they conceived as contrition. Absolution might be divine or human, absolute or ministerial. Of course it tended to grow private and personal.

Francis of Assisi, by ANNA M. STODDART. E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1903. pp. 247.

This booklet is certainly a labor of love and admiration. Much of it was written under the influence of Sabatier. It presents an excellent picture of the times and of the man and has a third and interesting part describing St. Francis in art.

Essays and Letters, by LEO TOLSTOY. Tr. by Aylmer Maude. Grant Richards, London, 1903. pp. 372.

This interesting and timely collection of the recent letters and papers of Tolstoy contains many an article of the twenty-six included, the publication of which in Russia was forbidden by the censor. Among the more striking is the defence of the views of Bondaref that every one should perform some physical labor, this being the only medicine that can save mankind. The plea that humanity has been arrested by alcohol and nicotine, the supplementary and plainer discussion of the Kreutzer Sonata that a pampered, under worked, and an over fed race tends to over sexual sensitiveness. The first step of reform is diet and abstinence from much or any animal food. The essence of religion consists solely in an answer to the question "Why do I live, and what is my relation to the infinite universe about me?" Every answer worth considering involves the subordination of the individual to the needs of the race. His final definition of religion is that it is "a relation man sets up between himself and the endless and infinite universe or its sources and its cause." He excoriates Huxley's conception "full of all kinds of jokes, verses, and general views on ancient religion and philosophy so florid and complicated that it is only with great effort that one is able to reach its fundamental thought," that the law of evolution runs counter to the moral law, and therefore renunciation is religious. The cosmic process must be checked and replaced by another higher ethical one. This could only make morality mechanical, and hence he suggests a second definition of religion as "a certain relation established by man between his separate personality and the infinite universe or its sources, and morality is the ever present guide to life which results from that relation. An article entitled "Shame" protests against flogging, especially in the army. Interesting, too, is his correspondence with Verigin, the Doukhobor leader, and his letter on nonresistance. He believes Henry George's plan of single tax to be practicable, holds that science gives too much attention to trifles "instead of supplying men with correct religious, moral, social, or even hygienic ideals." Instead of studying merely what exists it ought to show people how to live. He reiterates his view that to call a man a patriot will sometime become an insult, that this feeling should not be cultivated because it limits the feeling of humanism which should include the whole race. Patriotism has reduced the Christian world to the brutality of war and put mutual enmity in place of love. The spirit of patriotism as opposed to Christianity had a striking illustration in the famous instructions of the Emperor to his soldiers when sent to China. He would not destroy governments, however, but would uproot their violence and apply the Golden Rule to statesmanship and international law. Dignified and pathetic is his reply to the synod's edict excommunicating him, and this leads to an exposition of his faith. He began by loving orthodoxy more than peace, then preferred Christianity to his church, and now loves truth more than anything else. This he holds to be Christianity. His enemies have followed Coleridge's precept which is the converse of this. They began by loving Christianity better than truth, proceeded to love their own sect or church better than Christianity, and in the end loved themselves best of all. In a later essay he gives yet another definition of religion as "a relation according to reason and knowledge which man establishes with the infinite life surrounding him and such as binds his life to that infinity and guides his conduct." He again sets forth his doctrine in the way of protest by his appeal to the clergy, where the popes, bishops, priests or pastors are addressed.

The History of Christian Preaching, by T. HARWOOD PATTISON. Amer. Bap. Pub. Soc., Phila., 1903. pp. 412.

This work is illustrated with a list of twenty full page portraits of famous preachers from Augustine to Spurgeon, Beecher, Brooks and Moody. The first chapter discusses the phrophet and the synagogue and describes the origin of Chris-

tian preaching. The preaching of Jesus, the apostles, and preaching during the first four centuries occupy the next three chapters. Two others describe preaching from the fifth to the tenth and from the eleventh to the fourteenth century. The other chapters are devoted to more modern preachers, scores of whom are briefly characterized. The work is a labor of love and of erudition and cannot fail to both instruct and inspire. It is a book that should be in the library of every pastor and it is much of interest to all who practice public speaking.

Geschichte des deutschen evangelischen Kirchenliedes, von WILHELM NELLE. Gustav Schloessmann, Hamburg, 1904. pp. 234.

This author treats first of church tunes before the Reformation, then those of the Reformation period, of the thirty years' war, of the time of pietism ending in 1750, of the Aufklaerung ending in 1800, and in a final chapter brings his survey down to the present time. The book is illustrated by a number of portraits, and presents in brief compass an admirable survey of this interesting field.

The History and Use of Hymns and Hymn-Tunes, by DAVID R. BREED. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, 1903. pp. 364.

This book is the outgrowth of the author's own needs as a teacher of practical theology. It includes extended notice only of authors and composers of the first rank. He treats ancient Greek, Latin and German hymns, devotes a chapter to psalmody, others each to English hymnology, the best hymns, those of the first period from Ken and Watts to Toplady, hymns of the second period from Montgomery and Auber to Henry Kirk White, and those of the third, beginning with Keble down to the present.

Scientific Basis of Sabbath and Sunday, by ROBERT JOHN FLOODY. Cupples & Schoenhof, Boston. pp. 349.

We have here an interesting and scholarly study of what may be called the history of the Sabbath and also its psychology. There was first the seventh day of the heathen characterized by a feast, then the seventh day of the Hebrews characterized by rest, and lastly the seventh day of the Christians characterized by worship. The origin of it all was the four different shapes of the moon—the new, half, full, and the reversed moon, calling out special devotions on the particular days which these appear. All nations with whom the Hebrews came in contact observed this ancient custom. All these moon phases were celebrated by merry-making, and generally by the absence of work. Only late in the development of the priestly code was the Jewish Sabbath perfected as no longer man's day but God's. The word Sabbath means rest. It had no relation to the Babylonian Sabattum for that was a day to appease God's anger. It was only late that the moon was forgotten, and slowly the dominical Sabbath was developed. It was not a moral law but a memorial of God's rest day and when Christ arose the old Jewish Sabbath had finished its mission. For a time there was no special sacred day in the Christian church, at least not until much after the Council of Jerusalem when the necessity of a worship day arose. This had no relation to the Sabbath and was a new institution with a new spirit. The first law giving complete rest from ordinary labor dates from the Council of Orleans, A. D. 538, and soon other holy days followed. The real criterion now is whether it interferes with the favorable conditions of worship. The State has the right to enforce Sunday laws only to protect the rights of those who have religious convictions and for the general good of the State. Sunday will be needed until all days are Lord's days.

Grundzüge der Religionswissenschaft, von C. P. TIELE. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 68. Preis, 2.50m.

In 1901 Professor Tiele published a booklet of brief paragraphs designed to be summary statements of his positions for the use of the pupils who heard his lectures. Since his death, on January 11, 1902, his friend, Pastor Gehrich, in accordance with a request made by the author, has published and somewhat amplified this outline. It now presents a pretty full schema of Tiele's views in all the fields of religion. The introduction treats of the progressive emancipation of religious science from the leading strings of philosophy, method, field, etc. In what is called the morphological part he treats the idea of development, its stages, the lower and higher natural

religions, of which he makes six stages, culminating in the anthropic or hemiethic, which are succeeded by ethic religions. These themselves are classified. The laws of development, continuity, assimilation, concentration, and expansion are discussed. The other chief division falls into two great groups, the ontological and the psychological. First come the phenomenological ideas, then theology in the narrower sense, religious anthropology, soteriology, religious actions, and associations. The author nowhere gives a full definition of religion which he regards as by no means a simple thing. Indeed on many points the careful and scientific classifications of his views will no doubt prove somewhat disappointing to those who seek simplification.

Glauben und Wissen, von VIKTOR CATHREIN. S. J. Herder, Freiburg, 1903. pp. 245.

This is an orientation in several fundamental problems of religion. The author discusses the nature of knowledge and its relations to revelation, faith in general and human faith in particular, religious faith according to the Protestant and Catholic conceptions respectively, and the problems of faith and science, especially dignity, freedom, and the presuppositionless character of science.

Religion and Science: Some suggestions for the study of the relations between them, by P. N. WAGGETT. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1904. pp. 174.

This book describes the place of difficulties in thought, the word 'monism,' popular books, methods of meeting difficulties and discussions, ideal critique, Christian Science, the search for religion in science, theism and natural selection, the word 'deist,' the Ring and the Book, heredity, society as an organism, bacteria, etc. There is little here for the man of science, and perhaps the best merit of the book is that it raises more questions than it settles.

Pascal and the Port Royalists, by WILLIAM CLARK. (The World's Epoch-Makers.) T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1902. pp. 235.

This appears to be one of the best books of the World's Epoch-Makers' Series. The story of Pascal's life is a sad one. The early loss of his mother, his amazing precocity in mathematics and scientific thought, then his conversion and his deep religious mysticism with its too potent influence on his system, vast powers which seem rather wasted in somewhat fruitless discussions of his day—all these are very lucidly described, with incidentally a good account of the provincial letters, and of Port Royalism, and his death at the age of twenty-nine. All this makes a somewhat pathetic impression upon the modern student. Able as he was, his mind was in a peculiar sense a victim of his age.

The Genius of Methodism, by WILLIAM PITT MACVEY. Jennings and Pye, Cincinnati, 1903. pp. 326.

This little volume meets a real need not only within the Methodist Church, but it will prove a *vade mecum* for all students of comparative denominations. It is written by a competent hand, and is based on a new religious interpretation of society as a "consciousness of kind." Under the caption "the mind of Methodism," the writer discusses the traditional faith, articles, philosophy of life, anticipation of science, rapid and general acceptance, and fixity of type. He then proceeds to a concise statement of the genesis of the church and the ecclesiastical revolution which lead to its evolution in formal worship, social survival, and dual principles. The development of government is then discussed with its geography, modifications, and democratic influences. That of administration is next taken up, from the episcopacy down to the local ministry. Then come the problems of membership, discipline, and social assembly. As parts of the greater church are discussed the church consciousness, the consolidations of benevolences, and organic union. The cultural issue is treated with reference to spiritual and then to intellectual problems. The place of the Methodist idea in the history of the world, the republication and interpretation of the record and its appropriation, conclude the volume. In general Methodism may be considered as a spiritual movement away from dogma into life. The ultimate world form, as expressed in the formulæ of the Christian prayer, is shown to be universal holiness of life or conformity to the divine will made possible by the consequences wrought by the incarnate Son and the Holy Spirit. The record that set forth these provisions, though long obscured, was rendered

accessible through the Renaissance and the Reformation. Further centuries have been marked by increasing insight into the contents of the record as consisting essentially in provisions for a holy life. Methodism must do more, however, and become a medium whereby the world can pass to its ultimate condition. It represents a third transition stage comparable to those mentioned above toward realizing the ultimate world form. Great as the triumphs of Methodism have been in the past, those which it may confidently expect in the future are greater yet.

The Early Relation and Separation of Baptists and Disciples, by ERRETT GATES. Chicago, 1904. pp. 124.

This interesting monograph begins with the outline of Thomas Campbell's life, who was born in 1763. It describes his personality, his sermons and debates, the Christian Baptist, the status of Alexander Campbell's fellowship, the spread of the ancient order of things among Baptists, and finally the mutual separation. All in all the story of this denomination as here set forth is somewhat pathetic. The almost strident reaffirmation of certain vital principles, the vehement and protracted controversies about topics which now have little interest, make on the whole a somewhat sad chapter. The work, however, was well worth doing for its own sake and will have value to every student of church history in this country.

The Congregationalists, by LEONARD W. BACON. (The Story of the Churches.) The Baker and Taylor Co., New York, 1904. pp. 280.

In this series the story of the Methodists has been told by J. A. Faulkner, that of the Baptists by H. C. Vedder, the Presbyterians by C. L. Thompson, with another volume on the creed of the Presbyterians by E. W. Smith.

Scientific Aspects of Mormonism. By NELS L. NELSON. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904. pp. 347.

The very title of this book will surprise some. It discusses the claim of Mormonism to be the religion of Jesus Christ. Some of the most interesting chapters are those which discuss the Mormon conception of God and his personality, the place of religion in the economy of life, Mormonism as a transcendent system of evolution, and man's spiritual life regarded as a process of evolution, how God shapes the destiny of man the individual and rules among the nations, the scientific aspect of faith the identity of truth, education and repentance, the logical necessity of the latter and forgiveness as well as of baptism, what intelligent beings will do in the future, the philosophical difficulties in the concept of a personal God, Godhood as incarnated and its real meaning, the fullness of priesthood as Godhood, Mormonism destined to have the last word, its social aspects, proofs of pre-existence, etc. Another volume amplifying the social aspects of Mormonism and promising to discuss plural marriage "not, however, with any view to the recrudescence of the practice, but merely with a view to lifting the obloquy which now rests on the entire social system through a misunderstanding of this relatively insignificant feature," is to follow. It will certainly interest every philosophical mind to see this faith discussed in this large way. We only regret the slight traces of dogmatism and severity which sometimes appear, although neither of these traits are prominent.

Neue Bahnen. Der Unterricht in der christlichen Religion im Geiste der modernen Theologie, von O. BAUMGARTEN. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1903. pp. 120.

This book caused a great sensation when its contents were first delivered as lectures. No less than one hundred and ninety-three Schlesweg-Holstein clergymen petitioned the minister that he depose the author from his university chair of theology, but in vain. The motivation of the book was the author's effort in 1900 to issue a new edition of Kaftan's explanation of the catechism. Greatly as he revered this theologian he found himself in diametrical opposition to his views on many pedagogical points. The author believes he has found new ways of religious instruction that differ radically from those of homiletics or the catechism. These, and perhaps especially the latter, do not consider the naïveté of children. The author protests vigorously against sermons which children have to attend, although they are far above their intelligence, and insists that much Protestant doctrine is anti-child-like. There is lack of concrete objectivity even in Bible history. Youthful souls are

made both prematurely old and mechanical in the Sunday School. Matter is either ungraded or improperly graded. There is a noxious precocity cult that produces spiritual impatience. High words that are understood injure the mind. The catechetical method he calls a curse, and compares other Sunday School methods with "soup diluted with water." We are in the age of a materialism of memory of things not understood. There are incessant lessons of untruthfulness. The child takes much literally that he at once sees that the teacher does not believe. The sense of truth is gravely important in the Sunday School with its antiquated methods, its mechanized matter, its insistence upon things which adults do not believe, the defunct theological ideas and methods, so that in its training of the young the church now represents the most extreme of all reactionary influences against new educational methods, and that in a field of the utmost importance. The intellectual honesty of the teacher often suffers. The sense of reality is weakened so that religion is no longer actual, but a falsetto thing. God is an autocrat, etc.

Positively the author would begin instruction of Christianity with the development or the assumption of a high moral ideal or a sense of honor and allow the children to realize how far below that ideal they fall, and point out to them at once the motives for living up to the best within them and show them sources of consolation when they fail. Children belong in the heavenly kingdom. Religion is not a matter solely between the soul and God, but the element of social and communal right and justice comes in. The vicarious element in Jesus' suffering really springs from a sense of solidarity. One cannot live one's own life out independently of this. Religious instruction should be Christocentric and, with older children, independent of the Resurrection. Much that we have thought history must be recognized as only parable. Self-denial must be always taught, etc.

After these general considerations addressed to the teacher, a methodic section follows. Everything must be adjusted to the age and the individual. Religion is teachable only somewhat in the sense in which music is. It rests for the young upon a sensual basis. A religious tone of mind perhaps influences children even before they are born. The child's soul is very active and the paragon of religion may easily be extirpated. There should be no devotional mechanism. Little children should accustom themselves to, at least, prayer and song in the church, and all instruction should have an element of mystery. The feeling and attitude of the parents toward religion is far more important than anything which they can teach, but every mother should teach religion at least at the bedside. The wonder stories should be told. If this has not been done the Sunday School is liable to lack foundations.

School training the writer divides into three stages. The lowest should begin with a continuation of the mother's method—free narratives of Bible stories, always with a spirit of intimate devotion with no reference to the critical standpoint even for miracles, but some attempt to enrich the religious memory. In the next stage, too, the tone of feeling is far more important than reflection or even the thought content. This is the age of curiosity which should be fed with the greatest amount of new Bible matter, but still with no critique of miracles. Concentration in general formulæ should be avoided and there should be no confessions of faith. There should be abundance of song. In the upper stage the history of the Testaments should be surveyed as wholes and perhaps prophetism should now be the central point. There should be a connected picture of Jesus' life, not as a vicarious sufferer. Miracles should be treated rather as parables and there should always be an attempt to sift out the religious kernel from the mythic shell. This should be the initiation into the critical method. It needs courage as well as foresight. Biblical readers are desirable, but without introductions. We should not make semi-theologians and there should be no systematic instruction in either belief or morals.

In confirmation classes there must be great care to transcend all differences of sect, and the communion service should be simple and memorial, confirmation, initiation to a religious association, but there should be no act of individual confession or no vows or oaths. Here alone there might be a little catechism taught, but a devotional atmosphere should pervade all, and everything should have a subjective aspect. There should be no regimentation or inspection and no stated examinations, but the teacher should record some sense of the pupil's religious and moral

progress. For higher religious training there should be religious history, and something about that of dogma, and great care not to insist upon anything that the soul cannot accept with great heartiness. Often the stupidest teachers inculcate those things most abhorrent to the natural understanding, while the ideal condition would be that a teacher should impart matter that is foreign to the natural mind somewhat in proportion to his own talents. The Christian associations for young men and women are criticised. Growing sexuality needs great attention. In the training of adults there should be less appeal to feeling, to mood, and to femininity, and more to manliness, scholarship, common sense and intellect. Apologetic preaching and teaching should be far more direct and candid. The pulpit and religious teachers generally must not be too careful to spare the modes of belief of those who have grown old in conservative forms. They have duties to the young and to the future. It is the weak who rule in the church. The need of truth is far greater than the need of peace and quiet. What is wanted is a new, vigorous, and psychological apologetics as a mode of commending and enforcing religion upon adult minds.

Dawn in the Dark Continent, by JAMES STEWART. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, 1903. pp. 400.

"Paganism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity are now competing for the Dark Continent," says this missionary, who desired broader views in his own field. Paganism springs from a natural and not an evil root, which can neither be eradicated nor condemned. Mohammedanism came out of Arabia as a protest against idolatry. Its successes in Africa have been great. It is difficult to realize the vigor and intensity of this religion. "Its truths are massive, simple, authoritative, difficult to disprove or discredit. The moral nature of man responds to them." Its frequent calls to prayer recognize the control of the visible by the invisible. The Koran "which is more to the Mohammedan than the Bible is to the Christian is the nearest approach to Christianity that has been presented to the nations of the east." Polytheism, sorcery and human sacrifices instantly give way to it. "A general moral elevation is very marked." "The natives begin for the first time in their history to dress, and that neatly. Squalid filth is replaced by scrupulous cleanliness; hospitality becomes a religious duty, drunkenness instead of being the rule becomes a comparatively rare exception; polygamy, though allowed by the Koran, is not a common practice, chastity is looked upon as one of the highest virtues; idleness is regarded as degrading and industry as the reverse; justice is secured by a written code." In addition to this quotation from Bosworth Smith, the author adds the following: "It is melancholy to contrast with these widespread and beneficent influences of Mohammedanism the little that has been done for Africa by the Christian nations." Stewart asks, "Why do not Christian missions produce among the pagan tribes like beneficial results. Mohammedanism has forty millions of adherents in Africa, Christianity less than one." He answers that Mohammedanism has been thirteen years at work in the east and eight hundred in the west, and the Christians barely a century, that Christianity produces all these effects, that it takes a greater change to make a Christian. But there was Christianity in Africa not long after the day of Pentecost, and here Augustine and many of the fathers lived. Stewart commends the Mohammedans from whom, he says, he has learned lessons in self denial, courage and devotion, has found many men in Islam who are better than their creed. Réclus thinks the spread of Mohammedanism "the most notable event in the history of Africa since the fall of Carthage. Its simple creed, its missionary zeal, its cohesion, and its numbers conquer where Christianity fails." The Christian missionary denies intermarriage; the Mohammedan approves it. In describing the different missions the writer commends the Hermannsburg communists, also the German missionaries, who are required to have a good knowledge of the vernacular before they were fully recognized.

In the last paragraph on the training of the missionary the writer advocates a radical new plan and wishes this chapter to be read "as the sad cry of a man whose missionary life is ending; whose life has been full of splendid opportunities which might have been better improved, and which has always been full of mistakes which might have been avoided." No stranger discovers by intuition the best ways of presenting the great message. The intending missionary must study comparative religions and the history, customs, and condition of the people where he is laboring,

and if possible begin the study of their language. Now he often goes abroad unable to distinguish with any accuracy the members of even the great religions one from the other, assuming all heathens to be in general alike. Customs, too, must be studied. Many go to this work "with a preparation that is simply deplorable. He often has to grope blindly in the darkness with the almost inevitable result that for the first few years he may hinder as well as help the great cause he serves." Rome does better at her propaganda. It is a bad beginning to attack customs essential to the native not essentially immoral. Even wife purchase and indulgence in native beers should not bar from church membership.

Above all this author postulates a new kind of missionary magazine, well edited, and not "in the self laudatory and narrow-minded style" now in vogue. Boards circulate missionary literature with undue anxiety for immediate results. Their reports are often anodyne. A general missionary year book of all the societies in Christendom is needed, a little on the plan of the statesman's year book.

The author thinks with C. H. Pearson that we may soon "see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent or practically so in government, monopolizing the trade of their own region and circumscribing the industry of Europe." We must, at least, see to it that the African race with its enormous vitality is not further deteriorated by contact with civilization, and no longer be victims of mere missionary platitudes, so as to remove such reproaches as those of Miss Kingsley who says, "The Protestant English missionaries have had most to do with rendering the African useless. The missionary-made man is the curse of the west coast, etc." A new Africa is arising and it is to be a wonderful continent.

The Philippines and the Far East, by HOMER C. STUNTZ. Eaton & Mains, New York, 1904. pp. 514.

The author dwells through no less than ten chapters upon missionary work in the Philippines. He finds three peculiar hindrances—the tendency to formalism on the part of the people, the vicious example of "worldly and godless Americans," and the language barrier. "Form and ceremony have been the whole religion of the Christianized Filipinos so long that it is with the utmost difficulty that the essentially spiritual character of true religion is grasped by the Filipino mind. "The people are ready to be baptized, to read their Bibles, to unite with our Churches, and to comply with our outward requirements; but in too many cases they are not clearly converted as we understand that term. There is great need, he says, of spiritual regeneration and a sense of the conviction of sin. "Those Churches which are receiving members most rapidly are face to face with this difficulty in a grave form. Out of eight thousand Americans in Manila not more than five hundred can be found in the American congregation on Sunday, despite the excellent character of the preaching and music, the fine location, the wide advertisements. Again, there is a spirit of extreme worldliness. "Men who always went to church at home never go here. Those who were most scrupulous about the right observance of the Sabbath, here are found at the Sunday races, etc." "The society life of Manila seems given over to bridge whist, dancing, Sunday games and fetes." Again, "It will forever remain a mystery to the thoughtful why the military government admitted shiploads of liquor in the beginning." "One word from the military authorities would have made it impossible for liquor to land. But it was not spoken. The annual license was fixed at the utterly ridiculous figure of \$4. Saloons sprang up on every hand. Soldiers lay sodden drunk on the public roads. Our national honor was dragged in the very dirt of the streets." The civil government changed all this. In Manila saloons must now pay from six to eight hundred dollars for license, close at eleven, remain closed Sunday, and glass must be so set that the bar can be seen from the street. The American saloon has been introduced with all its attractiveness as a new factor in the life of the city. The natives had intoxicants of their own make, "but they are not an intemperate people. They are seldom seen drunk. The habit of drinking to intoxication is an American habit here." "Concubinage is a terribly common sin among Americans. The system of contract marriages which grew up under the excessive demands of the friars for marriage fees has lent itself to this evil." "Gambling is in the very atmosphere of the East. Our countrymen fall victims to it with fatal facility," and yet "the American is not

all bad. It is not true, as some say, that we are imparting all our vices and none of our virtues to the Filipinos; but there is enough truth in the statement to sadden every one who loves righteousness."

Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes, von LEO FROBENIUS. Erster Band. George Reimer, Berlin, 1904. pp. 420.

This author has already published a book on the views of the world by primitive people, and in this work, which covers in part the field occupied by Eduard Stuckens, large treatises on astral myths he traces out the stadia of sun worship as found among many races in all the great divisions of the earth. He believes that until recently the effects of migrations have been somewhat limited and that many myths of similar form have had independent, indigenous origin. He is interested in the elementary thoughts of man, and that they do coincide in people widely separated bears testimony to the unity of the race. On the other hand it cannot be denied that some myths of local origin have pervaded nearly the whole earth. In an interesting group of chapters the writer finds that the sun god inhabited the body of a fish, especially a whale, and sometimes a crocodile. Very many forms of these myths among very many races are given. In another book he treats of the myth of the immaculate conception which he also associates with sun worship. This he finds in Oceanica, America, Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Some forms connect the angel and the maiden directly. Others connect the latter with a swan. An interesting section is devoted to solar love life or the world myths of heaven and earth, the former usually the father, and the latter the mother. Often the sun and moon are a married pair. In another variant of the same theme is found among the Pleiad myths. Another book is devoted to the natural history of ogres, and giants, and this often connects with crocodile dragon forms. The intersusception of mythic elements with each other is remarkable. The theft of fire, man eaters, orion, the eating of the soul, of stars and constellations, the sin flood, fate goddesses, the Orpheus legends—all are more or less bound up with each other. On the whole it would appear, if this author's theory is correct, that the sun in its course through the heavens has been one of the most potent and formative of all agencies in shaping the soul of man.

Naturbetrachtung und Naturerkenntnis im Altertum, von FRANZ STRUNZ. Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 168.

This writer follows in general in the wake of Biese. He adds, however, something on oriental views of nature, but he does not, like Biese, bring his views to the present time. He lays special stress upon the therapeutic basis of the views of nature by orientalists and upon their practical study of it. His emphasis, however, unlike Biese, is not laid upon literature but upon philosophy. He takes up the early Ionics, the Eleatics, Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the later schools, ending with Neoplatonism. The comparison of this work with Biese suggests the rather sombre reflection that the literary conceptions which Biese describes are really more suggestive than those of the philosophers.

Das Feuer in der Natur, im Kultus und Mythos, im Völkerleben, von WILHELM WACHTER. A. Hartlebens, Vienna, 1904. pp. 166.

The writer first treats of fire and its general functions in nature. In the next part he traces it in cults, myths, religion and lastly in the life of people. He gives very vivid descriptions of the probable condition of man before the control of fire was understood, although he admits it is very doubtful whether to-day there is any savage race so low as not to understand it. He shows how after this control was attained man became far more independent of locality, could encamp almost where he chose, and especially was able to penetrate into the north. He describes many antique ceremonies of fire-worshippers, digests many quaint myths and ceremonials, makes the reader feel sympathetic with the attitude of fire-worshippers. The book is not encumbered by references although the author is very familiar with the very widely diffused literature bearing upon the subject. He is also very conscious of the atavistic propensity to revere fire in modern man. Naturally his view is rather poetic and genetic than scientific. It is quite remarkable how, if we compared a work like this with the study recently made by Browne and Hall on children's feelings towards fire, we have many a remarkable parallel thus brought out between the child and the race.

Politics and Religion in Ancient Israel, by J. C. TODD. The Macmillan Co., London, 1904. pp. 334.

The Bible was never more studied or less read than at the present day. This is especially true of the Old Testament. Modern researches have made it a collection of possibilities to the layman, while to the scholar it was never so rich a mine. Suppose, says this author, that at some future time, perhaps 5000 A. D., the literature of England became lost while that of Scotland survived and had been annotated for centuries, while England was known only by Scotch allusion. Suddenly the literature of England is unearthed by excavation and the learned world is rent in two. The new school declare that Scotland's true place is now known and is subordinate to England while the old school insist that Scotland's importance was its own and the discovery of ten Englands would affect nothing. Substitute now our Bible for Scotland and Assyria for England and we have the rival claims of Bible and Babel in Delitzsch's catchy phrase. Todd attempts to present the results of scholarship in this field in a popular way. No book has yet appeared that does this in so masterly and condensed a way. This book should be in the hands of every lay-student of the Old Testament, which is essentially the epos of the fall of Jerusalem, 586 B. C., the sad note of which rings through it from start to finish and is its key. Samaria, greater yet, had already fallen and would have been unknown, great as it was, had Jerusalem not caught up the tradition. The conquerors did not give culture, like the Greeks, or law, like the Romans, to their victims, but only reeked red ruin. It was a slow death lasting two hundred years. The best starting point, the author thinks, is Lamentations for the fall of Zion, the city that was only the citizen's greater self.

In the beginning of Israel's history we see a wandering tribe driven by famine, settling on the borders of a great empire, and slowly made serfs, drudging on vast public works. About the fourteenth century B. C., they broke away to their old pneumatic life, wandering for a generation, with only the primal interest of war and religion. Slowly they conquered the Canaanite tribes and their little tribal god, Yahveh, grew as the tribe extended its organization. The earliest worship was sacrifice of two parts—the blood rite and the feast. Holiness was first essentially a taboo for other uses placed upon priests, knives, and basins used in these rites. Occasionally there were human sacrifices. In this worship harlots in the sacred places were also holy. Over against Yahveh, the tribal and war god, stood the nature religions of the Canaanites, who regarded God as the husband of the land and the father of its crops. Thus Baalim stood for separation of village from village, agriculture and the harvest home, wine, sex, and luxury, while Yahveh stood for unity of the league, excitement of battle, self-restraint, more nomadic life. As Israel overshadowed the Baal tribes its god became the God of the Covenant with them. Then came the kingdom of Saul and his successors, the Assyrian invasion, prophecy, exile, return, and the collection of literature, etc. But we cannot follow this pedagogic masterpiece in detail.

Zionism and Anti-Semitism, by MAX NORDAU and GUSTAV GOTTHEIL. Scott-Thaw Company, New York, 1904. pp. 76.

Nordau here very frankly meets the criticism and even the ridicule which his fellow Jews have poured out upon the Zion movement. He holds, however, that those who desire to do so should be encouraged to enter heart and soul into the movement and even to cultivate the soil in Palestine; that it would strengthen the Jewish self respect and national consciousness, but that all should be done on a large scale.

The Ethics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, by JAMES H. HYSLOP. Chas. M. Higgins & Co., New York, 1903. pp. 333. Pr. \$2.

This is a very remarkable book, for the form of which we presume the author himself is not responsible. Its core is a single lecture delivered by him which has doubtless been amplified. It is incisive and clear like all the writer's works, but the curious thing is the hundreds of pages of padding that precede and follow it, together with the many quaint old pictures of the philosophers, of the library of Columbia University, the house of Mrs. Ole Bull where some other lectures in the series were given. There are many extracts from Plato and Aristotle and some fifty pages are given to a life of Socrates.

Buddhism. Its History and Literature. By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. 2nd ed. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904. pp. 230.

These six lectures discuss religious theories in India before Buddhism, an account of the authorities on which our knowledge of Buddhism is based, notes on the founder's life, his secret (the sign, the path, and the fetters), the wheel of life and Nirvana, and lastly some notes on the history of Buddhism. Anything this author writes in a field where he has such wide knowledge cannot fail to be interesting. This work adds something even to his own previous "History and Literature of Buddhism," but more in the first two lectures and the last than in the three devoted to the life and secrets of Buddhism. Only an expert can pronounce upon some of the points here discussed. Throughout the book there are certain rather painful notes—one, the repeated intimation that, because the literature of Buddhism is as yet so partially unearthed, our conclusions and, indeed, most previous and all early literature on the subject is probably misleading; second, the repeated invitation for funds to carry on the great work. These, no doubt, are one of the greatest needs of modern scholarship, but we think appeals of the kind here made are a little out of place in such a course of lectures. Thirdly, in the middle chapters there is a good deal of repetition of the author's previous work and very much material found in many other Buddhistic works accessible even in English, suggesting that the writer was turned aside from his work of editing and translating not without some reluctance on his part. Nevertheless, the author makes here a very important new contribution to the knowledge of all not experts in Sanscrit and Pali literature, and by whom his book is certain to be welcomed with thanks.

The Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India, by JOHN CAMPBELL OMAN. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1903. pp. 291.

All religious founders are ascetic. St. Theresa said, "My greatest desire is to suffer." Christianity developed penance as a penalty even for sins repented of. India abounds with the cenobites. The causes that have led to all these institutions are discussed in two of the most interesting chapters of this fascinating book. Some retire in mature years after having exhausted pleasure with a feeling of world weariness. Others, who are weak, seek protection and peace. Troublous times have sent many to the cell and desert. For many the burden of convention has grown too heavy and they follow the road of renunciation and resignation. Great calamities, of which India has had more than her share, tend to to the same result. The drouths and famines have often made fasting almost a habit of mind, and well accustomed poverty robs the hermit life of some of its terrors. Again, a despotic government supplemented by excessive over crowding, the enormous limitation to individual ambition which arises from the caste system, the very early maturity of children which often brings morbid fatigue later in life, the deficient energy favored by the very climate and traditions of an un strenuous land, vegetarianism, the fact that the race is itself old and senescent:—all these tend to dull stagnation which perhaps even had something to do with the facility of hypnotization which Esdale found here. Mendicancy and beggary in the Occident have a certain charm about them, and its rollicking and careless life is expressed in many a song and proverb.

These are some of the contributing causes that made asceticism such a passionate and national cult in India. The very gods often practiced self torture, and underlying all is the idea that by rigid practices of self immolation mortals can acquire supernatural power which is exactly in proportion to the severity of self-inflicted pain. Indeed the Christian church assumes that Christ's suffering and that of the martyrs laid up treasure, and monkish orders have distributed superfluous merit. Famous saints who have perhaps cut out, roasted and eaten bits of their own flesh gained power over the very gods who became jealous as they subjugated the three worlds. Brahma has been compelled to give great power. Often the power which the ascetic gains is selfish and sometimes vicious. Myths abound in legends of those who, by their austerities, have affected the course of the moon, been enabled to slay their enemies, steal children, compel even Vishnu to manifest himself to their minds, to hurl mortal curses, to create new gods, to ride on fire. Some of these ascetics have not been able to resist temptation and have fallen for a time, to renew the struggle, in some cases, for hundreds and even thousands of years. Although not only the New Testament, but the Old contains many

hints of this idea of power through penance, such as the contest between Moses and the Egyptian magicians, missionaries have great difficulty in understanding the immense scope and persistence of this principle which sometimes distinctly frees the devotee from ethical law.

Der Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung für unser Geistesleben, von ALFRED BERTHOLET. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 65.

This professor of theology undertakes a very condensed characterization of Buddhism based largely upon Oldenberg, Hardy, and others, sifting out first the story of Buddha's life, then giving a succinct account of his doctrine, his followers, and coming down to the remarkable work of Bruno Freydank entitled "Buddha und Christus," which is a Buddhistic apology, the point of which is summed up in the question, "When will the hour come in which Europe, the land of heathen, shall bow under the sign of the white lotus?" which assumes throughout that Buddhism is the religion of the future. He has scant praise for Theodore Schultze, the German Buddhist whom Arther Pfungst has characterized, who would actually sacrifice the karma and the monastic idea of Buddhism on the one hand, and still less for theosophy or even for esoteric Buddhism on the other. In the second part of this work the writer takes up the salient features of Buddhism one after another, comparing them with Christianity to the latter's great advantage. It seems, indeed, a little singular that a professor of theology can be in the first half of his book so very sympathetic in exposition and so ruthlessly negative in appreciation in the last half of his work.

The History of Philosophy in Islam, by T. J. DE BOER. Tr., by Edward R. Jones, Luzac & Co., London, 1903. pp. 216.

This is the first attempt since that of Munk in 1859 to present a connected history of philosophy in Islam. Very many writers, of course, have covered portions of this field and these authorities have been well used by this author. He first describes ancient Arabia, then the Semitic Persian, Indian, and especially the Greek influences which were predominant. Under Arab knowledge he discusses grammar, ethics, doctrine, literature and history. The Pythagorean theory and practice was very elaborately developed. So, too, were those of the neo-Platonists and Aristotelians. The latter part of the book is largely taken up with a special account of individuals:—Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Maskawaih, Ibn Sina, of whom a new life has just appeared by Devaux, Gazeli, Ibn Roschd (Averroes), Avempace, Abubacer, and a few others. It is certainly a remarkable development from the wild, free, healthy life of the original Bedouin to the culmination of Mohammedan power in not only the political, but in the philosophical and scientific field. If one thing is brought home more plainly than any other to this reader it is, perhaps, the inexcusable neglect of most historians of philosophy in failing to do justice to the great men who figure here.

Muhammad and His Power, by P. DE LACY JOHNSTONE. (The World's Epoch-Makers). T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1901. pp. 238.

"Mohammedism is compounded of an eternal truth and a necessary fiction," says Gibbon, viz., that there is only one God and that Mohammed is his prophet. The modern student of comparative religions would hardly be disposed to call the second of these affirmations an entire fiction. The present work describes first the awakening of Arabia before Israel, and, happily for the student, includes not only the story of Mohammed's own life but a general review of his system and a good account of the Quran, also a story of the spread of Islam after the prophet's death.

The Mysteries of Mithra, by FRANZ CUMONT. Tr. by Thomas J. McCormack. Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1903. pp. 239.

This is a condensed, comprehensive, and really fascinating discussion of the influence of Mazdaism on European thought. The religion of the Magi, which was the highest blossom of the genius of Iran, at three periods exerted an immense influence on oriental culture. The first was in Parseeism which left a very distinct impression on Judaism in its formative stage. Again, when the Romans conquered Asia Minor colonies of wise men from the region of Babylon moved west, welding their doctrines with those of the Greeks. The superiority of Mithraic religion over

the early forms of oriental faith was at once seen to be great. It was checked only when it came in contact with Christianity. Each then found with amazement very many similarities and their desperate duel was for the dominion of the world. Mithraism perished not only because it was too encumbered with antiquities, but because its liturgy and theology were too Asiatic in color to suit the Latin spirit. For the converse reason the same battle waged in Persia at the same time resulted in the defeat of Christianity. Manichaeism was the third and last assault made by Persia upon the West and the most sanguinary of all. Thus, it appears that Iranian mysteries have at times threatened to almost submerge the Occident and wipe out all Greece and Rome had so laboriously wrought. The Avesta does not give an adequate picture of this faith decked out in all its imagery and liturgy. In an interesting map showing the dissemination of this faith it appears to have been most developed throughout western and southern Germany and in Italy, with some slight representations in Britain, Spain, and even Greece. In Carthage, of course, it thrived, and in general its course of development was westward from its original seat rather than east. Hymns, ceremonials, sacrifices, all symbolic of doctrine, Mithra, the god of help, never invoked in vain, always young and alert, requiring perfect purity, with repeated lustrations to wash away the stains of the soul, resistance to sense being one of the most vivid symbols of the dual conflict between good and evil. The initiates taught a kind of moral astronomy with which a highly developed eschatology was connected and a firm belief in the resurrection of the flesh, a highly elaborated doctrine of sacrifice, and altogether a strange union of polytheistic fable and philosophy, with unsurpassed incitement to prayer and veneration—these constituted the heart of this wondrous cult.

The Religion of the Universe, by J. ALLANSON PICTON. Macmillan & Co., London, 1904. pp. 380.

This ambitious but interesting book discusses faith and paradox, the unknowable as God, revelation, what may be known of God, evil, including pain, death and sin, the everlasting gospel, Christianity, experimental religion, eternal life, worship and the church. His book, instead of being written in the spirit of Herbert Spencer, to whose memory, as the first true reconciler of religion and science, it is dedicated, breathes the spirit of fervid religious life almost like that of the camp meeting. He urges that there is nothing essential in the Methodist experience which the Pantheist may not share. The latter has a wider universe, but his faith is not less. Emotion and sentiment must undergo transformation with that of creeds. Eternal life does not mean personal immortality. Man is not a lonesome mortal god. The divine in him is imperishable in part and whole, but continuous identity is not assured to the part. The soul as finite is only a succession of phenomena. There is no real unity between its activities or between the consciousness of the child and adult, but this unity is only in the manifestation of the everlasting within us. Man is otherwise a dual, multiplex, and merely phenomenal being. There are no individual rights against the universe, even those of justice. The amiable desire for compensation in another world would practically amount to a change of person. Unhealed sorrow is a very exceptional thing in the world, yet we do not wholly die, but meet when we merge in God. As to the church, it should not be abolished but further evolved. As loyalty to the whole of which we are parts, religion demands expression. Pantheism is not inconsistent with prayer, but here, too, we need reconstruction. The tone of pantheistic worship is Wordsworthian. We often can glimpse the infinite even through superstition. The Bible, thus, has worth even in its legends, and yet more valuable are the Psalms and Prophets, and God is the highest. Hence, the meaning and sense of sacraments, too, needs reconstruction in the impending rehabilitation of worship which is now in danger of impoverishing the life of the multitude and committing "frauds against the souls of children." We can never revive the old faith, but by the judicious liberty of prophesying can reinterpret its antiquated forms. The clergy are generally, although with exceptions, not sincere and have a cheap conception of honesty. This has made unreality invade religion so that truth cannot support morals. Thus we need a new cleansing of the temple. Everywhere, however, true spiritual reality survives destructive criticism of alleged outward facts. The appearance of man was not a definite event and brought no change in the laws of the world. The blessedness of perfection lies

not in any reward. There are limits to Christian resignation. The resurrection of Jesus is itself unhistorical, but will remain a telling story. Paul's conversion was a revelation of the subliminal self. He was fascinated with the idea of resurrection which symbolized his own change. Mohammedanism is the most unitarian of all faiths. The essence of the religion of the universe is found in all the great religions, but best in Christianity. Paul's strange transmutations of Pharisaic traditions into a new theology may be abandoned, but not loyalty to Paul's moral teaching. All inspirations tending to evolution are good. The Pantheist, in fine, retains all the spiritual inheritance of Catholic, Anglican or Methodist, and is in accord with the devoutest experimental religion.

The Goal of the Universe; or, The Travail of the World's Saviour. By S. W. KELLE. Elliot Stock, London, 1903. pp. 399.

The religion of the Bible is one of restoration, the central figure of which is the Creator become the Saviour. The restoration began immediately after the fall, but sin could only be removed by a divine act, persuading the will and affecting its recovery to right choices. The chief topics treated are the early promise of the Saviour, the God-man as a fact of history, the incarnation, Jesus' early life and public ministry, and the post-existence of the Son of Man, his descent into Hades, the resurrection, ascension, reign till the day of judgment, the universal extent and spiritual nature of this reign, the millennium, the continued work of the ascended prophet, priest and king; the day of judgment, the restitution of all things, Christ's resignation of the Christocratic Kingdom, and the final goal of the universe—God all-in-all. The author has availed himself, on the whole, but very little of the resources of modern scholarship in this field.

Evidence for a Future Life, by GABRIEL DELANNE. Tr. and ed. by H. A. DALLAS. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904. pp. 264.

This book, translated and condensed from a larger one in French, is sufficiently startling to furnish us with nothing less than a new proof of the immortality of the soul based upon magnetism, the witness of mediums and spirits to the existence of the perispirit, the double, psychic organization after death, spirit photography, primordial matter, materialization, etc. All matter may be in a liquid, gaseous, ethereal, or psychic state. The conclusion of the whole matter is summed up in the following articles: (1) Human beings possess a twofold mode of manifestation: the physical and the psychic body. (2) The latter when separated from the former reproduces the identical appearance of the physical organism. (3) The psychic manifestations are not dependent on the physical body. When the psyche is completely exteriorized the body is quite inert. (4) The apparition can produce various degrees of materialization, from a simple vision to that of a concrete object which walks, talks, and acts upon matter. (5) The ethereal body can be photographed. (6) It can leave impressions on soft substances and in moulds. (7) During earthly life the psychic organism can perceive sensations otherwise than by the physical organs of sense. (8) The psychic organism produces not only the external semblance of the physical body, but the internal also. (9) Death does not destroy the soul, which persists with all its faculties and which possesses an invisible, imponderable organism built upon biological laws as is the physical body.

Über die Letzten Dinge, von OTTO WEININGER. Wilhelm Braumüller, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 183.

Otto Weininger was born April 3, 1880, and died October 4, 1903, by a shot in the breast from his own hand in the room where Beethoven died, where he had spent the night. He was precocious, tall, slender, and as he grew up developed epileptic symptoms. His interests early turned to philosophy and he most admired Kant and Plato. Without being a performer on any instrument he had most extraordinary susceptibility to music and also to nature. The key to his life and death was a unique and intense dualism such as perhaps no modern mind has developed. His view of the world may be roughly sketched as follows: Every man contains something on the one hand of nothing, chaos, devil, and on the other of the all, cosmos or God. The battle between these in the soul gives life all its meaning. Every negative makes possible a corresponding affirmative and every bit of cosmos in the soul involves danger of a corresponding chaos. God incarnated himself in man in order to

become conscious of himself in his battle against nothing. The two chief forms of nothing are crime and insanity over against goodness and wisdom. All knowledge is atonement for guilt. All real self knowledge is a spur to willing the good. Logic and ethics belong together.

More specifically those who feel inclined to insanity are chiefly drawn to problems of logic and epistemology. With the danger of insanity logical matters become problematical and even the simplest thought is doubted. The instinctive certainty and necessity of the sound mind is transformed into a cloud of thought possibilities. Thus, not to be swamped, such minds have to seek and invoke the most general principles. The greater the field of danger the more comprehensive the logical defences. Thus neurasthenics are absorbed in logical and epistemological problems which have no meaning to perfectly sane people. Wherever there is danger knowledge is necessary and this is even truer within than without. With mental instability everything becomes more and more problematic.

Just as thought becomes cloudy for those inclined to mental alienation so the feeling for worth and value is obscured and becomes problematical for the criminal, even the value of life and truth. For those who are not developed criminals but only feel inclinations to evil along with those to good, whose better ego seeks to affirm itself against temptation, the aphorism of which Weininger was most fond, namely, "every true problem is also true guilt," is truest. Where the battle between good and evil is hottest the highest illumination is necessary to prevent the obnubilation of a feeling of worth. Where everything is questioned there everything must be established and the ultimate source of morals sought out. The more darkness the greater light is necessary, so the saint is developed from the criminal or evil man. With base propensities higher ethical demands are made upon the soul, and such a dualist being will see evil where a more normal man does not.

The greater the danger of nothingness the more glorious the being that overcomes it. The greatest men are those who conquer the greatest enemy. Thus, genius is not a form of either insanity or crime, but the completest overcoming of one or the other or both. Perhaps Weininger was influenced by the biological law that toxins stimulate antitoxins which destroy them, and that disease, death or recovery are the expressions of the stages of this conflict. Under this analogy genius would have acquired the greatest degree of immunity for it would have overcome most. Where those predisposed to neuroticism and vice have also the highest moral impulses we can best see this process, and how, if the good wins, either the saint, the genius, or both emerge. One might almost say that as genius is converted lunacy so sainthood is converted criminality.

It is a little more difficult to understand his conception that everything that is interesting has an end in itself, as Kant's categorical and imperative would make conscience, or how he uses the term "functionalism" to answer the question how experience is possible. Functionalism within probably means the laws of consciousness and freedom.

Weininger's biographer states that he was in a high degree inclined to be a criminal, and yet had intense moral strivings. "He knew all evil well" and yet he had intense love of truth and an almost saintly goodness. He could never without pain tread upon grass in a meadow nor have others do so with him. If he gave to a beggar he took off his hat to him that he might not shame him. He wrote shortly before his death that if he conquered it would be the greatest victory that man ever won. His power and also the danger were great and he killed himself because he could no longer withstand, or "in order not to be obliged to kill another." Everything he wrote and did, therefore, he conceived to be a battle against nothing. He was very sensuous in his disposition, and after he had written his book he declared that it meant a sentence of death either to the book or its author. Ethics is never given man freely and good men have a very superficial ethics. Few people came nearer feeling that all evil in the world was his own guilt, or had a deeper conception of the near death of the soul. All pain is guilt, personal or assumed, and he divided men into those who either assumed guilt and suffered or those who threw it upon others. He found it hard to distinguish between hereditary and individual sin.

When his only book expressing these ideas was finished he declared there were three possibilities for him, either the gallows, suicide, or a future so brilliant that

he dared not think of it. The biographer mentions that rather curiously there was at Vienna a partial eclipse of the moon that ended just at the moment his body was put into the earth.

No account of this unique personality is complete without mention of his symbolism. A sunset was the fall into sin; fire meant evil and annihilation; a river the Apollonian and the sea the Dionysian principle. Everything visible was a symbol of an ethic and psychic reality and full of ethical potents like a materialized idea. Animals are all symbols of criminality; plants neurasthenic phenomena. Thus everything visible reveals an invisible metaphysical world, light meaning virtue. The deep sea fauna were incarnations of evil. He did not justify his extreme anthropocentric view, but was content to assume that man is a microcosm and to give fancy free rein to interpret his most extraordinary sensitiveness to all natural phenomena. His dualism, thus, was somewhat different from the modern parallelism, for he was interested only in ethical dualism and most opposed to views like those of Boelsche for whom there is no good and evil arising from deep grounds, but only more or less evolution or causes that favor or hinder it.

Rational Religion, by H. THEODORE KNIGHT. Rivingtons, London, 1903. pp. 287.

This volume reprints addresses, mostly to men, in which the author attempts to exhibit something of the higher criticism. He treats of science in the Bible, miracles, socialism and the Paternoster, and advent doctrines. Death is regarded as a moral condition, judgment as a national fact, hell a spiritual atmosphere, and heaven as a civic reality. The appendixes are devoted to a critical analysis of the Hexateuch, nature and the supernatural, and modern criticism of the New Testament.

System des religiösen Materialismus. I. Wissenschaft der Seele, von H. THODEN VAN VELZEN. O. R. Reisland, Leipzig, 1903. pp. 467.

After discussing the relations of psychology to other sciences the author discusses sense images and their influence, and ideas of feeling and their influence. A curious section is entitled, "Ideas which can be subordinated to consciousness," as distinct from ideas connected with thought and will. In the third part similarities and differences of psychic activities are discussed, and then follow in order: appearances in our activity and their origin, the soul and death. This volume is entitled "Psychology," and it will be interesting to know how these views are connected with religion, the treatment of which is to follow in another work.

Herders Theorie von der Religion und den religiösen Vorstellungen, von RUDOLF WIELANDT. C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, Berlin, 1904. pp. 127.

This brochure is due to the reviving interest in Herder who contained so much that is modern. First his general characteristics are discussed, then the psychological presuppositions of his theory of religion, and then the theory in itself in its various aspects. Especially interesting is the section devoted to Herder's indebtedness to earlier thinkers from Leibnitz down, especially to the English moralists, to Rousseau, Hume, Kant, Semler, De Wette and Schleiermacher. The whole is appropriately published in connection with the anniversary of Herder's death, December 18, 1903.

The Higher Life. A Psychological Study, by MADAME DE MEISSNER. 1904. pp. 40.

This little work is published in behalf of the Red Cross Society of Russia and in memory of the author's son who was a soldier. The author illustrates an interesting and attractive type of mystic piety.

The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, by EDWARD CAIRD. 2nd ed. James Maclehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1893. pp. 210.

The first chapter of this work gives a general account of Comte's philosophy and of his idea of a social system founded on the decay of theology. The second chapter is entitled "The negative side of Comte's philosophy." His view is opposed both to individualism and socialism. It is charged as a defect that Comte was unconscious of the categories that guided his thought. He recognized the need of substitutes for theology and metaphysics. He also found want of harmony between the intellect and the heart and would subject the former to the latter. This, of course, rouses the direct antagonism of thinkers of the Hegelian type, and so Professor Caird involves Comte in many kinds of contradictions, inconsistencies, am-

biguities, inadequacies, impossibilities, shortages here and surplusages there, seeks to show that his best ideas are in real agreement with those of modern metaphysics, etc. Thinkers like Comte and Caird represent almost opposite poles both of position and method. Comte was a genius with amazing insights and one of the most fertile and suggestive minds in the whole history of philosophy. Moreover, he has the great superiority of trying to make his system practical instead of priding himself, like most metaphysicians, in keeping as far aloof from common sense reality as possible. This book of Caird's does not attempt to give us what we so greatly need, a concise and abridged statement of all Comte's salient positions in the phrases of his school. Nor does it attempt any complete or general refutation of the system as a whole, but rather it selects here and there points which seem to collide either with those of Professor Caird or with the author and magnifies the opposition. Is this method and is this kind of book honest? Is it dignified? Does it comport with the new scientific method and spirit now entering this field?

Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History, by ANTONIO LABRIOLA. Tr. by Charles H. Kerr. Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1904. pp. 246.

Feuerbach. The Roots of the Socialist Philosophy, by FREDERICK ENGELS. Tr. with critical introd. by Austin Lewis. Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1903. pp. 133.

Labriola's book anticipates the jubilee of the Communist Manifesto of 1848 which marks the advent of this movement into history. The first part is entitled "The Materialistic Conception of History," and assumes that everywhere civilization is now developing a class antagonism between those who work and produce wealth and those who do not, so that each state comprises two nations in one. The ideals of the former working class of the reign of equality and happiness and the different forms which these ideals have taken in the minds of leading writers of the half century under review are stated. The economic factor of history explains most of it. The rest is largely verbiage and ideology. The conceptions of Engels and Marx that underlie economic structures of the whole need to be supplemented by understanding "those concrete and precise states of mind" which alone can make us really know the plebeians of Rome, the artisans of Florence, the peasants of France, the serf of Russia, and this would constitute social psychology and free us from mere phrase makers. To effect this emancipation is the historic mission of the modern proletariat. The author and his translator, Austin Lewis, agree in regarding Feuerbach's exaltation of humanitarianism as religion as one of the motives of the new socialism. He discovered the material foundations of the religious world and his theory would have led to a bourgeois society instead of to a new associated humanity. He failed to see that religious feeling is itself a product of society.

The Little Book of Life After Death, by GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER. Tr. fr. the German by Mary C. Wadsworth. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1904. pp. 108.

The translation of this weird and charming little book is a matter of congratulation. Fechner left his mark upon the world not only by his work upon the famous psycho-physic law that bears his name, but in literature by certain half humorous, half philosophic essays, of which this is one, published more than half a century ago under the name of Dr. Mises. Here he gives his fancy free scope, somewhat as Plato, not only on myths but philosophy. Here he does not attempt to prove immortality, but assumes it and seeks to make it intelligible by many bold and original analogies. Professor William James writes a brief but characteristically interesting introduction.

Zur Psychologie der vorexilischen Prophetie in Israel, von ROBERT KURTZ. Bruno Feigenspan. pp. 102. Pr. 2m.

The scope of this work may be indicated as follows. First the author outlines the general spiritual life of Israel as seen in its moral and religious status and as represented by the predecessors of the prophets. He next describes the inner development of the latter, how they slowly matured to the consciousness of their calling and of having a revelation; the inner opposition between the prophets and the people and their sense of the purposiveness of their work. Then the religious idea is presented to us in its conflict with the spirit of the people. The popular activity of the prophets and the second legation and the facit prophecy are described.

The Religious Education Association. Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention, Philadelphia, March 2-4, 1904. Executive Office of the Association, Chicago, 1904. pp. 640.

The second meeting of this association was, we know, one of unusual interest. We here have a chance to glimpse the best that the religious leaders of this country think and feel about this great theme and those most nearly connected with it. The addresses are grouped as religious experience, education in the home, the Bible in education, including colleges as well as theological seminaries, churches and pastors, Sunday School, elementary, secondary, private, and normal schools, young people's societies, library, press, correspondence, summer assemblies, religious art and music. On all these topics there are addresses generally by those most competent to speak—addresses, however, probably often somewhat abridged.

Das Mitleid in der neueren Ethik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Fr. Nietzsche, R. Wagner und L. Tolstoi, von WILLY GIESSLER. C. A. Kaemmerer & Co., Halle a. S., 1904. pp. 178.

It seems almost as if the Nietzsche literature had no end. Here we have first a description of the earliest philosophical studies of sympathy and pity by Spinoza, then by Hume, Adam Smith, Montaigne, Helvetius, La Rochefoucauld, Diderot, Rousseau, Wolff, Mendelssohn, Lessing, Kant, Fichte, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Tolstoi, Feuerbach Hartmann, Paulsen, and Wundt.

Naturwissenschaft und Bibel, von LEHMANN-HOHENBERG. Hermann Costenoble, Jena, 1904. pp. 160. Pr. 2m.

These essays are designed to promote the further development of religion, especially in its relations to what the author calls a new art of statesmanship. After describing the culture movements of the day and the Emperor's brief to Admirable Hollmann, the author proceeds to criticise the latter. In later essays he discusses the world riddle and its solution, social politics, the development history of thought in the present social physics, national popular education, and the further development of German law.

Beiträge zur religiösen Psychologie: Psychobiologie und Gefühl. VON G. VORBRÖDT. A. Deichert, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 173.

The motto is "All (also natural science) is yours and you are Christ's." The writer first discusses psychobiology in theology and the eternal life as the centre of Christianity. This has two forms—religious and biological. He then passes to the discussion of the psychology of religious feeling. Its methods are genetic and descriptive. Especially interesting is his account of the *Fides Historica* and of the feeling of assensus and fiducia. The style and, indeed, the content of the book is rambling and incoherent, but it is pervaded by many keen insights.

The Supremacy of Jesus, by JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER. American Antiquarian Association, Boston, 1904. pp. 186.

This volume is incisively written and treats of five topics: the historical position of Jesus; Jesus and Gospel criticism; a new appreciation of Jesus; a master of inner life; the authenticity of Jesus. The author is evidently more thinker than scholar. His suggestive pages often shine with light, but the marvel is that the writer has so often thought his way independently to conclusions that more technical scholars have reached by more exacting and belabored methods, while other results of the latter, which would come precisely in our author's line, are ignored.

The Simple Life, by CHARLES WAGNER. Tr. fr the French by Mary Louise Hendee. McClure, Phillips & Co., New York, 1904. pp. 193.

This charming little book which has been of late given such great prominence and vogue by President Roosevelt is most timely and opportune. Our life is too complex. We need to revert from the mercenary spirit, from notoriety and the inglorious good to simple thoughts, speech, duties, needs, pleasures and beauty. We need this in the life of the home and of the world, in education and in the intercourse of men. All this is here told simply and effectively.

The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the Growth of Religious Consciousness. By EDWIN DILLER STARBUCK, Ph. D. London, 1899. pp. xx-423.

That most conversions occur in early life when the mind is plastic has long been known. Some of the characteristic differences in respect to religious life between childhood, youth, and maturity have also been commonplaces of every day observation. But what particular year or period of years is most favorable to conversion, and why should there be any specially favorable time at all? What common elements exist in religious growth of different types? What place do adolescent religious phenomena in general occupy in the total progress of the child-mind and the child-body toward maturity? These are the chief questions that Starbuck's "*Psychology of Religion*" undertakes to answer, though a multitude of subordinate questions gathers about the study. The aim is the important one of tracing the line of normal religious growth in the individual from infancy to maturity so as to show the actual place of religion among the facts and forces of individual human life. The purpose is wider than to study adolescence as such; adolescence is chosen as the viewpoint because, as the transition-period between infancy and maturity, its facts look in both directions. This breadth of aim, no doubt, gave rise to the exceedingly inclusive title of the work, a title obviously too broad for a book that has nothing to say of the origin, nature, content and relations of the religious consciousness in general.

The data consist of auto-biographical material collected chiefly by means of question-list circulars. Unintentional selection is thus introduced in several ways. Not only are the data confined almost exclusively to American Protestants of the evangelical type, but it is evident that within these churches certain types of mind and of experience would respond to question-circulars touching the inner life much more readily than others. How far these returns may safely be taken as representing universal tendencies is therefore a question of first importance. The author clearly recognizes the fact of selection, yet one may raise the query whether he has given it sufficient weight as a constant in all his material. To this question I shall return after giving an outline of the conclusions of the book. Of the author's industry, ingenuity in the analysis of his returns, and general caution in making deductions therefrom, too much can scarcely be said.

The main thread of the thought is as follows: Conversions occur most frequently between the ages of 10 and 20, but they are distributed very unevenly through this period. The single age of greatest frequency is 16, but the largest volume of conversions of females comes at 12 to 14. At this earlier period there is also a perceptible increase in the conversions of males, and for both sexes the curve rises again at 18 or 19. Here is an obvious correlation of religious experience with mental growth, particularly the decline of sensory elements in consciousness and the rise of rational insight, and also with physiological development. The deep significance of these experiences is further evident from the fact that they arise only partly through external influences; there is a distinct internal propulsion toward them, which manifests itself in a largely spontaneous sense of sin, helplessness, depression; in anxieties, fears, doubts; and they are accompanied by various bodily affections. The deliberate and conscious element is only one of a long series of factors that extends deep into the subliminal region of the mind. In short, adolescent conversions are something more than mere accidents in the growth of the individual.

That we are here dealing, in fact, with a general law of development becomes increasingly clear through the fact that, even in the absence of the abrupt transformation called conversion, religious growth traverses essentially the same path by slower stages, and comes out at the same place. There are periods of increased or lessened religious interest, of doubts, and of the same emotions as those that precede, accompany, and follow conversion; and at these occur periods closely corresponding to those of the conversion type. The organic character of these phenomena is still further revealed by the fact, very interestingly brought out, that the characteristic mental differences of the sexes here come to the surface with great regularity and definiteness.

What then is, essentially, this phenomenon of adolescent religious change, and what law of development does it reveal? The change, whether rapid or slow, is a

kind of un-selfing followed by a re-selfing. It is the sloughing off of the child-self and emergence into a larger and more social world. Physiologically this points to the development of a new set of association fibres, or at least to the rapid maturing of function of some such set. Psychologically it reminds us that there are forces within and without that tend to break the unity and harmony of the child-consciousness, and so to create a demand for the re-integration of a divided self. Many persons do, indeed, grow in religion from childhood to maturity without being aware of any definite transitions, but the author believes, not only that growth does not often come in this way, but that, in the nature of the case, adolescent disturbances of one kind or another are to be expected. He points to the rapidity of the change from childhood to adult life, the complexity of the factors, the discontinuity of physiological growth itself, and the fact that the surrender of self here involved is an essentially painful process.

Looking forward from the adolescent transition to its fruition in adult life, the author finds that, whereas childhood religion is still predominantly an external interest, and in adolescence an internal interest, in maturity it becomes once more objective. Yet not merely that, for maturity brings a clearer realization of religion as a life within. This apparent paradox is solved by the fact that maturity, at the same time that it tends to be objectively ethical and social, tends also to recognize the presence of God in the whole movement of life, external and internal. Hence it is characterized by increased sense of dependence and trust as well as ethical objectivity.

For the sake of emphasizing the central contribution which this treatise makes to genetic psychology and to the science of religion, I omit all reference to a large mass of interesting details and sidelights. This contribution is of decided significance. From Tertullian until now, Christianity, for apologetic purposes, has insisted upon the *anima naturaliter christiana*, but not until now have we realized how completely the religious impulse is intertwined and, so to speak, fused with general physical and mental factors. In a broad way Starbuck has proved the unity of human development in the individual even at the point where such unity has seemed to be contradicted by the presence of cataclysmal outbursts.

Doubts will arise, however, as to the specific filling-in that Starbuck gives to this broad outline. That his method is capable of yielding adequate data as to dates and ages, and probable information as to the general drift of thought and emotion at a particular growth-period, no one need question. But what of the interplay of the mental elements among themselves, the relation of mental to bodily affections, and the relative effectiveness of various external influences? On all such points, question-list returns are far from being authoritative. Even on such points the author has frankly classified his data, in most cases, in accordance with the words of the respondents, thus taking at par value, no one knows how many memory illusions and mistaken self-analyses. At very few points, in my opinion, does this difficulty tend to invalidate the main line of argument, but it renders the author's tables of "motives and forces leading to conversion," "the relative prominence of various mental and bodily affections," and so on, of slight numerical value.

There is still room, moreover, for differences of view as to how far the phenomena of a troubled youth are due to incidental influences rather than to any necessity of mental or physical growth. Larger recognition, it seems to me, might have been given to the effect of modern conditions of life upon the growing organism, and to the force of suggestion contained in the teachings of the church and of the home. Certainly a large part of adolescent 'storm and stress' can be traced unerringly to these two sources. Our city life, our over-loaded school curriculums, the enormously multiplied stimuli of sense, of emotion, and of intellectual interest that fairly bombard the child in our complex civilization put an altogether extraordinary burden upon the growing nervous system. The result is the characteristic nerve-fatigue of adolescence, which I fear we are in danger of attributing to mother nature instead of to preventable conditions. Traditional evangelical teachings regarding sin and salvation, the natural and the spiritual, reason and authority, coming to youth already fatigued with the burdens of modern life, simply interpret the already existing strain in theological terms, and by suggestion evoke religious experiences which, however natural they may be under the circumstances, are not an index of normal development. There is nothing in the evidence to preclude the hypoth-

esis that, under normal conditions, the adolescent transition would be gentle and joyous, like the coming of morning rather than the gathering of clouds. The reasons why biographies of this gentle and joyous kind are so rare in Starbuck's collection are not far to seek. The conditions that lead to mental stresses would have their most marked effect upon suggestible and emotional persons, and these are the ones who are most ready to respond to question-circulars. Further, the very absence of high lights and deep shadows in one's religious life makes that life difficult of description, and tends to prevent one from answering questions.

No doubt, as Starbuck points out, temperamental differences like those just mentioned will always produce contrasts in the religious development of different individuals. From this he infers that religious pedagogy should be plastic, adapting itself to all the chief types of adolescent experience before adolescence arrives. But if some of these types, as I hold, are not so much natural as induced, religious education should, after all, be preventive. If strains and stresses arise, they should be treated as incidental rather than as essential, and the aim should be to promote a continuously joyous development.

The purpose of these remarks concerning the debatable border-line between the normal and the abnormal is not to bring Starbuck's main conclusions into doubt, but rather to free them from misconstructions that tend to obscure their real importance. Of the general soundness of his conclusions there is no reason to doubt. Soon after the two articles out of which the present volume arose were published (See the *American Journal of Psychology*, VIII, 2, and IX, 1), I undertook to test Starbuck's work by gathering new data and submitting them to fresh analysis. In only a few minor points did my results contradict his. On the main questions the correspondence was of the close, sun-clear kind that leaves no room for doubt that one is dealing with a law of nature and not with deciduous circumstances. I believe that any one who will take similar trouble to examine at first hand the facts of personal religious development will conclude that "The Psychology of Religion" has carried out its programme of ascertaining the general line of religious growth from infancy to maturity, together with the chief organic and mental conditions that determine it.

The educational value of such a work is not slight. Indeed, within the seven years since its first publication, it has entered as a conscious factor into the thinking of a large proportion of those who give intelligent attention to the religious training of youths in the churches, Christian associations, and schools. In a few cases the trend of its teachings has been misconstrued. Because Starbuck has shown that conversion occurs as a part of a natural growth, some religionists have inferred that a conversion is to be expected or sought in the case of everybody. What Starbuck proved is that the conversion cases, the gradual growth cases, and those that show development without conscious transitions, all fall under a single principle of development. In general the influence of the book is obviously on the side of a reconstructed method of training, a method that shall replace our present discontinuity by a connected plan which, varying the material to suit the stages of growth, shall wisely anticipate each new stage so as to make the change to it easy and natural. Such a plan cannot be invented; it can only be matured through much observation and experiment. Meantime, the great fact stands out that the period of youth is really beginning to be understood.

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